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A Privacy-Enhancing Framework for Mobile Devices 
Aziz Abdullah Alshehri 
The use of mobile devices in daily life has increased exponentially, leading to them 
occupying many essential aspects of people’s lives, such as replacing credit cards to make 
payments, and for various forms of entertainment and social activities. Therefore, users have 
installed an enormous number of apps. These apps can collect and share a large amount of 
data, such as location data, images, videos, health data, and call logs, which are highly 
valuable and sensitive for users. Consequently, the use of apps raises a variety of privacy 
concerns regarding which app is allowed to access and share; to what degree of granularity, 
and how to manage and limit the disclosure of this data. Accordingly, it is imperative to 
develop and design a holistic solution for enhancing privacy on mobile apps to meet users’ 
privacy preferences.  
The research design in this study involved an attempt to address the problem in a coherent 
and logical way. Therefore, the research involved different phases, starting with identifying 
potential user requirements based on the literature, and then designing a participatory study 
to explore whether the initial requirements and design meet users’ preferences, which in turn 
led to the design of a final artefact. Design science requires the creation of a viable artefact 
for the current problem in the field. Thus, this study reviews the current use of privacy 
technologies and critically analyses the available solutions in order to investigate whether 
these solutions have the capability to meet personal privacy preferences and maximise users’ 
satisfaction. It is evident that most of the prior studies assume the homogeneity of privacy 
preferences across users, yet users’ privacy preferences differ from one user to another in 
the context of how to control and manage their data, prioritisation of information, 
personalised notifications, and levels of knowledge. Moreover, solutions with a user 
interface designed according to the users’ perceptions and based on HCI principles are not 
readily available. Therefore, it is paramount to meet and adopt user’s need and requirements 
to enhance privacy technology for mobile apps.  
A survey of 407 mobile users was undertaken to discover users’ privacy preferences. The 
outcome of the survey shows that it is possible to prioritise information into 10 unique 
profiles. Each profile effectively represents a cluster of likeminded users and captures their 
privacy-related information preferences. The outcomes of the analysis also revealed that 
users differ not only in the context of prioritisation of their information, but also regarding 
design, protection settings, responses, and level of knowledge. This, in turn, emphasises the 
need to develop and design a holistic solution for users, considering all these dimensions.  
As such, the thesis proposes a novel framework for enhancing privacy technology in a 
modular and robust manner that would support such a system in practice. This system 
provides a comprehensive solution that has been developed by considering different 
dimensions, and it includes a personalised response, prioritisation of privacy-related 
information, multilevel privacy controls, and also considers users’ varying levels of 
knowledge. As a result, this approach should enhance users’ privacy awareness and meet 
their needs to protect their privacy. Additionally, the proposed of the system consists of user 
interfaces designed according to the users’ perceptions and based on HCI principles to 
overcome the usability issues without compromising the users’ convenience. Ultimately, the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed approach shows that it is feasible and would 
enhance privacy technology as well as user convenience. This, in turn, would increase trust 
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1.1   Introduction 
The number of unique mobile phone subscribers has increased dramatically over the last few 
years, from 4.4 billion in 2014 to 5.4 billion in 2019, and is anticipated to reach 5.86 billion 
by 2025 (Internet Growth Statistics, 2019). Mobile apps are used in daily life to, for example, 
connect with friends, order food, send money, check emails, and play games. It has also led 
individuals, companies and governments to rely heavily upon on mobile phones for 
accessing and storing financial, medical and business information that is considered is 
sensitive and valuable. Therefore, the enormous amount of private and personal information 
that is stored on mobile technology has increased. Hence, users are becoming increasingly 
concerned about their personal information that is stored by these applications (Anton et al., 
2010), and studies indicate that users can take responsibility if they know how their 
information is being used online (TRUSTe, 2016). 
Regarding privacy control, Brandimarte et al. (2012) found that when users have control 
over their personal information, they are willing to share more. Users are also concerned 
about lack of control over their personal information due to often being unaware of what 
information an application collects about them (Hajli and Lin, 2016). These findings 
highlight the need to provide users with more control over their personal information, which 
in turn would increase trust and encourage them to share more and reduce privacy concerns. 
The problem is further magnified as users are now in possession of an ever-growing number 
of apps that deal in large amounts of data. Furthermore, the Information Commissioner’s 
office indicates that it is undesirable to present a user with large privacy information or a 
large number of requests (CIO, 2013). Therefore, it would be difficult for the average user 
to assert control over such large amounts of data. The problem is exacerbated when it comes 
to privacy-related information preferences where the most current solutions assume that 
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privacy-related information preferences are the same and can be captured by a one-size-fits-
all approach. Whilst, Madden et al. (2013) indicate that users’ privacy-related information 
preferences differ from user to user, there is another dimension to preferences highlighted 
by Wisniewski et al. (2016) regarding existing users’ expertise, which is a key factor in 
educating users so that they can take appropriate privacy protection measures (Wisniewski 
et al., 2016). However, the current solutions and tools still suffer from not accommodating 
novice but expert users. Therefore, there are various aspects of user preferences and desires 
regarding privacy that current solutions and tools are still far from meeting.  
Due to their concerns about privacy protection, most mobile operating systems, such as 
Android and iOS, provide some privacy safeguards for users. However, Kelley et al. (2012) 
found that users struggle to understand the permissions in Android due to the lack of 
usability. Also, several studies have shown that privacy interfaces, whether for iOS or for 
Android, do not provide users with sufficient information or control (Felt et al., 2012; Gerber 
et al., 2016; Kulyk et al., 2016). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) suggests that privacy 
controls need more improvement to protect users’ privacy (Federal Trade Commission, 
2013). The aforementioned studies also indicate that current operating mobile systems suffer 
from several issues related to usability, and reflect an essential connection between usability 
and privacy. 
Accordingly, it is not realistic to assume homogeneous privacy preferences and requirements 
across whole users. Therefore, it is paramount to explore current users’ privacy preferences 
in the context of usability, privacy control, prioritisation information and the level of users’ 
knowledge in order to allow users to dynamically change their preferences and meet their 
needs without overly burdening them. This, in turn, emphasises the need for a holistic 
solution for users, considering all these dimensions on mobile devices. The term “mobile 
device” has been used to convey varying meanings in different contexts, mainly with 
reference to the technology of wireless devices though. Authors across relevant literature 
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appeared to have used the term to mean “mobile phone”. This is, perhaps, because the mobile 
phone is the most common example of a wireless mobile device. Accordingly, this research 
would use the term “mobile device” to refer to “smartphones”. Although the mobile phone 
is the focal point of this study, the research outcome is intended to be applicable to all mobile 
devices. 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
This research builds upon the current use of privacy technologies and the available solutions 
in order to explore whether these solutions have the capability to meet personal privacy 
preferences, enhance privacy technology and maximise user satisfaction.  Key to answering 
this question is to better understand the nature of the technologies and services users utilise, 
in order to develop an understanding of what privacy-related information means for users 
(in terms of its identification and impact), and how best to interact with such information in 
order to inform and react. 
In order to achieve this, the following research objectives have been established: 
 To identify and understand the potential privacy concerns that users have across the 
internet, social media, mobile devices and the internet of things. 
 To review the privacy techniques and solutions available to protect users’ 
information and reduce their concerns across a range of platforms, including 
computers and mobiles.  
 To explore users’ privacy-related information preferences in order to develop a new 
technique to manage and prioritise a large volume of information on mobile devices.  
 To investigate end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards usability in order to 
develop usable and adaptive interfaces that maximise user satisfaction. 
 To develop a novel and holistic framework that will enhance privacy technology on 
mobiles to meet users’ privacy preferences. 
4 
 
 To design mobile privacy awareness interfaces that exemplify the enhanced privacy 
technology framework to better understand how the architecture would work in 
practice.  
 To conduct an evaluation of the aforementioned model to determine its effectiveness.  
1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters and each chapter address the particular objectives 
as follows:  
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem and outlines the overall research objectives and 
the structure of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 provides background information about the concept of privacy and how users 
value it within their technology use. The chapter continues by providing an overview of the 
potential privacy concerns that users have and how they are perceived in different 
applications. 
Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive literature review of current privacy solutions for mobile 
applications, participatory sensing, web applications and social networks. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion on identifying the gap that exists in the literature. 
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the research methodologies, including highlighting the 
philosophical systems and paradigms of scientific research.  It also presents and discusses 
the specific research methodology adopted in this research.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates the design of the initial requirements based on prior studies in order 
to enhance privacy technology and meet users’ privacy preferences. The initial requirements 
have been utilised in the survey to verify and explore the current privacy preferences 
regarding the prioritisation of privacy-related-information and how to manage it. Moving 
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forward, the outcomes of the survey are discussed in this chapter, which in turn involves an 
analysis of how to cluster the entire user population into a number of subgroups. 
Chapter 6 sets out the design of the initial interfaces based on Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI) principles to overcome the usability issues without compromising the users’ 
convenience. The initial interfaces have been used to investigate the end users’ perceptions 
and attitudes towards usability in order to develop usable and adaptive interfaces that 
maximise user satisfaction. 
Chapter 7 builds upon the knowledge resented in Chapters Five and Six to develop a novel 
privacy technology framework that considers current privacy preferences, followed by 
detailed practical architectural specifications designed in a modular and robust manner. The 
chapter then presents Mock-Up interfaces to prove that the concept of the proposed 
framework would work in practice. It also provides a focus group evaluation conducted with 
two separate groups (experts and end-users) in order to investigate users’ acceptance of, and 
satisfaction with, the proposed approach. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions arising from the research, and highlights its 
achievements and limitations. Future research and developments related to this project are 









Chapter Two    





2. Technology and Privacy 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides background information on the concept of privacy and how users 
value it within their technology use. The chapter continues to provide an overview of the 
potential privacy concerns that users have and how they are perceived in mobile 
applications. Therefore, the first section discusses the emergence of privacy in digital 
information and how it is important to protect privacy. The second section proceeds to 
discuss the impact of information technology on user privacy, and the consequences of 
privacy violations on these technologies. Additionally, it presents the potential privacy 
concerns that users have and how they are perceived. The third section explores the 
concept of heterogeneous privacy to highlight and the point that users have different 
privacy concerns and requirements. The final section describes some of the privacy 
safeguards available for users on mobile platforms. 
2.2 Conceptions of Privacy and the Value of Privacy 
The concept of privacy, in general, exists in various topics such as the media, digital data 
communication, and bodily privacy. However, with the increasing collection and storage 
of digital data, information privacy has become a majorly important issue now (Anton et 
al., 2010). Therefore, it is essential to highlight the concept of information privacy and 
how important it is to individuals. From a historical viewpoint, in 1968, Westin defined 
privacy as "the right to select what personal information about me is known to what 
people” (Westin, 1968). Although this concept refers to non-digital data, it can be 
extended to digital information. This definition enhances the concept of autonomy and 
the protection of human rights. Autonomy is a core value of privacy, which allows the 
user to make independent decisions according to his or her ideals (Levin and Abril, 2009). 
Therefore, Laas-Mikko and Sutrop (2012) indicate that the primary task of privacy with 
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respect to the individual is to protect his or her autonomy. Protecting autonomy represents 
the deep need to develop a self-identity and an individual lifestyle (Michelfelder, 2001).  
Regarding the right to control access, Altman (1977) defines privacy as “selective control 
over access to the self”. Moreover, Himma and Tavani (2009) see privacy as “control and 
self-determination over information about oneself and over the access to one’s personal 
affairs”. Similarly, Fuchs shows that privacy is based on human action and users may 
choose to prevent or disclose a lot of information about themselves (Fuchs, 2011). In this 
case, privacy is variable, dynamic, and flexible, depending on individual action and 
choice. Because the concept of privacy is based on individual action, empowering users 
to control their personal information is an important feature. Furthermore, control over 
personal information may be seen as a state that enhances personal growth. 
Subsequently, internet privacy ought to be an integral part of fundamental human rights. 
As such, a number of developed countries have adopted broad laws intended to protect 
individual privacy. For example, in 2016, the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) adopted new legislation on data protection (European Commission, 
2016). The GDPR specifies six data protection principles that everyone must follow when 
collecting, processing and storing personal data. These principles identify the lawful 
purposes for utilising users’ data, as shown in Table 2.1. 
The new law enhances users’ privacy and requires companies to be more transparent, 
provide users control over their personal data, and such data can only be gathered legally 
under strict conditions, for a legitimate purpose (Allen and Overy, 2016). However, as 
technology constantly changes, these laws may not adequately protect users’ privacy. 











collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes;  
Data 
minimisation 
adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they are processed 
Accuracy accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be 
taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate 
Storage 
limitation 
kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes  
Integrity and 
confidentiality 
processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, 
including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing  
Source: (European Commission, 2016) 
Table 2.1: The GDPR data protection principles 
2.3 Mobile Privacy Usage and threats  
The mobile applications collect and process a large amount of data that is really valuable 
and sensitive to users. Therefore, it is imperative to study these aspects, and to explore 
potential privacy concerns and threats. Understanding users’ concerns about their privacy 
would help designers and researchers to develop more effective solutions. Moreover, 
solving privacy concerns will enhance users’ acceptance of the technology. 
A mobile application typically has direct access to different sensor information and a 
variety of private information residing on smartphones, such as device ID, call 
information, location, calendar events and photographs. Amongst the most popular 
platforms are Android and Apple’s iOS. However, Android and iOS are quite different in 
how they manage privacy. The App Store on iOS is a centralised, curated marketplace for 
downloading iPhone applications and it inspects apps in order to check whether the apps 
follow the privacy guidelines of the Apple company or not. While there are several 
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marketplaces for Android users to download applications (Chin et al., 2012). In order to 
protect users’ privacy on Android, Google has included app permissions that allow users 
to selectively grant or restrict permissions for installed apps (Felt, Egelman and Wagner, 
2012). Unfortunately, some permissions on Android may cause potential risks for users. 
For instance, the user has no choice to grant access only to permissions that are related to 
the functionality of the app. The problem is exacerbated when the user is unaware of what 
permissions mean and the lack of information on the risk of permissions confuses the user 
with regard to determining whether to install the app or not (Kraus et al., 2014). Thus, it 
is difficult for an average user to determine what data is at high or low risk. Felt et al. 
(2012) recruited 308 participants from among Android users to answer an online survey 
regarding Android permissions, and they found that only 17% of the participants paid 
attention to permissions during installation, and only a minority of users demonstrated 
both awareness of permission warnings and reasonable rates of comprehension. 
In addition, some apps may contain advertising, especially because advertising on apps 
is an essential revenue source for developers. The apps that contain advertising have an 
embedded specialised code called advertising libraries, or ad libraries, which often require 
permission in order to collect private information such as network connectivity and 
location information (Lin et al., 2014). Pearce et al. (2012) found that 49% of Android 
applications contain at least one advertising library. Advertising libraries over-privileged 
46% of the applications. Moreover, 56% of the applications with advertisements 
requested permission to access the users’ location (34% of all applications) (Pearce et al 
2012). This study indicates that many advertising libraries often request sensitive 
permissions, or permissions not related to the application’s functionality. Therefore, 




Another privacy threat on mobile devices is related to the exposure of information in 
sensors, because modern mobile phones come with a rich set of embedded sensors such 
as an accelerometer, digital compass, gyroscope, GPS, microphone, and camera. Several 
studies have emphasised that there are privacy concerns from personal sensing 
applications (Iachello et al., 2006; Klasnja et al., 2009). One of the concerns is regarding 
accessing the sensor information that can include the recording of intimate discussions, 
photographs of private scenes, or tracking a user’s path and monitoring the locations they 
have visited (Christin et al., 2011). Iachello et al. (2006) examined privacy concerns 
regarding the audio capture of conversation and they found that users were concerned 
with the potential misuse of their recordings by third parties. In addition, Raij et al. (2011) 
focused on the concerns of users whose conversation episodes may be inferred without 
any recording of the audio, such as an innocuous respiration sensor. Furthermore, Klasnja 
et al. (2009) examined privacy concerns when participants are using a physical fitness 
system and found that 42% of the participants had concerns about GPS being recorded 
all-day, every day. Although there are many advantages of using GPS on mobile devices, 
for instance, GPS allows users to search for the nearest restaurants, having one’s location 
constantly sensed can enable an unwanted person to learn where and when a user spends 
their time. Furthermore, users may simply be uncomfortable with others knowing their 
location (Klasnja et al., 2009).   
Moreover, several health applications, such as Hospital Information Systems (HISs), 
Electronic Medical Record (EMR) systems, Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSSs), 
and so on, collect personal information from sensors (Ventola, 2014). Therefore, many 
studies have examined sources of concerns about informational privacy and the 
confidentiality of health-related information. Chin et al. (2012) found that users are less 
willing to perform tasks that involve sensitive data such as health records on their phones 
compared to their laptops, because the users were more concerned with privacy on their 
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phones than on their laptops. Therefore, access to health information by some applications 
without the user’s knowledge could reduce their trust about using these health 
applications. 
Shopping applications also have direct access to sensitive information such as credit card 
number and expiration date, which represent sensitive information for users. Chin et al. 
(2012) interviewed 60 participants and found that smartphone users are concerned that 
using mobile payments could put their financial and personal security at risk. Therefore, 
participants are significantly less willing to make shopping purchases on their 
smartphones than on their laptops. This result highlights that there is a difference between 
users’ behaviour on mobile phones and laptops regarding the privacy issue. Therefore, it 
is important to protect the users’ privacy on these applications in order to increase their 
trust in mobile shopping online. 
When it comes to multimedia content, taking and sharing photographs or videos has 
become easier with mobile devices and high-bandwidth mobile networks. Moreover, 
several studies have shown how multimedia content is sensitive or valuable to users. 
Muslukhov et al. (2012) found that some of the participants consider photographs and 
videos on mobile phones as both sensitive and valuable. Therefore, disclosing this 
information could cause confidentiality to be at risk. Moreover, another study conducted 
by Ben-Asher et al. (2013) surveyed 465 smartphone users and found that multimedia 
was ranked by 60% of the respondents as sensitive, and they fear unauthorised access, 
which will violate their privacy.  
Mobile web browser can access personal information, often referred to in the literature as 
Personally-Identifying Information (PII). PII includes a visitor’s behaviour on a website, 
contact numbers, login credentials and credit card information, which is critically 
important to users. As a result, numerous studies have already highlighted many of the 
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online privacy concerns that have arisen (Chung and Paynter, 2002; Anton, Earp and 
Young, 2010; Zhao, 2015). These concerns include whether personal information can be 
collected by websites without consent, or whether third parties can track a user’s browsing 
activity across a website. With the increase in online shopping, cloud computing and 
social networks, there has been an increase in individuals’ level of concern about 
information (Yaprakli and Unalan, 2017).  
One of the essential concerns of internet users is regarding sharing their information with 
third parties for marketing or other purposes without permission, or even having their 
details published on the Internet (Sipior, Ward and Mendoza, 2011). In order to collect 
users’ data, many websites employ cookies. These are small amounts of information used 
by a website and stored on the user’s computer in order to identify users and capture the 
user’s preferences when using a particular site. As a result, websites may share personal 
information such as gender, age, buying preferences, or even the user’s email address, 
with a third party. Therefore, the GDPR requires each company in the EU to gain explicit 
consent from online users before collecting any personal data (European Commission, 
2016). Despite the fact that obtaining consent has been utilised widely in many 
companies, there many issues still exist, for instance, the collection of personal 
information from social media that is connected to a web page. Ali et al. (2018) have 
shown that some social networking profiles are connected to cookies, allowing the social 
networking profile to know the viewing habits of some users. Moreover, online users may 
be unaware of how to make informed consent, and not fully understand the facts, 
implications and consequences of an action (Politou et al., 2018). Due to these concerns 
regarding using cookies, 27% of online users in the world use an adblocker tool to disable 
all unwanted tracking or delete cookies (Statista, 2018). The outcomes of these studies 
emphasise that the tracking of users’ activities in the browser would raise privacy 
concerns, especially when the users’ profiles can be connected to their identity.  
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Search engines are another tool on the web browser which collect personal information 
about users such as their IP address, cookie-based unique ID, the time of the user’s visit, 
personal interests, search histories, and the links that users choose, through the most 
important tools for finding information like Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft Live Search. 
Arguably, users’ personal information has to be collected and analysed to provide users 
with the relevant result that meets their intention. However, malicious servers may 
intercept and alter search engine requests in order to change the links that appear 
alongside a result. For example, one study found 349 malicious servers that were 
modifying content inflight (Ross and Maltz, 2011). However, intercepting 
communications is prohibited in many countries. For example, the law in the UK, the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), prohibits the interception of 
communication without the user’s knowledge (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Ac, 
2012). 
Due to search engines storing personal data related to a user’s private life, disclosing of 
this information by these applications could cause a serious issue for users. For instance, 
in 2006, twenty million queries made by 658,000 users of the AOL search engine were 
released (Romero-Tris et al., 2015). In 2018, 500,000 users’ accounts were breached in 
Google+  which allowed attackers to access the personal details of users (zdnet, 2018). 
These incidents show that Web Search Engines (WSEs) are not always capable of 
protecting users’ privacy. Arguably, despite these tools having many advantages for 
users, they may pose a privacy threat to users due to storing past searches submitted by 
each user. 
Personal information in online patient health records is another concern for users. For 
instance, one study showed that 100% of patients would like to know and be able to 
control their health information because they are concerned about the sharing of that 
health information (Caine et al., 2015). Moreover, when patients find out that their health 
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data has been revealed to third parties, many feel this violates their privacy. Hence, some 
patients may avoid healthcare or withhold data from physicians due to privacy concerns 
(Appari and Johnson, 2010). This indicates that the patients’ desire for more transparency 
and more privacy control over their health information. 
In general, these studies highlight that users are concerned about a wide range of privacy 
issues regarding the type of information being shared without their knowledge and who 
has access to it. Therefore, this section draws attention to the need to reduce these privacy 
concerns in the web browser.  
Online Social Networks (OSNs) allow users to share personal information, photographs, 
videos, and opinions (Statista, 2016). Therefore, it is important to understand how 
personal information is used on OSNs and how OSNs vary in their levels of privacy.  
Indeed, the personal information that can be stored on OSNs varies from site to site. For 
example, the profile of the user on Twitter contains some personal information such as 
date of birth, current address, and telephone number(s). Whilst some sites such as 
Hobbyearth and LifeKnot encourage users to provide more information about themselves 
such as hobbies, favourite cars or movies and relationship status.  
Numerous privacy risks exist in these networks, such as privacy violations, identity theft, 
fake accounts and sexual harassment (Fire et al., 2013). Some of the threats specifically 
target users’ personal information such as relationship status, date of birth, school name, 
email address, phone number, and even home address. Using personal information allows 
an attacker to create a new account or use the information from employee profiles in order 
to establish trust over time. It has been reported that 1.5 million fake Facebook accounts 
were on sale during February 2010 (Richmond, 2010). Fake accounts can be used for 
different reasons, for example, to spread misinformation and rumours, to attract new 
followers that can later be spammed, or waste an OSNs advertisement customer resources 
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by making them pay for online ad clicks or impressions from or to fake profiles (Cao et 
al., 2012). Many researchers have addressed the risk from the fake account that could be 
spam (Fire, Gilad and Elovici, 2012; Krombholz, Merkl and Weippl, 2012; Yang et al., 
2016). Fire et al. (2012) have presented an algorithm for identifying fake profiles and 
spammers using the social network’s own topological features. They evaluated their 
methods using three directed OSNs - Academia.edu, Anybeat, and Google+ and they 
detected 46%, 33% and 32% of the profiles were considered spammers. The outcomes of 
this study reveal high percentages of fake and spammer profiles across the various social 
networks.   
Another purpose of using fake accounts is that attackers can use the victim’s personal 
information to ask the user’s friends for assistance – typically in the form of transferring 
money to a bank account.  The Sunday Times revealed that Abigail Pickett is one such 
example, where someone in Nigeria had hijacked her account on Facebook and used her 
account to send requests for money to her network of friends on the pretext that she was 
“stranded” (McGinnes 2010). 
Healthcare can use social media to potentially improve health outcomes and interact with 
patients. The social media site QuantiaMD found that 65% of physicians use these sites 
for professional reasons (Ventola, 2014). Therefore, some social media sites may store 
health information about physicians and patients. Patients can connect with each other 
around common problems and share relevant health data using Health Social Networking 
Sites (HSNS). Although many benefits exist from sharing personal health information, 
such as information about diagnosis and treatment, it also presents risks; for instance, 
disclosure may negatively affect relationships, job opportunities, and insurance options 
(van der Velden and El Emam, 2013). Some social networks may send health information 
to third parties without the explicit consent of the information owner. Li indicates from 
an analysis of the end-user license agreement that checkMD websites 
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(http://www.checkMD.com) may disclose users’ personal information to its business 
partners and other third parties (Li, 2013). 
These risks increase when users are children because they are more exposed and 
vulnerable than adults (Fire, Goldschmidt and Elovici, 2013). Therefore, there are also 
threats that intentionally and specifically target younger users of OSNs. For example, an 
Internet predator may pretend to be a friend of an innocent young boy or girl through 
whom he collects personal data. Wolak et al. (2010) found that most victims of Internet-
initiated sex crimes were teenagers (aged 13 to 17). 
Another privacy issue is related to the exposure of multimedia content on OSNs. Users 
may not typically be careful when disclosing and sharing multimedia content, revealing 
a lot of sensitive information. For example, a Microsoft survey noted that 70% of 
recruiters in the US have not accepted candidates due to information, including 
photographs, that they found on the Internet (Stuart J. Johnston, 2010). Users may share 
photographs of houses, concerts, vacations, and so on, which indicates that the house is 
‘open’ to thieves (Ilia et al., 2015). Therefore, some users may be unaware of the 
implications of their actions on social networking sites. 
In addition, most social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, allow users to 
keep others aware of their location at all times, which is not an issue in itself, but this 
information may be misused and could pose many potential threats to users who share 
their locations with a large number of users. Several studies have demonstrated that it can 
be easy to identify a person’s location from a social network (Humphreys, Gill and 
Krishnamurthy, 2010; Mao, Shuai and Kapadia, 2011).  Mao et al. (2011) demonstrated 
that classifiers can be trained to identify Twitter users’ locations in real time. Additionally, 
Humphreys et al. (2010) found that 20% of Twitter tweets examined included information 
on when people were engaging in certain activities, and 12% of the tweets mentioned the 
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person’s location. Although users can derive benefits from sharing where they are in 
public and when, disclosing their location may raise concerns about who has access to 
the location. However, protecting users’ privacy may help them to gain the benefits from 
sharing information through social media while protecting them from unwanted exposure. 
When it comes to the Internet of Things (IoT), the mobile device can create a very smart 
environment using smart devices. Connected with mobile applications enable users to 
control these devices remotely. Some applications of the IoTs require access to sensitive 
information in sensors such as the user’s movements, habits and interactions with other 
people (Rose, Eldridge and Lyman, 2015). For instance, sensor data (e.g., accelerometers 
and gyroscopes) can send data to healthcare systems in order to evaluate and improve gait 
or physical activity levels. Another example is AutoWitness system, which can also track 
location and movement patterns by using sophisticated tracking algorithms (Guha et al., 
2012). These examples demonstrate that some IoT applications can gain access to 
sensitive information related to dietary habits, psychosocial stress, addictive behaviours 
(e.g., drinking), exposure to pollutants, social context, and movement patterns (Raij et al., 
2011). Therefore, IoT applications may reveal sensitive information about users’ daily 
lives. 
Accordingly, some studies have focused on understanding the privacy concerns emerging 
from sensory data, such as location traces, while others studies have focused on new 
privacy concerns that emerge from the disclosure of measurements collected by wearable 
sensors. For instance, AutoSense, an experimental unobtrusive wearable sensor, can be 
worn for weeks in order to collect important information such as electrocardiogram, 
respiration, accelerometer, temperature, and skin conductance data. This information can 
be unique and should not be shared with others due to fear of unknown threats to privacy 
(Raij et al., 2011). 
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One of the particular technologies in IoTs that needs more consideration regarding 
privacy is wearable technologies, as they are among the fastest-growing segment of IoTs 
(Thierer, 2014). According to CCS Insight, the wearables market is set to treble in size 
over the next five years and grow from 84 million units in 2015 to 245 million units in 
2019 (Insight, 2019). However, there are already many types of wearables available, such 
as smartwatches, fitness trackers and eyewear (Nguyen, 2016). The impact of wearable 
technology is evident in many areas such as education, entertainment, and healthcare. 
Wasik (2013) states that the wearables revolution could take shape much faster than the 
mobile revolution that preceded it. 
Moreover, wearable technologies collect and store a large amount of data - they do not 
store only a user’s personal information, but also data on how they live their lives and 
their current location. Consequently, wearable devices will and do store more uniquely 
personal properties than the broader IoTs. Therefore, these technologies raise a variety of 
privacy concerns regarding how the wearable devices collect information about users, 
how long the data be retained for, and who else might have access to that information 
(Jamie Carter, 2014).  
Some wearables devices such as Google Glass and the Narrative clip-on camera allow 
users to automatically take snapshots of their daily activities every 30 seconds (Liu et al., 
2016). Other types of wearable devices such as Butterfleye, Autographer, and CA7CH 
Lightbox, allow users to snap pictures at regular real-time stages (Page, 2015). Because 
these real-time tools and activities collect and store sensitive information, disclosing this 
information may cause the user’s privacy to be at risk. Therefore, others studies have 
highlighted various privacy issues related to surreptitious footage and sound recordings 
that can be sent to the cloud and distributed without the subjects’ knowledge or consent 
using this aspect of the technology (Talebi et al. 2016; Page 2015). Moreover, Motti and 
Caine (2015) found that users have different levels and types of privacy concerns, such 
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as privacy for augmented reality systems and surveillance concerns among Google Glass 
users. They indicate that the variety of concerns about wearable devices depends on the 
type of wearable they use (Motti and Caine 2015). 
In general, prior studies have revealed that mobile phone users have a variety of concerns 
due to the diversity of data stored on these devices, which include (but is not limited to) 
payment information, personal information, patient information and multimedia content. 
The problem is further magnified as users are now in possession of an ever-growing 
number of apps that deal with a rich set of embedded sensors, which in turn increase their 
concerns. 
2.4 Heterogeneous Privacy 
Different studies have highlighted that users’ privacy concerns are varied, for instance, 
Sheehan (2002) found that users with lower levels of education are less concerned about 
their privacy online than users with a higher level of education. Another study 
demonstrated that there is a significant correlation between level of education and privacy 
concerns (Lin et al., 2014). They found that users with higher levels of education are more 
concerned about their privacy. This means that education level could be one of the factors 
that affects users’ privacy preferences.   
In terms of age, one study found that older age groups tend to be more concerned about 
privacy on Facebook than younger users (Kezer et al., 2016). Another study found that 
older teen social media users are significantly more likely to share some types of 
information on their profile than younger teens (Madden et al., 2013). These studies 
indicate that there is relationship between age and concerns over the level of privacy.  
Moreover, it is apparent that the variation in privacy requirements is not only between 
elderly and young users but also exists between those of the same age group.  
21 
 
From a national perspective, Wang et al. (2011) focused on the citizens of three countries 
and explored American, Chinese and Indian social networking site (SNS) users’ privacy. 
They found that American respondents were the most privacy concerned, followed by the 
Chinese and Indian respondents. However, the US sample exhibited the lowest level of 
desire to restrict the visibility of their SNS information to certain people (e.g., co-
workers). The Chinese sample presented higher concerns regarding disclosure of their 
identity on SNS. Another study conducted by Krasnova and Veltri (2010) found that 
German users are often more worried about their privacy than American users because 
German users expect more damage and attribute higher probability to privacy-related 
violations on Facebook, such as the sharing of Facebook information with employers or 
governmental agencies (Krasnova and Veltri, 2010). Therefore, it can be deduced that the 
level of privacy also varies from country to country. Hence, Zhang and Zhao claim that 
it is unrealistic to assume homogeneous privacy requirements across the whole population 
(Zhang, Nan and Zhao, 2007).  
Furthermore, the differences in attitudes towards privacy may be due to differences in the 
data types, as many studies have emphasised that the users’ preferences regarding 
privacy-related information are varied, and the level of privacy for individual users may 
change according to the type of data (Liu, Lin and Sadeh, 2013; Lin et al, 2014; Watson, 
Lipford and Besmer, 2015). Benisch et al. (2011) added another dimension that makes 
privacy preferences different, which is time. They discovered that users’ preferences vary 
with time of day, and day of the week, and they found slightly greater preferences for 
sharing locations during the evening. Apple also added a feature that allows users to share 
their location for a period of time with someone. This feature helps the user to choose a 
specific person to know where he or she is without the need to call and ask (Apple, 2016). 
The aforementioned studies highlight that users have different levels of privacy concerns 
and requirements because factors vary, such as age, level of education, legislation, and 
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country of residence (Alaggan, Gambs and Kermarrec, 2015). Hence, privacy preferences 
are diverse and it cannot be assumed that users have uniform privacy preferences across 
all populations.  
2.5 Current Privacy Control on Mobile Devices 
Due to users’ concerns about the privacy protection related to mobile devices, most 
mobile operating systems such as Android and iOS provide some privacy safeguards for 
users. Android 6.0+ system displays an app requests permission at runtime, rather than at 
install time. In Android 10, Google introduced a new feature of the runtime permission, 
which allows the user to grant access only while the app is in active use as show in Figure 
2.1. However, this option only works the for the location permission. In Android 11, 
Google offers users more fine-grained control over other permissions such as camera and 
microphone access called only this time. When the user selects this option in the dialog, 
the system allow the app to access the data for once time. Next time when the app needs 
similar permission again, it will have to ask for it. 
 
(Android, 2019) 
Figure 2.1: Permissions dialog that Includes only This Time Option 
In order to view and manage all app permissions at once is from the privacy and safety 
options in the settings, where the user can see a list of different categories of permissions, 
along with the number of apps installed that have access to that permission as shown in 
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Figure 2.2. Categories include Body Sensors, Calendar, Camera, Contacts, Location, 
Microphone, Phone, SMS, Storage, and some additional permissions. App permissions 
allow users to block any app permissions of certain apps on an Android mobile device, 
as well as grant permissions that the app is allowed to use. 
 
Figure 2.2: App Permissions in Android 
iOS also allows users to manage their permissions. By default, an app cannot access 
certain user data until the user explicitly grants it. For instance, when the Facebook app 
wants to access the camera to upload pictures, iOS shows a notification to the user to 
allow Facebook to access the camera. Moreover, some iOS apps display a notification 
with a short description citing the purpose of the location access as shown in Figure 2.3. 
In order to show this message, the users need to go to the location services setting to view 
it. This feature is not very useful because the purpose of the location access will not pop-





Figure 2.3: Example Purpose String 
iOS also has privacy settings centre similar to Android settings. However, Egele et al. 
(2011) analysed 1,400 iOS apps and they found that many iOS apps leaked sensitive 
information from a mobile device to third party. This shows that iOS permissions are not 
sufficient to protect users’ privacy because some apps may abuse these privileges. For 
instance, some apps may ask the user for access to their location even though that is not 
related to the functionality of the app. Moreover, privacy control on iOS does not provide 
users with information about who has access to their data. For example, once permissions 
are granted to an app, they may share data such as location, with a third party without 
informing the user. Therefore, privacy control is severely limited.  
Furthermore, Walters (2014) demonstrated that users struggle to understand who has 
access to their data, what use is made of that data, and who has the right of access to the 
information (Walters, 2014). Therefore, prior studies have indicated that privacy control 
on mobile devices are not sufficient to protect the user’s privacy. Due to these concerns, 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has suggested that privacy controls need further 
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improvement to protect consumers’ privacy, and they recommend that companies adhere 
to three primary principles: Privacy by Design, Simplified Consumer Choice and Greater 
Transparency  (Federal Trade Commission, 2013).  
2.6 Conclusion  
Numerous studies have highlighted that users are more concerned about their privacy on 
the Internet, mobile applications, IoTs and social networks.  These concerns include who 
has the right to access their information, when, where, and how it is accessed. In addition, 
users prefer to maintain strict control over the disclosure of their information, which some 
mobile applications provide in one way or another, but to a limited extent. However, some 
users are unaware of those tools and options. In addition, the tools that are provided by 
applications are not sufficient to meet the expectations and needs of users. Another 
finding from the aforementioned studies indicates that the level of the privacy is different 
from user to user because of numerous factors, such as age, level of education and culture. 
Additionally, a single change in context can trigger a change in privacy preferences. 
Therefore, it is essential to find ways of improving privacy options for users, particularly 
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3. Literature Review of mobile device-Related Privacy 
Having established that users have concerns regarding different types of applications on 
a mobile device and that the level of concerns varies from user to user, it is imperative to 
explore the current solutions that can help to protect users’ data and meet their privacy 
preferences, as this should lead to alleviating users’ privacy concerns. Accordingly, this 
chapter presents a comprehensive review of the literature through exploring and 
investigating the literature on current privacy solutions for the mobile device. In recent 
years, many studies have been published on ways of protecting users’ privacy, because 
privacy issues exist wherever personal information or sensitive information is disclosed. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion identifying the gap that exists in the literature. 
3.1 Mobile Applications  
Researchers have proposed many solutions in order to protect the privacy of users. Some 
of these solutions focus on sensing that is used by the mobile device. The majority of 
existing works on sensing rely on centralised servers and often involve cryptography to 
secure and anonymise data to protect the privacy of users. AnonySense is one of the 
participatory sensing systems that aims to anonymise participants’ information (Cornelius 
et al., 2008). This is a comprehensive system for realising pervasive applications based 
on collaborative, opportunistic sensing by personal mobile devices. The system 
opportunistically sends the task to mobile nodes that choose to participate for sensing the 
physical and network environment around them. The mobile device retrieves tasks and 
submits reports through an anonymity preserving protocol. In this case, users cannot be 
identified within a group of users assumed to reside in the same place at the same time. 
This method helps to protect the user from inference attacks aimed at linking reports back 
to that user. For more protection, they designed a second layer that collects user reports 
before submitting them to the campaign administrator. In order to preserve their 
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anonymity, they used group signatures; cryptography schemes that enable users to 
anonymously sign their reports. However, using this anonymity technique in order to 
protect user privacy by hiding any identifying information, can threaten the 
trustworthiness of the system because it permits dishonest users to access the service. 
Moreover, the user should be more aware of the risk of revealing his or her personal 
information to this system. 
Another solution that also uses cryptography to protect the privacy of users is Privacy 
Enhanced Participatory Sensing Infrastructure (PEPSI) (Cristofaro and Soriente, 2013). 
This is a new scheme that has been designed to protect the privacy of both data producers 
(i.e., mobile nodes) and data consumers (i.e., queriers). PEPSI is based in a centralised 
server and has been designed to protect the privacy of queries. These queries are sent to 
the user, who is interested in some specific sensing information. Moreover, PEPSI 
leverages Identity Based Cryptography. In that sense, the queries arrive at the mobile 
nodes in an encrypted form. Then, the client device sends reports of sensed data to the 
service provider, which acts as an intermediary between queriers and mobile nodes. After 
some processing, the service provider delivers the reports to the queriers. However, 
PEPSI hides the reports of sensed data and queries from unconcerned entities, and reports 
and queries are all encrypted. In this case, no entity can learn any information about the 
sensed data reported by mobile nodes. The only entity that is able to decrypt the report is 
the querier. However, PEPSI does not ensure privacy against the network operator before 
forwarding the report to the service provider because this system trusts the network 
operator to remove sensitive data from reports and does not provide users with control 
over their personal data. 
To increase the trustworthiness of the collected data, Kazemi and Shahabi have proposed 
Trustworthy privacy-aware participatory sensing participate (TAPAS) (Kazemi and 
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Shahabi, 2013). This framework collects data from multiple participants to increase the 
validity of the collected data. The more participants that send information to the data 
collection process, the higher the trustworthiness of the collected data is. The system 
allows multiple participants assigned to each DC-point (data collection point). The server 
contains the list of DC-points; therefore, each participant can query the server for the 
locations of close by DC-points. In order to protect the participant’s privacy, instead of 
sending their exact location, participants blur their location in a cloaked area among other 
participants, from which a subset of them (i.e., by utilising the voting mechanism) are 
selected as representatives to send cloaked regions to the server. Consequently, a 
malicious server cannot identify each individual participant by linking his query to the 
query location. 
Other solutions do not rely on a centralised server, such as Privacy Enhancing Protocol 
for PaRticipatory sensing (PEPPeR) (Dimitriou, Krontiris and Sabouri, 2012). The 
PEPPeR system allows queries (mobile nodes) to have access to the data provided by 
participating users without the need to connect to a centralised server. The PEPPeR 
system aims to protect the privacy of queriers, by letting them obtain tokens from the 
service provider in order to have access to the data provided by participating users. The 
queriers can spend the token with any producer (mobile phone user) directly, but before 
that, the producer has to validate the token and then provide the querier with the proper 
amount of requested data. The token reveals no information about either the querier or 
the desire of the querier - the service provider just provides the token to participant. When 
the querier receives the token, the querier can directly contact the mobile user for data 
(producer). After the producer receives the token, the producer directly validates the token 
and then provides the querier with the proper amount of requested data without leaking 
the identity of the querier to the node or to the application owner. In order to know if the 
token has been used before, the producer will contact the witness service to attest to the 
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validity of the token or provide proof that the token has been used before. The final step, 
when the producer is convinced that the token is valid, is for the producer to provide the 
data requested by querier. Consequently, when the querier contacts the service provider, 
the system should not leak any information about the identity of the authorised querier.   
A similar concept is discussed by Boutsis and Kalogeraki (2013). They propose 
LOCation-based middlewAre for TrajEctory databases (LOCATE). The system does not 
necessarily rely on a central server to generate and store data sensing. Instead, LOCATE 
allows users to locally sense and store data. The framework focuses on the participatory 
data that contain locations. There are many transportation applications, such as 
MetroSense and VTrack, which allow users to share their local traffic observations. For 
instance, users may submit queries in the form “Give me the trajectories from location A 
and B in real time”. In this case, all members of the community sense and contribute data 
to the system. The data contains the locations that a user has visited and his or her 
trajectories. The framework provides privacy preservation for participatory sensing 
systems on Android-based devices. Users can store data locally, as well as submit queries 
across the system. The data that is stored on the user’s local database is represented as set 
of the tupules. Each tuple consists of six forms of information: latitude, longitude, time 
stamp, point type and id trajectory. The Id of the trajectory is a unique id from among all 
the tuples from different trajectories. The unique id is produced through a cryptographic 
hash function that utilises the timestamp and the id of the user. In order to preserve the 
privacy, each tuple is separated from its producer (user) because it would be relatively 
easy for an attacker to assemble the trajectories provided for the same id and identify the 
user, including his/her sensitive locations. Additionally, in order to protect the user’s 
sensitive data, the system makes the attacker consider all trajectories as equiprobable to 
containing sensitive data. In this case, the leak of sensitive data is prevented. The 
LOCATE system distributes the user’s data trajectories among multiple user databases, 
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based on the local entropy. Information entropy is a method used to measure how much 
information there is in an event. As a result, all paths are equiprobable to be a sensitive 
location. 
However, although many solutions have been proposed to protect the privacy of users for 
sensing, few of these studies provide users with control over their personal data. Yet it is 
important to empower participants to take control over their personal information because 
the participant is initially only able to choose the granularity at which sensor readings are 
collected and disclosed to end users. In addition, it helps users to improve their awareness 
and make informed decisions to reduce their degree of exposure.  
In contrast, some studies have considered usability issues in participatory sensing. One 
of these studies that focus on usability to increase the user’s awareness in participatory 
sensing applications was conducted by Christin et al. (2013). They designed different 
graphical interfaces that allow users to apply filters, which eliminates the privacy-
sensitive elements of the sensor readings prior to transmission to the application server in 
order to protect their privacy. The study by Christin et al. (2013) aimed to increase user 
awareness about potential privacy risks and display picture-based warnings. These 
warnings allow users to know about potential risks to their privacy, and invite them to 
change their settings or leave them unchanged. Picture-based warnings are inspired by 
pictures on cigarette packets illustrating the risks of smoking. Every warning contains a 
picture and a sentence about the illustrated threat. Figure 3.1 shows the colour code of the 
interface for the description and the continue button. The green colour indicates a coarse-





                                                               Source: Christin et al. (2013)  
Figure 3.1: Example of Privacy Settings  
Figure 3.2 shows some examples of warning sets when publishing pictures online. These 
interfaces provide users with more granularity in order to control the information. Users 
have different levels of controls, which include fine, medium and coarse. For instance, 
when a user wants to change the level of a location, he has three levels: precise location, 
street and city. When a user-selects one of these levels, they have the ability to understand 





Source: Christin et al. (2013) 
Figure 3.2: Users Can Release Location Data at Different Degrees of Granularity 
Similarly, Figure 3.3 shows the warning set when the user shares party pictures depending 
on the selected degree of granularity. It shows the impression that an employer may have 
about employees if they view the picture. On the other hand, when users choose to apply 
the moderate level, it will be difficult to infer the identity of the person.  
 
Source: Christin et al. (2013) 
Figure 3.3:  Users Can Release Pictures at Different Degrees of Granularity  
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The system reveals little information about the user, for example, whether the user is 
solitary or sociable. Another benefit of this proposal is introducing a history view to allow 
users to consult who has accessed their data, when, and to what degree of granularity.  
Figure 3.4 shows that the user’s history can be filtered according to different criteria, such 
as sensor modality, data recipients, or access dates. Viewing history will help users to 
verify whether their current privacy settings correspond to their privacy conceptions or 
not. An evaluation was carried out involving 30 participants, and 70% of participants 
would change their settings after having seen the picture-based warnings (Christin et al., 
2013).  
 
Source: Christin et al. (2013) 
Figure 3.4: History Interface  
However, Christin et al (2013) did not conduct long-term user studies to quantify their 
effects on user behaviour under real-world conditions. Although the proposed solution 
was designed with different graphical interfaces, users could not configure the user 
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interface settings in order to choose the size and the type of warnings. This approach 
empowers users to change the privacy settings, but changing the settings each time may 
become cumbersome for the user. Therefore, it may be difficult for novice users to make 
the right choice. Moreover, the history view in this proposal does not assist the system to 
identify the user’s preferences. Hence, the system allows the user to dynamically change 
their preferences in order to reduce the user burden. 
Most of the current solutions focus on the Android operating system because it is the most 
popular mobile operating system in the world. Taintdroid is one of the most popular 
tainting analysis tools for Android (Enck et al., 2014). It was designed based on a dynamic 
approach, which is executed while a program is in operation in order to detect the 
sensitive data when that sensitive data leaves the system via untrusted applications. The 
system can track the flow of data through four levels: variable, method, message, and file. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the following four levels: 
 
Source: (Enck et al., 2014) 
Figure 3.5:  Four Level Approach  
 Variable-level: in order to track the variables in the application, TaintDroid 
implements variable-level taint tracking within the Dalvik VM interpreter. When 
the system tracks variables, the system will focus on taint markings only for data 
and not code.  
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 Message-level: the message-level uses tracking between applications. The system 
taints on the message instead of the data.  
 Method-level: in this stage, the systems patch the taint propagation on return.  
 File level: the operating system may share sensor data such as the microphone and 
via file. Therefore, the file taints sensor data with the appropriate tag. Hence, the 
four levels can simultaneously track multiple sources of sensitive data. 
The outcomes of the experiments revealed that TaintDroid incurs a runtime overhead of 
less than 14% for a CPU-bound microbenchmark. However, although TaintDroid 
provides users with finer control over the disclosure of their personal information, the 
system assumes that users can correctly configure all the resulting settings. Therefore, 
this approach could impose an undue burden on the user. In addition, they do not examine 
the usability related to the interface displayed to users. 
Balebako et al. (2013) proposed another solution which was built based upon the 
TaintDroid platform to detect the sensitive data that leaves the system via an app. The 
solution aims to improve users’ understanding of potential privacy leakages by designing 
a visualisation interface, which contains columns and cells. The columns show the type 
of data, and the cells in each grid show the number of times the information was sent. 
Figure 3.6 shows that phone ID for the Angry Birds app is red because the number of 
times the information was sent is high. In addition, it provides information about the data 
leaked by all applications over a period of time; this period is configurable by the user. 
The system also provides user notifications in order to notify users the moment that data 
is leaked by using vibration and sound. To evaluate the system, 19 users participated to 
investigate their existing understanding of potential privacy leakages through apps. The 
study shows that thirteen out of 19 participants did not know that data would be shared 
for advertising, and most of them were concerned about sharing data via these game 
applications. However, when looking at the number of the sample size, it shows that the 
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total number of participants is quite small. Additionally, the notification interface informs 
users of each data being sent, which could significantly increase the burden on, and 
frustration of, the user. 
 
Source: (Balebako et al., 2013) 
Figure 3.6: Main Visualisation Screen of Privacy Leaks 
Indeed, the aforementioned studies have proposed solutions to improve users’ 
understanding of potential privacy leakages, but still these solutions suffer from providing 
users with multi-level control over their information. In contrast, AppFence is a system 
that aims to provide users with privacy controls to protect their sensitive resources by 
utilising two level controls: shadowing sensitive data and blocking sensitive data  
(Hornyack et al., 2011). Sometimes users do not want to provide application access to 
sensitive data; therefore, AppFence sends shadow data instead of the actual data. For 
example, when an application requires access to a user’s contacts, AppFence may provide 
application shadow data that contains no contact entries, and contains only those genuine 
entries not considered sensitive by the user, or that contains shadow entries that are 
entirely fictional. Another example is when applications require access to the unique 
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device ID, which is called International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). This is 
frequently used for creating user profiles, and AppFence may send the device ID with a 
device secret and the application name. The second approach for protecting sensitive data 
is blocking sensitive data from being exfiltrated from the device. In order to track the 
sensitive data and prevent information from being transmitted from the data out of the 
device, AppFence utilises the TaintDroid tool, which in turn means that TaintDroid 
helped the researchers to monitor the user’s data. However, when applications have access 
to an empty shadow contact list, AppFence allows the user to prevent information from 
being misappropriated from the sensitive data. Hornyack et al., (2011) evaluated the 
privacy controls for 50 applications from the Android Market which were selected based 
on popular and permission-hungry. The result of the evaluation shows that privacy 
controls reduced the effective permissions of 66% of the 50 applications. However, they 
only focused on four types of sensitive resources: unique device ID, contact list, network 
location and GPS location, and they did not consider a wide range of other data that is 
sensitive and valuable for users such as calendar and call log. Additionally, the system 
does not alert users about how applications use data and whether they will exhibit side 
effects if privacy controls are applied. In order to know whether side effects affect user-
desired functionality, it is necessary to consult users each time. In this case, the system 
may place a high level of burden on users.  
Similarly, the Taming Information Stealing Smartphone Applications (TISSA) provides 
the user with fine-grained control over the disclosure of their personal information, which 
includes four types of personal information: phone identity, location, contacts, and call 
log (Zhou et al., 2011). The fine-grained controls were two levels of control: empty level, 
or bogus level for personal information that may be requested by the app. The advantage 
of this tool is that it is a lightweight runtime system for protecting the user’s private 
information because the implementation has low-performance overheads and requires 
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less than one thousand lines of code. TISSA consists of three main components, where 
the first one is the privacy setting content provider, which contains the current privacy 
settings for untrusted apps on the mobile device. It also provides users with an interface 
in order to query the current privacy settings for an untrusted app (e.g., a location 
manager). The second component is the privacy-setting manager, which allows users to 
manage or update the privacy settings for installed apps. The third component contains 
content providers or services for regulating access for four types of personal information: 
phone identity, location, contacts, and call log. For example, when an app requires access 
to private data, the system will query the privacy settings, and respond to the requests 
according to the current privacy settings for the app. However, the tool does not allow 
users to limit the disclosure of their private information on different multiple levels 
because blocking data or shadow data may not be sufficient for users, as users may desire 
more level of control over locations. Therefore, the approach could not support different 
multi-level privacy controls for users to achieve more flexibility. 
In order to enhance privacy controls, another study proposed DROIDFORCE to enforce 
privacy controls based on a user’s policy (Rasthofer et al., 2014). DROIDFORCE works 
at the application level to target apps with static data flow analysis to identify strategic 
policy enforcement points, whether for a single application or for multiple applications at 
the same time. These policies may depend on the data available only at runtime. However, 
this system does not show how users can better understand these policies to make an 
informed decision. 
Unlike previous studies that simply consider the transmission of private data as privacy 
leakage, AppIntent determines whether transmission is user intended or not because the 
transmission of sensitive data in itself does not necessarily indicate a privacy leakage 
(Yang, 2013). AppIntent was designed to distinguish between user-intended data 
transmission from the user as unintended, and Yang (2013) developed an event-space 
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constraint guided symbolic execution technique. This technique can reduce the event 
search space in symbolic execution for Android apps, which are used to determine the 
right inputs that ready the program to execute. The new symbolic execution technique, 
called event-space constraint guided symbolic execution, for Android apps aims to avoid 
the possibility of the path explosion problem during symbolic execution. The path 
explosion problem occurs when there is a large number or combination of input events. 
The researchers apply statistical analysis first to identify the possible execution paths that 
lead to sensitive data transmission under analysis (such as sending SMS). Then they use 
these paths to generate event-space constraints; these constraints represent all the possible 
event sequences for the given execution paths. Next, guided symbolic execution considers 
only the paths that satisfy the event space constraints. In the final step, they developed a 
dynamic program analysis platform to execute the app driven by the discovered event and 
data inputs. To evaluate usability, three Android experts were invited. During the 
evaluation, AppIntent was introduced to them with less than 15 minutes to examine it. 
Then they were asked to fill in a sheet which in each case should be classified as “user-
intended” or “unintended. The results show that 98 cases match with the design of the 
AppIntent expectations. However, the evaluations should have been conducted with a 
varying number of participants in order to identify the extent of user acceptance of the 
system. Moreover, AppIntent does not analyse data transmissions that are not triggered 
by a sequences of GUI manipulations, as it focuses only on app behaviours activated by 
GUI events. 
Other approaches such as PrivacyGuard (Song, 2015) and AntMonitor (Le et al., 2015)  
analyse the actual network traffic of Android using VPNService API to intercept traffic. 
This approach does not require root permissions and is portable to all devices with 
Android version 4.0 or later. The AntMonitor system consists of three components: an 
Android application, AnyClient, and two server applications, AntServer and LogServ, but 
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PrivacyGuard runs in its entirety on the local device. Figure 3.7 shows how the three 
components: AntClient, AntServer, and LogServer work together. AntClient establishes 
a VPN service on the device to create a virtual (layer-3) TUN interface which receives all 
outgoing traffic that is generated by any application on the device. Then AntClient sends 
the packets to their target hosts. When the host responds, the packets return to AntClient. 
Next, the TUN interface sends the packets to the application. The purpose of the client-
side analyses is to protect users in real time, provide fine privacy control and provide 
ground truth mapping of packets to applications. While the server can be applied to a 
large crowd-sourced dataset. AntServer controls the clients and routes their traffic. 
LogServer works as the central repository to store and analyse all network traffic data and 
does not have to analyse a large amount of live traffic compared to AntServer. Figure 3.7 
also shows that the user can choose which applications are permitted to contribute to the 
data collection. 
 
Source: (Le et al., 2015) 
Figure 3.7: Antmonitor System Overview  
To evaluate the AntMonitor system, Le et al., (2015) recruited nine student volunteers for 
five weeks to use AntClient on their phones. The system collected the packets of the 
applications that the volunteers selected and stored them on LogServer in order to check 
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whether any of the installed applications are sending the personal data out to the Internet. 
They found that 44% and 66% of the users have applications that leak their IMEI and 
Android Device ID respectively. However, they did not show how the average user 
accepts the system. Moreover, both PrivacyGuard and AntMonitor are not easy to use for 
average users because they require a priori knowledge of Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII). For example, the user can add personal information, such as home 
address, ethnicity, gender and age that he wants to protect. When a user inserts the string, 
AntClient inspects every outgoing packet for any of the protected strings, before sending 
it out.  
Another popular mobile operating system, iOS, has privacy controls to protect the privacy 
of the user’s data. PIsOS allows users to protect their personal information in the fine-
grained privacy policy on iOS in order to specify precisely which privileges are assigned 
to an application (Werthmann et al., 2013). PSiOS are completely implemented in one 
shared library. Based on this approach, when the enforcement framework defines the 
policy it will be applied to all applications. One feature of this system is allowing the user 
to define sandboxing for each third-party application without requiring access to the 
application source code. PSiOS was implemented on a number of popular iOS 
applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp, ImageCrop, BatteryLife, LinPack, Satellite 
TV and the Audi App in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. In order to 
prevent the app from accessing private user information, sandboxing profile was defined 
for each app and Werthmann et al., (2013) found that PSiOS successfully prevents access 
to the address book (for Quickscan, Facebook, and Whatsapp), to personal photos (for 
ImageCrop and Instagram), and to the iOS universal unique identifier, short UUID (for 
Quickscan, BatterLife, Flashlight, MusicDownloader, MyVideo, NewYork, and Audi). 
The outcomes indicate that PSiOS effectively prevents privacy breaches. However, the 
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framework does not show how the user can understand these policies to make informed 
decision information about good privacy practices.  
ProtectMyPrivacy (PMP) is another solution that detects privacy leaks on iOS 
applications (Agarwal and Hall, 2012). It provides users with fine-grained privacy for 
each app in order to send anonymised data instead of privacy-sensitive information. The 
type of data that PMP protects is a unique device identifier (UDID), IMEI, Wi-Fi MAC 
and Bluetooth MAC. Another private data type that PMP protects is the user’s address 
book, which includes names, addresses, phone numbers and emails, because some apps 
upload this information to a server without the user’s permission. When the app wants to 
access the private data, PMP allows the user to deny or allow the app to access private 
data in real-time. Hence, PMP provides the user with two options to protect his address 
book: the user can allow the app to access his or her address book, or allow PMP to send 
an alternative address book, filled with fictitious entries (names, emails and phone 
numbers). Additionally, they have developed a crowdsourcing system to help the user to 
make informed decisions, which provides app-specific privacy recommendations. The 
PMP Server collects the protection decisions from users in order to generate 
recommendations for those users. There are three conditions for collecting protection 
decisions: 
 The system does not generate recommendations unless there are more than five 
users who make the protection decisions for each app. 
 The system considers decisions from only active users of an app (used for more 
than a week).  
 PMP Server collects decisions only from users who have made decisions for a 
minimum number of other apps (n > 10 apps).  
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Figure 3.8 shows what type of recommendations are available. However, the user has a 
choice to use recommendations for this particular app or not. If the user chooses not to 
use the recommendations, and recommendations are available for the app, the system 
prompts the user to check if he would like to use them, as shown in Figure 3.8. If no 
recommendation is available, then the system provides the user two options: protect or 
allow. Figure 3.8 shows stars for what is recommended, and displays whether one of the 
privacy-protected features has not been accessed yet, which are the automatic 
recommendations.  
 
Source: (Agarwal and Hall, 2012) 
Figure 3.8: Pop-Up Showing That a Recommendation is Available  
To evaluate user acceptance, the PMP has been in use for over nine months and has been 
used by 90,621 real users, and Agarwal and Hall (2012) found that 48.4% of apps used 
the access permission to the device identifier, 13.2% location, 6.2% address book, and 
1.6% music library. The strength of this experiment is the fact that it was based on a large 
number of real users’ data. Moreover, the users accepted the majority of 
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recommendations (67.1%), which means that the recommendations were helping them to 
make informed privacy choices. However, the system only deals with mere access to 
private data, but does not address privacy once the data leaves the app. Moreover, the 
system does not provide each user with personalised recommendations because each user 
has their own privacy preferences. Therefore, it would be helpful to take account of the 
user’s profile when the system generates recommendations, in order to make a more 
personal recommendation. 
Other researchers have proposed approaches that do not rely on one operating system but 
can run on different mobile systems. Nadkarni and Enck (2013) have proposed Aquifer 
as a policy framework in modern operating systems such as Android, iOS, and Windows 
8, which performs two types of restrictions that protect the entire User Interface (UI) 
workflow, define the user task, and ensure only specific apps can export the data to the 
host. Aquifer provides each application with control over sensitive data, and can therefore 
contribute towards the security restrictions. However, Aquifer does not show users the 
privacy policy of an application. Additionally, it does not provide users with 
comprehensive tracking of the sensitive data because it just focuses on the UI workflow 
that sends data to another application. 
Labyrinth  also supports both Android and iOS to detect access to private data by using a 
privacy enforcement system that automatically detects the leakage of private data 
originating from standard and application-specific sources (Pistoia et al., 2015). It 
contains a Packet Analyser that collects all the data applications that are sent to any 




Source: (Pistoia et al, 2015) 
Figure 3.9:  Architecture of the Labyrinth System  
When the data is collected, the Packet Analyser detects whether private data has been sent 
in the clear. Then the system will terminate any unauthorised communication of private 
data in the clear between the client and the server via the proxy interface. Moreover, 
Labyrinth is equipped with an integrated Visual Configuration Framework in order to 
identify the private information that Labyrinth should protect. Therefore, when an 
application accesses the private information via user input or through standard libraries, 
Labyrinth compares the data that is collected at run time by the Packet Analyser along 
with the data that is collected by the instrumentation layer. If a match is found, a 
confidentiality warning is reported. Regarding visually configuring, it is directly atop the 
application’s UI and it does not require operating-system instrumentation. Figure 3.10 
shows the visual configuration of environment specific features to track at run time on 
the iOS platform. In order to improve the usability of the security administration of a 
mobile application, the visual configuration provides users with the type of data that may 
leak from the application at run time. However, it may not be feasible to notify users of 
each leak from the application at run time. Moreover, constant notifications for each leak 
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from the application may affect the user’s acceptance of the system. Additionally, 
configuring the privacy policy each time may place a high level of burden on users. It 
would be helpful to take account of users’ choices, in order to create a more personal 
policy.  
 
Source: (Pistoia et al., 2015) 
Figure 3.10: Visual Security Configuration on iOS  
Several techniques, methods and solutions have been proposed to preserve privacy when 
users are surfing the web browser. Privacy Bird was an early browser privacy add-on that 
showed coloured icons and played bird sounds to notify users whether a website’s privacy 
policy matched their preference settings (Cranor et al., 2006). This tool helps user to 
understand the policy by keeping only the relevant elements of P3P (Consortium, 2002), 
removing jargon, and grouping items based on the user’s preferences rather than on a P3P 
structure. Users can see the bird icon with a song bubble in the title bar at the top right-
hand corner of the Internet Explorer browser window. When a website has P3P enabled 
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and its privacy policy matches a user’s privacy preferences, in this case, the bird changes 
colour and the contents of the song bubble.  
However, users who want to protect all personal information such as health information, 
may not find many companies that provide users with sufficient P3P policy for some 
protection against sensitive information.     
Takano et al. (2014) proposed the MindYourPrivacy system to help online users to know 
which companies are collecting their web browser history. It captures users’ Web 
browsing traffic at gateways and analyses packets that contain HTTP and other traffic.  In 
order to evaluate the usability and effectiveness of the proposed system, Takano et al. 
(2014)  conducted two experiments: user traffic analysis and questionnaire-based use 
analysis for 129 participants; most of them were either IT specialists or IT students. The 
MindYourPrivacy system collects all the user’s network traffic, including cookie and ad 
sites. The outcomes of the traffic analysing revealed interesting results regarding the top-
five most-referred sites, which include GoogleAnalytics, Facebook, Twitter, Google+, 
and DoubleClick. GoogleAnalytics has the largest number of incoming links, which 
equals to 847. Regarding the Ad sites generally, they tend to collect user information for 
marketing purposes. However, the questionnaire-based user study showed that 
visualisation of Web tracking would help users to understand online privacy, whilst other 
participants are not concerned about their online privacy, which in turn emphasises that 
users’ privacy requirements are various and this variation should be considered during 
the design stage.   
Dhawan and Ganapathy (2009) examined the Sabre system to monitor JavaScript 
execution on runtime. They monitored sensitive resources and low-sensitivity sinks. Each 
JavaScript object is associated one label in the browser. When Sabre detects that objects 
contain sensitive data, the system will label this data differently. Sabre monitors all 
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JavaScript code executed by the browser. In addition, it monitors code on web 
applications, JSEs, as well as JavaScript code executed by the browser core. In order to 
monitor the codes, Dhawan and Ganapathy (2009) modified SpiderMonkey, the 
JavaScript interpreter in Firefox, to include security labels. The system will raise the alert 
when an object has sensitive data that is accessed in an untrusted way. However, the level 
of monitoring is too restrictive and can disable some useful and normal extensions. 
Additionally, this system only focuses on the information that is on an extension web and 
does not support a model to measure the users’ privacy risk when users are browsing the 
Web.  
Another approach is to modify the JavaScript interpreter and implement finer-grained 
enforcement mechanisms such as JSFlow (Hedin et al., 2014). JSFlow is a tool for 
securing information flow in the browser and provides a practical mechanism for fine-
grained enforcement of secure information flow for JavaScript to ensure that the 
information does not leave the browser, or is not sent to a third party. The monitor will 
interrupt the execution of the program if a forbidden flow is detected. When the monitor 
detects that the information-flow policy is being violated, the tool can respond using one 
of these ways: simply logging the leak, silently blocking offensive HTTP requests, or 
stopping script execution altogether. The interpreter is implemented in JavaScript and 
keeps track of the security labels where each value is labelled with a security label 
representing the confidentiality of the value. JSFlow supports different information-flow 
policies, including tracking of user input and preventing it from leaving the browser. 
However, this approach requires implementing a new JavaScript interpreter. Moreover, 
this approach may be too restrictive because JSFlow tracks every instruction in the 
JavaScript engine and this is not efficient.  
Liu et al. (2015) also proposed a solution for monitoring sensitive data, but they used a 
different technique to monitor the data, which is from network traffic. It automatically 
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detects personal information that is collected by services accessed via web browsers in 
network traffic. From Layer-7 flows of user traffic, the PI of users is extracted from HTTP 
requests, assuming that it is transferred in the form of key-value pairs. Liu et al. (2015) 
combined a key name with the name of the domain associated with the request. The 
purpose of using this method is that key names will potentially be used for the same type 
of information within the same domain. For example, google.com may use the keyword 
“gender” to collect user’s gender regardless of the specific Google service. In contrast, 
the same key will likely be used in the context of different domains with different 
meanings. For example, the key id may be used differently by Google and Facebook. The 
domain is extracted from the Host HTTP header, and extracted keys (and values) from 
three locations: (a) the query string of HTTP GET requests, (b) the query string in the 
Referer HTTP header, and (c) the Cookie HTTP header. Next, all of the domain-key 
combinations in a group are labelled PI “containers" in order to know if threshold subsets 
of them are found. The subset of PI containers are identified through a list of seed rules 
manually crafted to locate the PI of different types. The evaluation resulted in a large-
scale traffic trace collected on the network of a residential service provider, and shows 
the technique is able to identify the rare domain keys that serve as containers for PI with 
low false negatives (2.7%) and acceptable false positives (13.6%). However, this 
approach does not distinguish between the PI the user has intentionally shared and others, 
although that is not because the transmission of the PI in itself does not necessarily 
indicate a privacy leakage. Additionally, the study does not demonstrate how to enhance 
the user’s awareness about the PI that is collected from user when he accesses online 
services. Therefore, it is important to enhance user awareness and user empowerment in 
order to allow them to distinguish between the PI the user has intentionally shared and 




In context, enhancing users’ privacy awareness only blocks tracking sensitive data, which 
may not be sufficient to preserve the privacy of web users. Hence, Starov and Nikiforakis. 
(2018) designed PrivacyMeter, which aims to inform users about the privacy 
consequences of visiting certain websites. The tool provides the user with the privacy 
score of any website that they visit. The score is calculated based on different factors such 
as the reputation of trackers, the amount of third-party content, or the presence of insecure 
“leaky” web forms. Moreover, it also provides users with contextual notifications 
regarding tracking for instance, “many aggressive trackers”, or “many inputs are 
submitted to third parties”. In order to improve the design of the notifications, they used 
the traffic light colours method to inform the user about the privacy risks, where green is 
used as “safe”, yellow as “potentially dangerous”, and red as “dangerous”. To meet users’ 
preferences, the tool allows users to change the score calculation settings to better reflect 
their privacy preferences. In terms of evaluation, however, Starov and Nikiforakis, (2018) 
did not conduct user studies to explore users’ perceptions towards the tool and evaluate 
how easy it is to use and understand the output of PrivacyMeter. 
Hamed and Ayed (2015) proposed another approach that utilised privacy scoring in order 
to enhance users’ awareness. It aimed to measure the users’ privacy risk when they are 
browsing the Web. Two versions of a Firefox add-on were developed - one for the desktop 
and another one for the android version. Although this tool showed a message containing 
information about privacy, these messages contain too much information, which may 
make it difficult for the user to understand the privacy risks. Moreover, in context of the 
usability issue, the tool also does not help the users to know the level of risk or distinguish 
between a high level of risk and low risk.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated that users have different privacy concerns regarding social 
networks due to the networks collecting and storing a large amount of personal 
information such as name, age, gender, profession, location, hobbies and multimedia, 
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which could be used for privacy violations, identity theft, fake accounts and sexual 
harassment. Therefore, many companies seek to protect users’ information in these 
networks, for instance Trend Micro offers a free tool called "Privacy Scanner" (Trend 
Micro, 2015), which has been designed to increase privacy issues surrounding the use of 
social networks. It is an Android application that checks Facebook, Twitter, and Google+ 
settings for privacy risks, and can help the user to ensure that his personal information 
stays private. Another tool that was developed by the company is ZoneAlarm Privacy 
Scan (ZoneAlarm, 2015). It automatically evaluates the posts that users have created over 
the last month and the posts in which users are tagged. However, these tools are not 
sufficient to help users to protect their information on social networks. Therefore, a 
number of solutions have been proposed in order to overcome the shortcomings in these 
tools and meet users’ preferences.  
The C4PS privacy interface is one of the solutions that was introduced by Paul et al. 
(2012), which utlises a colour- coding scheme for making privacy settings more usable. 
The C4PS tool marks each attribute on the user’s profile with a particular colour, based 
on the group of people who have access to this attribute. This approach applies four colour 
schemes for different groups of users: red – visible to nobody; blue – visible to selected 
friends; yellow – visible to all friends; and green – visible to everyone. This allows the 
user to change the privacy settings for any attribute by clicking on the edge on the right 
side, as shown in Figure 3.11. The right side on the edge contains three colours: green, 
blue and red. When the user chooses the green colour, it indicates that the user has allowed 
anyone to see the private information. For example, in Figure 3.11, the user chose the 
green colour for his birthday attribute to allow anyone to see it. Moreover, the tool allows 
the user to check and modify the privacy settings for photograph albums with the same 
colour mechanism. When the user visits his photographs on Facebook, three coloured 
buttons are shown on every item and this allows the user to change the privacy setting, as 
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described previously. However, the tool is not implemented for posts to other users’ walls, 
and does not help the user to know the consequences of applied authorisation changes. 
 
Source: (Paul et al., 2012) 
Figure 3.11: Colour Coding for One Attribute – Birthday  
Toubiana et al. (2012) designed a system to allow users to apply their tagging preferences 
automatically when a picture is taken. Users may not want to have a link between their 
identity and pictures without being able to modify them or control who accesses them. To 
solve the problem, the system allows users to declare their tagging preferences directly 
when the picture is taken, by enforcing users tagging preferences without revealing their 
identity. The following steps demonstrate more regarding how the system works: 
 First, when a user takes a picture, the camera gets the "Tagging Profile" TP of 
every person present in the area and fetches their profile pictures and preferences. 
 Second, the Photo-Tagging Preference Enforcement (Photo-TaPE) will recognise 
these faces.  
 Third, when user takes a new picture, Photo-TaPE first extracts every face on the 
picture. When the faces match with the faces that are already stored in the local 
Gallery, Photo-TaPE retrieves the tagging preference of the person pictured.  
 Fourth, Photo-TaPE applies a filter matching its owner’s preference (“blur”, 
“tag”, “send by e-mail”) for each matched face.   
 Finally, the picture that Photo-TaPE delivers to the end users is a photograph 
respecting the preferences of every pictured person.  
However, the system allows location services to inform Photo-TaPE of their presence and 
to disclose their location to other users in the same area. Disclosing personal location will 
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raise a large number of privacy issues related to the collection, retention, use, and 
disclosure of location information. 
Squicciarini et al. (2009) discuss collaborative privacy management in a game-theoretical 
approach for collaborative sharing and control of images on a social network. They 
classified users based on their relationship as viewers, originators and owners. Viewers 
means users who are authorised to access the data, whilst users who post data on a given 
profile were defined as originator.  Users who share ownership privileges with the 
originator were defined as the owners. This approach considers the access control policies 
of content that is co-owned by multiple users in an OSN. Each co-owner can select his or 
her own privacy preference for the shared content. The system helps the user to have 
control over the sharing of pictures, with automatic detection of pictures’ co-owners based 
on id-tags, and collective privacy policies enforcement over shared pictures based on 
auctions. Game theory was applied to evaluate the scheme. However, the solution has 
usability issues because it is hard for the average user to understand the Clarke-Tax 
mechanism and specify appropriate bid values for auctions.  
Faresi et al. (2014) focused in their research on a specific type of social network: a health 
social network (HSN). They examined how to protect users from other social networks 
because it is possible that members of an HSN are also members of other social networks 
such as Facebook and Twitter, which are virtual communities that allow members to 
connect with friends, family, and co-workers. They proposed a method for constructing 
a re-identification risk model using a probabilistic network. The purpose of the method is 
to know the risk from the re-identification of HSN members. Bayesian networks were 
used to identify the strength of the links between two networks when the user of these 
networks reuses their pseudonyms between these social networks. However, they did not 
apply the solution over a broad range of social network.  
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Some of the aforementioned studies can assist OSN users in improving their privacy 
settings, but users may forget to “lock their door,” and consequently they may leak 
sensitive information about themselves. Hence, Squicciarini et al. (2013) proposed 
Privacy Manager PriMa, which supports the semi-automated generation of access rules 
in order to protect the user’s privacy settings. A Multi criteria algorithm was utilised for 
generating access control rules from a user’s profile, which focused on two factors: user’s 
preference and the consequences of the disclosure of sensitive information. However, 
when the user changes his or her own preferences on a social network, the access control 
rules are updated to suggest these rules to the user, and the user to make their own decision 
about whether to accept these rules or reject them. In order to generate access rules, PriMa 
identifies each type of the information on the user’s profile as a finite set of traits; for 
example, the user’s age on their profile, a comment or status update, or a social 
relationship. Regarding the privacy control, PriMa provides the user with a fine grained 
approach to specify his or her privacy preferences for each individual trait, or the user can 
choose a general access rule. Therefore, users can specify who has access to the 
information, and these preferences are eventually translated into quantitative metrics for 
computation purposes. Then the system can automatically identify who can safely access 
the trait according to this coarse-grained indication. However, Squicciarini et al. (2013)  
only evaluated their solution on Facebook, where Facebook’s relationships between 
members are always bidirectional, which means both members are required to consent in 
order to connect; while some social networks such as Twitter do not require consent from 
both members. Furthermore, they have not addressed usability aspects or investigated the 
acceptability of the access rules generated by this solution. 
Numerous studies have already highlighted many of the privacy issues related to user 
profiles, settings and control access. However, a few researchers have focused on the core 
of the shared information - the multimedia content. Ilia et al. (2015) explored the privacy 
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issues related to the exposure of photograph content on OSNs. They proposed an 
approach that can effectively handle the problem by changing the granularity of the access 
control mechanism for photo-sharing services that enforces the visibility of each user’s 
face based on their respective access control lists. The approach allows an OSN to express 
and enforce every user’s privacy setting within an image, even if the user’s settings are 
restrictive or permissive. The system relies on face recognition to detect the faces of 
known users, which become objects in the access control model. Each user’s face is 
automatically restricted based on the privacy settings of the specific user and not the 
content publisher. To evaluate the system, Ilia et al. (2015) used 34 participants. Each 
participant was shown a set of randomly selected photos of their contacts, with one friend 
“hidden” in each photo, and they were requested to identify the hidden friend. The result 
shows that the system effectively prevented users from identifying their contacts in 
87.35% of the restricted photos. Although this approach presents a significant solution to 
preventing unwanted individuals from recognising users in photographs, the approach 
could have been extended to protect other sensitive information such as video and voice. 
Moreover, the user’s identity might be inferred from other information and not just the 
photograph, such as the title of photographs and the comments. In addition, there are 
many more types of information that are embedded in photographs that need to be 
protected, for instance, ample metadata information when the photograph is created, and 
GPS coordinates. 
3.2  Discussion  
Numerous studies have been reviewed and investigated in this chapter in order to 
understand the current state-of-the-art of privacy methods, including both the problems 
and available solutions. The majority of existing studies have focussed only on the 
technical aspect to protect the privacy of users, especially how to monitor user data in 
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real-time. Some of the tools detect the sensitive data from the application level such as 
TaintDroid whilst others detect the data from the network level as shown in Table 3.1. 
Hence, the prior studies have shown that it is possible to monitor sensitive information 






Christin et al. (2013) Coarse, 
moderate, 
fine 
--- Picture-based   
Enck et al. (2014) Off/on Dynamic  Policy  
Balebako et al. (2013) Off/on Dynamic  Quantification  
Hornyack et al. (2011) Shadow, 
block  
Dynamic    
Zhou et al. (2011) Empty level, 
bogus level 
Dynamic    
Le et al. (2015) Off/on Network    
Song (2015) Off/on Network    
Lin et al.  (2015) ---- Dynamic   
Werthmann et al. (2013) Off/on Network   Hierarchical clustering 
Bal et al. (2015)  Dynamic  Risk impact  
Egele et al. (2011)  Static    
Agarwal et al. (2012) Off/on Dynamic  Crowdsourcing  
Nadkarni et al. (2013) ---    
Pistoia et al. (2015) Off/on Network  visually based  
Rasthofer et al. (2014)  Static    
Paul et al. (2012) Off/on  Colour based  
Liu et al. (2013) Off/on Dynamic  K-means 
Table 3.1: A review of prior studies approaches and solutions 
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However, the monitoring solutions that were proposed by these studies suffer from 
holistic monitoring of data, where most of these solutions only capture little pieces of data 
specifically, despite the increasing and rapidly diversifying characteristics of mobile data.  
When it comes to privacy controls, most current privacy solutions support only binary 
and static privacy control approaches. Such approaches provide the user with two options 
- “allow” or “deny” - an application’s access to their private information. To overcome 
this limitation, a few studies such as TISSA provide users with empty or bogus options 
for personal information, whilst AppFence sends shadow data instead of the actual data. 
However, these approaches do not consider more flexible multi-level privacy controls to 
allow users to limit the disclosure of their private information on multiple levels, and do 
not take factors such as the level of user knowledge into account. It is paramount to 
consider the user’s knowledge because providing novice users with multi-level privacy 
controls may not help them to make an informed decision and may confuse them. Figure 
3.12 shows a summary of the main solution approaches. Most solution approaches often 
assumed that users have uniform privacy requirements. Thus, current research approaches 
to privacy are usually fundamentally static in nature.  
In contrast, personal information is dynamic because privacy preferences diverge from 
time to time. For instance, some users are willing to share their location for a period of 
time with some groups, such as close friends, family, Facebook friends and friends at 
work. Another example is that some users may share their location during certain hours 
of the day or days of the week. Therefore, there are a number of critical dimensions to 




Figure 3.12: The main solution approaches 
Another dimension that has not been considered by the current solutions is privacy 
preferences related to users’ information where most of the approaches assume that users 
have uniform privacy concerns across all their data. Whilst some users may be concerned 
about some categories of apps such as social networks, they may not be concerned about 
others. This further indicates that prioritisation of a user’s information differs from user 
to user.  
However, a few studies have sought to measure the user’s privacy risk when they use 
applications. In order to achieve that, they have implemented a variety of different 
methods, for instance, some have used the scoring method to identify the level of the 
privacy risk. However: Firstly, it is very difficult to quantify and measure the privacy 
level without returning to the user because this method only relies on the machine to 
calculate the level of the risk. Secondly, a user’s preferences may change over time which 
indicates that it is difficult to use a static approach to protect users’ privacy. In addition, 




























the prior art has not presented a holistic assessment, but rather focuses on one aspect of 
privacy such as web and mobile applications. This makes privacy measurements more 
challenging. Moreover, some approaches allow users to know the potential risk to their 
privacy and invite them to change their settings, such as Boutsis and Kalogeraki. (2013), 
Zhou et al. (2011) and  Irvine et al. (2015). Despite these solutions providing users with 
settings to change the level of privacy, inviting users to change the level of privacy each 
time for each piece of data could place a burden on users, and could have a negative effect 
on the initial adoption of these solutions. 
From a usability perspective, a few studies related to privacy focus on usability issues in 
order to increase user awareness. An interesting study conducted by Christin et al. (2013) 
aimed to increase user awareness about potential privacy risks and display picture-based 
warnings. Another benefit of this proposal is introducing a history view to allow users to 
know who has accessed their data, when, and to what degree of granularity. Paul et al. 
(2012) introduced the C4PS privacy interface, which uses a colour-coding scheme for 
making privacy settings more usable. However, the current approaches present the same 
content of the interface to all users. Therefore, current approaches have involved 
designing static user interfaces for all types of users, and they have not considered the 
level of users’ knowledge during the design in term of how users understand the interface. 
Some users may want to know more information about the potential privacy risks and 
more control, while others may not want to.  
Regarding the notification method, the most prevalent method for privacy alerts is to 
inform users about each potential single data leakage, but this method may significantly 
increase the burden on, and frustration of, the user. Additionally, they have not helped 
users to understand the consequences of the disclosure of sensitive information, which in 
turn would increase users’ knowledge and help them to make an informed decision.  
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The evaluation of these studies shows that they have not been conducted with varying 
groups of participants in order to explore end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards the 
design, and identify the current users’ preferences, which would enhance users’ 
acceptance of the system and help to overcome the usability issues without compromising 
the user’s convenience.   
3.3 Conclusions 
As presented in this chapter, several methods and systems have been proposed in order to 
protect individual’s privacy. However, the utilisation of these techniques requires a 
number of considerations in regards to user acceptance, usability and holistic privacy 
solutions, to take factors related to different dimensions into account during the design; 
for example, users’ desire to manage privacy and gain knowledge, prioritisation of users’ 
information, and their current level of privacy knowledge. In addition, none of these 
studies have considered that sharing personal information differs from time to time and 
from person to person. Users have different privacy concerns and requirements because 
they have heterogeneous privacy attitudes and expectations. Assuming that users have 
uniform privacy requirements would be ineffective, and it could significantly increase the 
burden on, and frustration of, the user.  
Therefore, there is a shortage of literature available on ways of increasing user awareness 
about potential privacy risks. These few works have focused on certain types of personal 
information among users, rather than presenting various types of information that can 
help users to manage their privacy across a range of apps on an individual basis. 
Moreover, none of these approaches have included designing an interface that overcomes 
















4. Research Methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research methodologies, including highlighting 
the philosophical systems and paradigms of scientific research.  It also presents and 
discusses the particular research methodology applied in this study, accompanied by a 
description of the scientific methodology used to design the questionnaire, collect data 
and analyse it. Moreover, this chapter does not only describe the paradigms of research, 
but it also goes beyond that to identify the differences between each approach that was 
utilised in the research. This has helped to guide the researcher towards determine the 
characteristics and the strengths of each approach. These comparisons begin with section 
two, which is about positivism versus interpretivism. Then moving forward, research 
methodologies and approaches to analysis are discussed in sections three and four, along 
with a comparison between each approach and paradigm. 
The definition of research paradigms according to Guba, is “the set of common beliefs 
and agreements shared between scientists about how problems should be understood and 
addressed” (Kuhn, 1962). Therefore, research paradigms help to build a method and 
strategy to seek answers to research questions. By looking at the essential elements in a 
paradigm, according to Lincoln and Guba (1994), it should contain three primary 
elements, which are ontology, epistemology and methodology (Guba, and Lincoln, 1994). 
Ontology can be defined as “the nature of our beliefs about reality” (Richards, 2003). It 
focuses on what exists and what does not exist, and it is a theory about the nature of 
reality. It leads the researcher to investigate what kind of reality exists. 
Regarding the term epistemology, it can be defined as “the branch of philosophy that 




validated” (Gall, Borg and Gall, 1996). It focuses on how to gain knowledge and the 
sources used to obtain knowledge. Specifically, epistemology deals with the nature and 
limitations of knowledge in the area of research. In this case, the researchers would 
identify criteria to determine what does and does not constitute knowledge.  
The third primary element in the research paradigm is the methodology, which helps to 
identify the method that should be utilised to obtain knowledge. It leads the researcher to 
determine the type of data that is required for the research, and to identify the method that 
will be performed to collect the data. It guides the researcher to address the question 
regarding how the world should be studied. 
These three elements form a holistic view of how researchers view knowledge, the 
relationships between this knowledge, and the methodological strategies that are used to 
discover it. These elements also comprise the fundamental assumptions, beliefs, norms 
and values that each paradigm holds. However, there are many paradigms that are used 
in scientific research, which include positivism and interpretivism, qualitative and 
quantitative, inductive and deductive, as well as exploratory and confirmatory. 
4.2 Positivism versus interpretivism 
There are some differences between the two paradigms of positivism and interpretivism 
in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology. In term of ontology, positivism 
posits that there is a single reality, whilst interpretivism posits there is no single reality or 
truth (Stahl, 2007). Positivists view reality is stable if the results are the same if and when 
the same research is done by others. Regarding epistemology, positivism focuses on 
discovering absolute knowledge about objective reality. The role of the researcher and 
the researched are restricted to data collection and interpretation in an objective reality. 




socially constructed rather than objectively determined (Carson, 2001); the role of the 
researcher and the researched are interdependent and mutually interactive.  
With regard to the research methodology, positivist research involves acquiring data from 
different methods such as laboratory experiments, and survey and field experiments, as 
the research methods. The data, in this case, can be measured and known, and therefore 
they are more likely to use quantitative methods to measure this reality. In comparison, 
interpretivism involves using diverse approaches, including social constructivism and 
phenomenology. Social constructionism studies how people perceive the knowledge of 
the world from within a social context, whilst phenomenology is another methodology of 
interpretation that aims to interpret the world via directly experiencing the phenomena. 
However, in the end, the goal of different research methods and data analysis techniques 
is to provide information that is beneficial to the domain. 
4.3 Qualitative versus Quantitative 
There are two main approaches of research methodologies: quantitative and qualitative. 
The goal of qualitative research is to observe human behaviour and try to answer the whys 
and hows of human behaviour, opinion, and experience (Tong et al., 2012).  The essential 
characteristics of qualitative research are: 
 It does not use numerical measurements or statistical methods as key research 
indicators and tools.  
 It uses the description as the unit of analysis.  
 It is appropriate for situations in which detailed understanding is required.  
 It is used to analyse small-scale studies and look at issues from a holistic 
perspective. 
Despite these aforementioned characteristics, this approach has some limitations, which 




of the research, and also the outcomes could be different on a different day/with different 
people.   
Quantitative is another approach to research methodology, which differs from qualitative 
approaches in terms of the type of data, the sample size, methodology and the outcomes 
of the results. Table 4.1 summarises these differences between qualitative and quantitative 
research.  
 Qualitative research Quantitative Research 
Sample  Small and narrow  Large and abroad  
Methodology  Focus groups, interviews, 




interviews & observations, 
and reviews of records or 
documents for numeric 
information 
Data Analysis  Non-numerical data Numerical data  
Reporting Outcomes Directional in nature 
Not projectable to the total 
target audience 
Reports are graphical 
Representative of the target 
audience 
Table 4.1: The Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative Research 
Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages regarding the time of data collection, 
cost and ease of data collection. Ultimately, the selection of a research approach is 
dependent on the core purposes of the research. 
4.4 Inductive Versus Deductive 
Inductive and deductive are significant approaches used in research to analyse the data.  
Deductive has a top-down logic and begins from one or more general statements 
regarding a phenomenon, and then moves towards an extracted specific conclusion. 
Whilst induction has a bottom-up logic, which begins with a general statement that is 
derived from specific examples (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Accordingly, the deductive approach would start by identifying hypotheses or theories 




theories can be identified based on personal experiences or from prior studies. In contrast, 
the inductive approach starts with specific observations or real examples of events to build 
broader theory or observations. Thus, when researchers use the inductive approach, they 
establish a set of observations and then they can formulate those observations to test, and 
eventually develop some general conclusions. Though there are some differences 
between the inductive and deductive approach, they can actually be rather complementary 
and often address the same question. 
4.5 Design Science Research Methodology 
Designing science research according to Hevner and Chatterjee is “a set of synthetic and 
analytical techniques and perspectives (complementing positivist, interpretive, and 
critical perspectives) for performing research in information system” (Hevner and 
Chatterjee, 2010 p.214). Walls et al. (1992 p.37) also defined information systems design 
as “a class of research that would stand as an equal with traditional social science-based 
theory building and testing”. These concepts demonstrate that design science is a 
systematic method that seeks to design solutions for information systems. The knowledge 
in design science is acquired from an iterative process of a problem, which includes 
awareness, development, evaluation and conclusion. The first stage in order to solve the 
problem is to use preliminary quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. 
Then, the iterative development of an artifact is conducted. The experiment will be the 
final stage for evaluation, and the findings suggest opportunities for further improvement 
using insights or suggestions. Consequently, the findings of design science are essential 
artifacts as a solution to the problem in practice, and these outcomes may be refined after 
being delivered.   
Regarding how to implement and evaluate information system research, Hevner et al. 




in the proposed framework identifies the limitations of the problem, which consists of 
three components: people, originations and technologies. The framework aims to include 
two aspects of paradigms: behavioural science and design science. Design science aims 
to create and develop a new artifact, whilst behavioural science seeks to study behaviour 
in relation to IT usage. Moreover, behavioural science is seen as reactive and looking to 
demonstrate what already exists. Design science is seen as proactive and aims to create 
technological solutions for the future. Both paradigms are essential to the information 
system discipline in order to study the confluence of people and technology. 
 
Source: (Hevner et al., 2004) 
Figure 4.1: Information Systems Research Framework  
When it comes to the knowledge base component, it provides the basic materials, which 
are utilised to complete IS researches. The knowledge base involves two-aspects: 
foundations and methodologies. Foundations provide different elements, which can be 
utilised in the development stage such as theories, frameworks, instruments and methods. 





Von Alan et al. (2004) have proposed seven guidelines for designing science research 
within the discipline of information systems. The seven guidelines are provided and 
demonstrated in the following points: 
1. Design as an artefact: Design-science research must produce a viable artefact in 
the form of a construct, a model, a method, or an instantiation. 
2. Problem relevance: The objective of design-science research is to develop 
technology-based solutions to important and relevant business problems. 
3. Design evaluation: The utility, quality, and efficacy of a design artefact must be 
rigorously demonstrated via well-executed evaluation methods. 
4. Research contributions: Effective design-science research must provide clear and 
verifiable contributions in the areas of the design artefact, design foundations, 
and/or design methodologies. 
5. Research rigour: Design-science research relies upon the application of rigorous 
methods in both the construction and evaluation of the design artefact. 
6. Design as a search process: The search for an effective artefact requires utilising 
available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws in the problem 
environment. 
7. Communication of research: Design-science research must be presented 
effectively both to technology-oriented as well as management-oriented 
audiences. 
As a result, design science research requires the creation of a viable artefact for a 
special problem on the domain. Moreover, the artefact should provide a solution to 
the problem and should be a more effective solution. This artefact should be evaluated 




Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007) proposed other guidelines for design science research 
within the discipline of information systems which include five stages: 





Awareness of the problem stage can be generated from investigating and analysing 
prior studies. The findings from this stage would identify the research gap in the 
domain. Whilst, stage two which is about suggestions and aims to address the 
problems based on the theoretical foundations and methodologies (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2007). Accordingly, it would involve designing a viable artefact that 
addresses the research problem. 
4.6 Method Adopted for the Current Research 
Design science provides specific guidelines for evaluation and iteration within research 
projects which could address the problem in a coherent and logical way for information 
systems Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007). When it comes to human/computer interfaces, 
design science approach play an essential role because it would develop  HCI artifact to 
design and evaluate the interfaces. Therefore, many studies used design science in the 
HCI domain in order to design and evaluate web interfaces. For instance, Gjøsæter (2015) 
adopted the design science research approach to propose domain-specific guidelines for 
designing mobile augmented reality systems. Another study used design science to 
develop HCI artifact to design and evaluate web interfaces signs to make them intuitive 




 Accordingly, this approach provides guidance not only for what steps need to be taken 
to ensure the quality and contribution of the created artifact but also to understand a real-
world problem, for what a solution artifact is required to be developed. Moreover, it helps 
HCI researcher to follow the all core phase of a HCI research methodology, design, and 
evaluation, whilst it keep the research rigor. Therefore, the design science research 
paradigm was deemed a suitable approach for this research. 
When it looks at another research methodology such as action research, it appears that 
there is some similarity between action research and design science in term of an iterative 
process and solving problems. However, design science research presents specific 
guidelines for evaluation and iteration to the design and development of artifacts with the 
information system domain. Explanatory sciences is another research methodology that 
focuses to develop guidelines on other domains such as the natural sciences psychology 
and sociology, which is to develop knowledge to describe and explain phenomena in the 
social world. Whilst design science research aims to achieve knowledge and 
understanding of a problem domain by developing of a designed artefact Hevner et al. 
(2004). Moreover, this approach checks the validity and reliability of a process or 
methods from a replicability dimension. 
Table 4.2 shows how the design science principles are being applied in this research. One 
of the essential stages in Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2007) guidelines is awareness of the 
problem, which aims to identify the research gap. Whilst the development stage identifies 
the final goal of this research, which is about enhancing privacy technology for mobile 












1. To identify and understand the potential 
privacy concerns that users have across the 
internet, social media, mobile devices and the 
internet of things. 
2. To review the privacy techniques and 
solutions to protect users’ information and 
reduce their concerns across a range of 
platforms including computers and mobiles.  
Awareness of 
problem 
Analysis of prior studies 
3. To develop a new technique to manage and 
priorities privacy-related information.  
4. To develop usable and adaptive interfaces that 
maximise user satisfaction 
Suggestions 
Prior studies analysis  
Designing preliminary 




5. To develop a novel and holistic framework 
for enhancing privacy technology on mobiles 
and meet users’ privacy preferences. 
Development 
Current privacy and usability 
preferences 
6. To conduct an evaluation of the 




Evaluation of the framework 




and limitations for the 
proposed framework 
Table 4.2: Design Science and its Applications in This Research  
This research addresses the lack of current use of privacy technologies and available 
solutions for mobile devices in terms of how to manage a large volume of data, designing 
for usable privacy and transparency, and how to prioritise privacy related information. 
Moreover, most of the current solutions have not led to the development of a flexible 
solution to accommodate novice and advanced users, hence there is a gap in the literature 
that needs to be addressed. 
Regarding the research processes, Figure 4.2  shows the stages of this study, which 




in order to help to understand the dimensions of the research problem and identify the 
focus of the study. This stage has been discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. 
Chapter Two presented a review of current users’ privacy concerns in regard to different 
technologies. Then, Chapter Three presented an analyses of the current tools and solutions 
for protecting users’ privacy and reducing their concerns. The outcomes of this stage have 
helped in identifying the research gaps.  
 
Figure 4.2: Research Processes 
After understanding the problem, the thesis will discuss in detail how to address the 
problems (in Chapters 5 and 6). Accordingly, the initial potential requirements are 
described to build the system.  This phase split has been into two components:   
 Initial requirements to manage and prioritise the user’s privacy-related 
information, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
 Initial design, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.  
A questionnaire has been designed in order to explore whether the initial requirements 




discussed in both Chapter Five and Chapter Six, and has involved employing a 
quantitative method. This study has used the questionnaire method because it provides 
researchers with quantitative data. 
 The outcomes of participants’ responses have been utilised to refine the initial 
requirements and initial design, and prioritise privacy-related information.  The resultant 
requirements and design choices finally led to building a holistic framework to enhance 
privacy technology. In phase 4, a Mock-Ups prototype was designed to help in visualising 
and better understanding how the framework would work in practice. Finally, a focus 
group has been conducted to evaluate designing a Mobile Device PET by end-users and 
experts. By using a quantitative survey and conducting focus group interviews with 
experts and potential users, this research has used a mixed-methods approach, albeit 
through different stages of the design iterations. According to Creswell (2014), using 
mixed methods allows the researcher to obtain essential quantifiable data on a matter, 
along with gaining more in-depth perspectives from key individuals. Therefore, the 
research has led to a thorough investigation of the proposed system for improving user 
privacy.             
4.7 Questionnaires Design 
One of the stages of this research is to design questionnaires in order to prioritise user 
information, identify what the current privacy preferences to manage privacy are, and 
also to investigate users’ thoughts regarding the current design of interfaces and initial 
requirements. A questionnaire method was used to collect data because it has several 
important advantages for this research. It can provide researchers with quantitative data, 
which can be employed to cater for different user preferences and expectations. It also 
enables users to be divided into a smaller number of privacy profiles. Another advantage 




users and can obtain more responses by using questionnaires, compared to the other 
methods such interviews. In addition, respondents may be more willing to answer 
sensitive questions at a convenient time on their own schedule. 
One of the main goals of the questionnaire is to identify an effective method to prioritise 
user privacy-related information in order to overcome the burden related to managing 
such a large amount of information. To achieve this goal, it is important to determine the 
current privacy related-information. This represents a challenge due to the large volume 
of information in the current privacy settings in mobile operating systems such as Android 
and iOS, which are called permissions. Furthermore, the user’s privacy information does 
not exist only on permissions, but there is much more personal information such as phone 
number, email, birthday and address, which may be shared with different apps which do 
not appear in the permission settings (Le, Varmarken, et al., 2015; Ren et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the current mobile privacy setting and the current user information in-apps 
have been studied and analysed to identify the users’ information. Accordingly, an app 
privacy preferences section has been designed and organised along two dimensions: app 
categories and data type.  
Due the questionnaire seeking to identify the current privacy preferences to manage users’ 
privacy, the second part of the questionnaire needed be related to how to control the 
privacy-related information in order to meet the needs of the individual and their desire 
to control different aspects of their privacy. Hence, a tailored solution for users has been 
designed based on these needs. 
Finally, a set of questions were drafted regarding usability in order to achieve the second 
research question, which is about how to present the information in a usable fashion. 
According to the literature review, there are several usability issues related to the interface 




maximise prioritised privacy-related information, this research has investigated users’ 
thoughts regarding the design of interfaces. Hence, four proposed interfaces have been 
designed (notifications interfaces, historical view, control and help and support). The 
aims of this procedure were to evaluate the following: 
 If users are attracted by the use of colours in the interfaces. 
 How easy user interfaces are to use. 
 Whether the information provided by the software is easy to understand. 
 If users are attracted by the use of icons. 
Accordingly, and prior to recruitment for participation, eight subjects were asked to 
undertake a pilot study. A pilot study was conducted to verify that the survey instruments 
were understandable and reliable. The feedback from the pilot study was used to refine 
and enhance the survey questions.  
As a result of the previous steps and processing, the survey was structured to include four 
parts: 
 Demographic: exploring the participants’ demographic characteristics, including 
questions related to gender, age, education and occupation. 
 Users’ mobile app privacy preferences: this investigated how concerned users are 
about such privacy-related information being shared by different categories of 
apps. 
 Privacy control and management: this presented questions related to how to 
control the privacy-related information.   




4.8 Data Collection 
The second stage of the design is discussed in this chapter, which aims to develop a new 
technique to prioritise privacy-related information and to develop usable and adaptive 
interfaces that maximise user satisfaction. In order to achieve these goals, a questionnaire 
was designed and participants were recruited to answer that questionnaire. The 
participants were recruited through a range of methods such as email, predominantly 
targeting students at the University of Plymouth, staff and colleagues in the Faculty of 
Science and Engineering, as well as friends. Additionally, it was published on Facebook, 
Twitter and WhatsApp. Some community centres in Plymouth were also requested to 
participate in the survey. Therefore, a sampling frame was not used for the current 
research because, as explained by Bryman (2016), representativeness was not a 
significant concern; rather, the views of a range of participants who use various apps was 
required.   
Furthermore, the expected total of participants that complete responses should be within 
the range of other surveys in the research domain and close to the expected and targeted 
figure, which is about 300 to 500 participants (Watson, Lipford and Besmer, 2015; Chua 
and Chang, 2016; Wisniewski, Knijnenburg and Lipford, 2017). Moreover, according to 
Statista data, 4,978,317,680 adults own smartphones in the UK (Statisa, 2017). Hence, in 
order to determine the sample size, the following formula was utilised for the sample size 
n: 
n = N*X / (X + N – 1) where, X = Zα/22 *p*(1-p) / MOE2, 
Zα/2 is the critical value of the Normal distribution at α/2 (e.g. for a confidence level of 
95%, α is 0.05 and the critical value is 1.96), MOE is the margin of error, p is the sample 




people, which means this research needed this number of participants for statistically 
sound results. 
All of the information from the questionnaires has been treated confidentially and 
respondents have been anonymised during the collection, storage and publication of the 
research material. Accordingly, it is worth noting that ethical approval (see Appendix B) 
was obtained, ensuring that this survey conforms to the ethical principles laid down by 
the University of Plymouth. Prior to displaying the questionnaire questions, its aims and 
structure were briefed, as well as confirming that the respondents should be 18 years of 
age or older, and they are free to withdraw up until the final submission of their responses 
(Appendix C).  
4.9 Data analysis 
Data analysis generates a set of scientifically valuable data, which was primarily utilised 
to determine the potential for improving the initial requirements for enhancing privacy 
technology. This also provided valuable insights on design for the third stage of the 
research design, which is about the development. To achieve these goals, it was important 
to identify which approach should be utilised to analyse the data.  
Two approaches were used to analyse the data: machine learning to cluster users, and 
statistical analysis. In data science, clustering analysis helps in obtaining valuable insights 
from the data by seeing what groups the data points fall into. This technique is called 
unsupervised machine learning, and it aims to find similarities in the data points and 
collect similar data points together. However, there are two common methods used to 
cluster users - hierarchical clustering and k-means. Hierarchical clustering with an 
agglomerative approach is utilised to cluster users’ mobile app privacy preferences. 
Hierarchical clustering provides a binary tree of the data that successively merges similar 




K-means method assigns each data to the cluster whose centre, also called the centroid, 
is nearest. The centroid is the average of all the points in the cluster, and then the 
algorithm will assign each data point to its closest centroid point (Soni, 2012). However, 
hierarchical clustering is much more informative and more interpretable than other 
methods such as K-means.  Moreover, determining the optimal number of clusters in K-
means is a fundamental issue. Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer to determine 
the optimal number of clusters. The optimal number of clusters somehow relies on the 
technique used for measuring similarities. Therefore, different approaches for estimating 
the optimal number of clusters have been proposed (for example, statistical testing 
methods, visual exploration and precision of predicting users’ preferences) (Liu, Lin and 
Sadeh, 2013). 
Gap statistics were performed to determine the optimal number of clusters. The gap 
statistic compares the total within intra cluster variation for different values of k.  This 
statistical approach avoids the increase or decrease in the monotony of other validation 
scores with the increasing number of clusters. 









Where nr denotes the number of elements of the cluster r.  
The gap statistic is defined as:  
Gap(k) = E(log((𝑊𝑘)) – log(𝑊𝑘) 




Another approach to determine the optimal number of clusters relies on how easy the 
cluster is to interpret and how meaningful the options are. The clusters that are easy to 
interpret would also make it easier for users to identify which cluster best matches their 
preferences. 
The hierarchical algorithm begins with all the data points assigned to a cluster of their 
own. Then, two nearest clusters are combined into the same cluster. Ultimately, this type 
of clustering elapses when there is only one cluster left. In order to combine two clusters, 
this is based on the closeness of these clusters. To determine the closeness of clusters, 
there are multiple metrics: 
 Euclidean distance: ||a-b||2 = √(Σ(ai-bi)) 
 Squared Euclidean distance: ||a-b||22 = Σ((ai-bi)2) 
 Manhattan distance: ||a-b||1 = Σ|ai-bi| 
 Maximum distance:||a-b||INFINITY = maxi|ai-bi| 
 Mahalanobis distance: √((a-b)T S-1 (-b))   {where, s : covariance matrix} 
In general, clustering can be a useful tool to explore how to divide users into unique 
groups, which in turn helps to understand how to prioritise users’ information initially. 
However, in order to cluster the data, R code was utilised, which has an amazing variety 
of functions for cluster analysis. It also provides researchers with a wide variety of 
statistical and graphical techniques, classification, clustering, and others. 
Unsupervised machine algorithm was not the only method utilised in this research, but 
supervised machine was also used to predict many of a user’s mobile app privacy 
preferences, which could significantly reduce user burden with minimum questions.  
Statistical analysis is another approach that was used in this research. It has been utilised 




management, and the correlation between participants’ demographic characteristics and 
their preferences. SPSS software was utilised because is one of the most popular statistical 
tools used by researchers to attain a complex statistical analysis.  
SPSS software provides the Pearson’s coefficient correlation test to measure the 
correlation between two variables.  It has a value of between +1 and −1 where 1 is a total 
positive correlation as the value of one variable increases, so does the value of the other 
variable. Whilst zero indicates there is no correlation, and −1 is total negative correlation 
as the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable decreases. P-value 
determines if there is a statistically significant correlation between the two variables. 
When the p-value is less than or equal to .05, that means there is a statistically significant 
correlation between two variables. 
In order to identify the strength of the Pearson’s coefficient correlation test between two 
variables,  Cohen, (1992) provides guidelines for the purposes of interpreting this 
strength, where r = 0.10, r = 0.30, and r = 0.50 indicate small, medium and large in 
magnitude, respectively, as shown in Table 4.3 . 




Table 4.3: The Strength of the Relationship 
Accordingly, various approaches have been utilised in this research to analyse the data, 
which are summarised as follows: 
 K-means and Hierarchical clustering, which was aimed at clustering users into a 




 Pearson’s coefficient correlation, for the analysis of users’ thoughts regarding the 
design of interfaces, privacy controls and management, and the correlation 
between participants’ demographic characteristics and their preferences 
 Supervised machine, which was aimed at predicting users’ mobile app privacy 
preferences with a minimum number of questions 
4.10 Evaluation 
The evaluation of the framework is the third stage in the research design. Therefore, it is 
important to determine a suitable evaluation to ensure that the research objectives are met 
and they are as effective as they can be. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches can 
be used to evaluate a system (Howell, 2013). This research has used a qualitative 
approach to evaluate the system because it provides useful information to investigate 
users’ acceptance and satisfaction in depth, which is difficult to achieve through purely 
quantitative approaches (Kaplan and Maxwell, 2005). This research has used a specific 
qualitative research method, the focus group method, which is an effective method for 
gaining details about the experiences of end-users and experts. Additionally, it provides 
content-rich, qualitative information and reveals insights that are difficult to capture with 
other methods.   
4.11 Conclusion  
This chapter has highlighted the philosophical systems, paradigms of scientific research 
and the strategy and the methodology adopted in this research. Moreover, the differences 
between each approach have been identified in order to explore their characteristics and 
strengths. By examining various research paradigms, the design science research 
paradigm was deemed a suitable approach for this research, which provides guidelines 





This research has employed a survey questionnaire strategy, which is the most common 
method of data collection, and it helps to gain quantitative data. The quantitative approach 
helps to cluster users into a small number of privacy profiles, which is difficult to achieve 
these through a purely qualitative approach. However, a qualitative approach was also 
used to evaluate and investigate users’ acceptance and satisfaction in depth, in order to 
gain content-rich, qualitative data that is difficult to capture with other approaches.  The 
outcomes of this process have been used to determine the requirements for a mobile PET 
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5. Requirements Analysis for Profiling Users’ Privacy 
Information       
Analysing and reviewing the current solutions in prior studies has revealed that current 
solutions have a lack of meeting users’ privacy preferences in the context of how to 
manage and prioritise a large volume of data on mobile apps, which in turn leads to a lack 
of privacy protection. Therefore, this chapter seeks to identify the initial requirements 
based on prior studies in order to develop and enhance privacy technology and meet users’ 
privacy preferences, which be discussed in the first section. One of the major 
requirements that will be presented in the first section is to prioritise privacy-related 
information, which would play an essential role in discovering how to manage a large 
volume of data. 
The initial requirements have been utilised in the survey to verify and explore the current 
privacy preferences regarding the prioritisation of privacy-related-information and how 
to manage it. Moving forward, the outcomes of the survey will be discussed in this 
chapter, which in turn leads to an analysis of how to cluster the entire user population into 
a number of subgroups. 
5.1  Initial requirements analysis 
It is evident from the current literature review that prior research is lacking in some areas 
with regard to enhancing the privacy of mobile technology from the following aspects:  
 Prioritisation of privacy-related information. 
 Adapting privacy to the user’s knowledge  
 Fine-grained privacy control  




Accordingly, the subsequent sections will discuss how to address these problems. 
Previous studies have provided valuable insights and suggestions that can help to enhance 
the current privacy-related problems. 
5.1.1 Prioritisation of privacy-related information 
Users are sharing large amounts of personal information through a large volume of apps 
such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, Fitbit and the Amazon app. As seen in the 
literature review, most studies have assumed that users can manage and control such a 
large amount of information. Therefore, they have provided users with a mechanism to 
allow them to control access to sensitive data. However, users are likely to struggle to 
manage such a large volume of information as they are quite complex and change 
frequently (Liu, Lin and Sadeh, 2013). 
In order to overcome the burden related to managing such a large amount of information, 
prior works have proposed that, despite the diversity of users’ privacy preferences related 
information, it is possible to divide a user’s mobile app privacy preferences into different 
profiles as the default settings for initial interfaces, which could significantly reduce the 
user burden (Liu, Lin and Sadeh, 2013; Lin et al, 2014a; Watson, Lipford and Besmer, 
2015). For instance, some studies such as Mugan, Sharma and Sadeh (2011) and Lin et 
al., (2012)  used this approach in location privacy to reduce the user burden, which 
involves the identification of privacy profiles. Another study by Watson, Lipford and 
Besmer (2015) also used this approach in social media and they found that the user 
privacy preferences of profile items and disclosure can be utilised to create initial privacy 
settings that better represent user preferences. Moreover, Lin et al. (2014) indicate that 
applying privacy profiles as default settings for initial interfaces could significantly 




 Accordingly, in order to cater to different user preferences and expectations related to 
privacy information initially, user profiling could be utilised to cluster users into a smaller 
number of privacy profiles. The strength of this approach lies in its ability to closely 
capture the users’ preferences, which in turn should reduce individual user’s burden and 
frustration.  
5.1.2 Adapting privacy to the user’s knowledge  
Nielsen (2010) claims learnability is in some sense the most essential usability 
characteristic because most of the systems require being easy to learn, and a transition 
from a novice to an expert. Moreover, prior research has shown that considering the 
knowledge of users during the design can improve user performance, satisfaction and 
experience (Hwang and Yu, 2011; Chua and Chang, 2016a). In the context of privacy, 
Wisniewski et al. (2017) state that users differ significantly in how they learn and use 
different privacy mechanisms on Facebook. This draws attention to the paramount 
importance of considering users’ needs and expertise during the design of the system, 
which in turn could help to attain greater usability. 
Accordingly, the goal of this requirement is to make the system understandable and 
learnable for the novice user, while at the same time not hindering the advanced user from 
working productively. Researchers in the HCI domain have pursued identifying who is a 
novice and expert, and their role in order to be accommodated while designing the 
interface. Nielsen (2010), for instance, states, “Expert users are defined as individuals 
who have rich interaction knowledge, task knowledge, and domain knowledge of a 
specific system”. Whilst novice user is defined as “a user who is trying to complete the 
task in the system but has little or no past experience, have less interaction experience”. 
Therefore, they need additional help and support such as documentation, tutorial guides, 




on board more knowledge about how to use the system, their level of knowledge changes, 
from novice to intermediate, or from intermediate to expert; consequently, the system 
provides the ability to automatically adapt the level of assistance and guidance provided. 
5.1.3 Fine-grained privacy controls  
According to the literature review in Chapter Three, most current privacy solutions 
support only a binary and static privacy control approach. This approach provides the user 
with two options - “allow” or “deny” - an application’s access to their private information. 
To overcome this limitation,  Almuhimedi et al. (2015) developed a tool to notify the user 
about how their personal information is accessed by an app, and whether they are allowed 
to control their privacy preferences in an appropriate manner. TISSA (Zhou et al., 2011) 
also provides users with empty or bogus options for personal information, whilst 
AppFence (Hornyack et al., 2011) sends shadow data instead of the actual data. Bugiel et 
al. (2013) suggest involving the user in selecting their privacy configuration because the 
user’s privacy protection strongly depends on the subjective security objectives of the 
individual user. Consequently, the system allows users to modify their privacy settings 
when they realise the potential risks of using an app. Moreover, Kim et al. (2017) suggest 
considering multi-level privacy controls in order to achieve more flexibility in providing 
their private information to mobile apps and to meet users’ privacy requirements. 
Therefore, providing users with multilevel privacy controls allows them to limit the 
disclosure of their private information on multiple levels by taking factors related to the 
level of the user’s knowledge into account. 
5.1.4 Transparency feature 
According to GDPR guidelines, users have the right to be informed about the collection 




is an essential transparency requirement under the GDPR. Moreover, Christin et al. (2013) 
show that users desire to have a historical view to know who has accessed their data. 
Another study’s findings emphasise that there is a strong need for more transparency to 
reduce users’ privacy concerns and lead to more trust in services (Alrayes and Abdelmoty, 
2016). It can be deduced from these findings and suggestions that a certain level of 
transparency would be useful to enhance privacy technology and increase user awareness. 
Therefore, the proposed system should allow users to access the date of the data that was 
sent out of the mobile and which app shares this data and at which degree of granularity. 
However, other prior requirements such as the user’s knowledge pose different 
dimensions that should be considered and combined during the design of the system in 
the context of how to help a novice user to understand the historical interface. This would 
allow an advanced user to know who had access to which data, at which degree of 
granularity and when, without confusing novices 
5.2 Methodology  
This section seeks to explore how to design the privacy-related information section in the 
survey and how to present this information to the participants in an effective way. As 
previously mentioned, one of the essential requirements is to identify an effective method 
to prioritise users’ privacy-related information in order to overcome the burden related to 
managing such a large amount of information. To achieve this objective, it is paramount 
to find out about the current privacy related-information on mobile apps.  
5.2.1 Privacy related information categorisation  
Due to mobile apps storing and sharing a large volume of information,  this information 
needs to be analysed and determined before it is presented in the survey. Hence, different 




First, Android and iOS were analysed to identify the privacy control settings. According 
to the Apple website, iOS provides users with settings which help them to see which apps 
they have permitted to access to certain information to, as well as granting or revoking 
any future access (Apple, 2015). This includes access to: 
 Contacts  Camera  Photos 
 Reminders  Music and video   Health 
 Microphone  HomeKit  Motion activity  
 Calendars  Photos  Speech recognition 
 Location Services  Bluetooth sharing  Apple Music 
 Media library   
For Android, Google has included app permissions that allow users to selectively grant 
or restrict permissions for installed apps. Therefore, Android permissions were studied 
and it was found for this group of data (Google, 2015) that the following information is 
included:  

















Thus, iOS and Android have some similar data sharing, such as location, calendar, motion 
activity and contacts. Furthermore, the user’s privacy information does not exist only on 
permissions, but there is a lot of personal information such as phone number, email, 
birthday and address being shared with different apps which do not appear in the 
permissions settings (Le, Varmarken, et al., 2015; Ren et al., 2016).  Zang et al. (2015) 
analysed network traffic and found that 73% of Android apps shared personal information 
such as email address, birthday and name with third parties. Moreover, their analysis of 




share user input with a third party. Another study found that health apps collected PII 
such as name and address as well as demographic data (e.g., date of birth, gender) and 
potentially sensitive data about activities (e.g., location, heart rate), nutrition, or medical 
data (Wagner et al., 2016). These studies indicate that there are different types of personal 
information being shared with different apps which do not appear in the permissions 
settings. Hence, these types of information were considered during the analysis to 
understand what types of data are collected by mobile apps. 
Each group of data contains multiple data sources, for example motion activity contains: 
steps, location, calories, heart rate in beats per minute, height, speed and weight, which 
means there is an enormous amount of personal data that would take a long time and be 
difficult to answer by the participants. Therefore, to minimise the questions, data that have 
a similar impact were grouped into eight categories: geographical location, identity, 
health information, phone information, calendar, multimedia information, contact and 
motion activity, as shown in Table 5.1. 
Data group Data type 
Health information 
Heart Rate, ECG, Steps, Weight, Sleep Tracker, Place 
Tracker, Medical Data, Health History, Blood glucose 
Personal Information 
Address, Gender, Name, Date of Birth, Email, Postal 
Code 
Location Approximate location, Exact location 
Phone Information Device Id, call log, phone number 
Calendar Calendar 
Multimedia information Voice record, Photos, Videos 
Contacts Read contacts, modify Contacts, Social media accounts 
Motion activity Steps, calories, , height, speed and weight 




5.2.2 Privacy-related information Questions 
After determining the privacy-related information categorisation, it is important to 
identify how to present this information to the participants an effective way. According 
to a study by Felt et al. (2012) participants understand data types better when the data is 
associated with a familiar application. For example, a participant who does not understand 
the motion activity data in isolation might know that data is needed to record details about 
their activities when he or she has decided to use a fitness application. Therefore, each 
app category is associated with various data types. However, in order to ensure that 
participants fully understood the questions, these steps were performed: 
 A number of people were asked if they could understand the data type associated 
with a familiar application in order to observe their understanding before 
publishing the survey. 
 Each data type category includes some example that are related to the category, 
for instance, motion activity (steps, calories burned and sleep duration). 
 These questions were presented to non-expert users to evaluate user 
understanding. 
 The data type is short, simple, and non-technical. 
The app privacy preferences section in the survey were refined and enhanced after 
performing the previous steps. For instance, some participants may not understand the 
app category; therefore, some app categories were displayed with some definitions and 
examples. Additionally, each app category includes photographs for some apps under 
these categories to help the participants to understand each category. Accordingly, the 
App privacy preferences section includes the following steps in order to make sure that 
participants understand each question: 




 Display photographs for some apps under these categories to help the participants 
to understand each category 
 Display some examples for each category. 
After processing these, the app privacy preferences section was organised along two 
dimensions: App categories and data type. Hence, eight app categories were associated 
with various data types. Table 5.2 shows 46 cells that represent the 8 app categories with 
their data types. Accordingly, the following question was asked participants in the survey: 
 “Different types of applications capture and process a variety of different types of 
privacy-related information, the following questions will ask you how concerned you are 
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Table 5.2: App categories and data types 
 Game and entertainment category question 
Mobile users can install various game apps such as Angry Birds, Candy Crush and 




primary data types: approximate Location, Exact location, Identity (e.g. date of birth and 
name), contact, multimedia (e.g. photos and videos).  
 Health category question 
“Suppose you installed an application which is developed by a trusted medical provider 
eg NHS, could you please indicate your concern about letting the application send the 
following information”. 
Chapter 2 revealed users would like to know and be able to control their health 
information because they are concerned about the sharing of that health information and 
fitness. Therefore, the survey includes the health category and fitness in order to 
investigate user concern regarding sharing their data with these apps. 
  Social Networks Category question 
Social media apps dominate mobile device users' time. Social networks category allow 
users to share many different types of information such as identity, location and 
multimedia. Therefore, it is important to involve the social network category in the 
survey. 
 Shopping category question 
Shopping applications also have direct access to sensitive information as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Therefore, the survey includes a shopping category to explore users' concerns 
regarding these apps. 
Productivity apps, lifestyle apps and navigation apps can access users' private data. 
Therefore, the survey includes these categories with their data types. Hence, the app 
privacy preferences section in the survey included most app categories in a mobile device 




turn, makes the survey comprehensive for most users' data. This section would help to 
divide the participants’ preferences into a number of subgroups. 
 Demography questions 
Other questions related to demography were included in the survey, which included the 
following characteristics: gender, age, education level, occupation and the level of 
knowledge. The demography questions aim to explore whether there is a correlation 
between user preferences in the context of prioritisation of the information; users’ 
knowledge about privacy apps on their mobiles, and managing and controlling settings 
and usability. Moreover, demographic characteristics have been investigated to look at 
whether users’ demographic information, including age, gender and education level, 
could be utilised to assign the user to the closest profile. 
 Privacy control and management questions 
The third part of the questionnaire is about privacy control and management. It presents 
questions related to how to control the privacy-related information in order to meet the 
needs of the individual and their desire to control different aspects of privacy. Hence, a 
tailored solution for users could be designed based on these needs.  
“Following statements about the privacy control and management. Would it be useful 
to have the following settings:”  
 Ability to control information across different apps 
This question is about the ability to control information across different apps. This 
question aimed to find out users’ desire to control the information they share.  




The second question is regarding the display of multi-level privacy controls (e.g. No 
access, Low access, and Full Access). This question was not only to find out the user’s 
desire to have multi-level privacy controls, but explored if there was any correlation 
between users’ demography and multi-level control. 
 Ability to change the privacy notification settings for different apps 
Another question is related to user notifications in order to notify users at the moment 
that data was being sent. However, the question here aims to find out users’ satisfaction 
with being allowed to change the privacy notification settings for different apps. 
 Ability to restrict the time period of sharing your data 
As discussed in Chapter 3, none of the prior studies has considered that sharing personal 
information differs from time to time and from person to person. Therefore, this research 
seeks to explore end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards adding this feature that 
allows the user to restrict the time period of sharing data. 
Permission settings questions. 
“Read each statement carefully and indicate your level of knowledge about the privacy 
of apps : (all the statements are related to your privacy apps on your mobile)” 
 Understanding what permissions apps are seeking before installing. 
This question aims to find out the extent of the user understanding the app's permission. 
Moreover, this question aims to explore if there was any correlation between users’ 
knowledge and understanding apps permissions. 
 How to change privacy settings for the apps. 
Due to users’ concerns about the privacy protection related to mobile devices, most 




users. Therefore, this question seeks to investigate user knowledge about these settings in 
the current mobile device. Moreover, this question would help to explore if there was any 
correlation between users’ knowledge and understanding how to change privacy setting 
for apps. 
 Understanding privacy policy for the apps. 
This question aims to explore if there was any correlation between novice, intermediate 
and advanced participants and their understanding for a privacy policy. 
The targeted participants were public users who are 18 years or above and have a 
smartphone. The participants were asked how concerned they are about such privacy-
related information being shared by different categories of mobile apps on a five point 
Likert scale (from extremely concerned to Not at all concerned).  Regarding the rating 
scales, this questionnaire has utilised a five-point Likert scale. Most rating scales, 
including Likert-type scales, contain either five or seven response categories (Peter, 1979; 
Bearden and Netemeyer, 1999). However, a seven-point Likert scale may be more time 
consuming for the participants answering the questions to make a decision. Moreover, 
prior studies recommend a five-point scale as it has been shown to be less confusing and 
to increase the response rate (Babakus and Mangold, 1992; Devlin, Dong and Brown, 
1993). 
5.3 Analysis of the Results 
This section presents the results of the survey that was conducted to investigate current 
users’ mobile app privacy preferences. In total, 407 completed responses and the total 
responses are within the range of other surveys in the research domain and close to the 
expected and targeted figure (Watson, Lipford and Besmer, 2015; Chua and Chang, 




formula that was discussed in Chapter Four, in order to determine the expectation of 
sample size for the UK, the total of estimated participants were 384 people. Hence, the 
total number of participant responses that were collected in this survey almost 
corresponds to the sample size expectation and with prior studies. 
5.3.1 Demographic 
Demographic information was collected, including questions related to gender, age, 
education, and occupation in order to analyse the data, although the age ratio or any other 
demographic composition of the participants were not specifically controlled. Among 
these participants, 70% of them were male whilst the remaining respondents were female, 
as illustrated in Table 5.3. With regard to the age groups, more than half of the participants 


















































Male 285 70% 
Occupation 
Student 88 21.60% 
Female 122 30% Employed Full time 273 67.10% 
Age 
 
18-24 34 8.40% Employed part time 10 2.50% 
25-34 191 46.90% Unemployed 34 8.40% 
35-44 141 34.60% Retired 2 0.50% 
45-54 37 9% 
Education 
High school and lower 16 3.84% 







Bachelor 149 36.60% 
Postgraduate 212 52.10% 
Table 5.3 Summary of Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics 
Being within an academic institution, nearly 82 percent of the participants have a bachelor 
or postgraduate degree, more specifically, nearly half of the participants have 
postgraduate degree. Despite the analysis of the results of this survey possibly being 




representation of mobile users. Moreover, it is in-line with the United Kingdom’s Office 
of National Statistics analysis that the age group (18-44), regardless of gender differences, 
were found to be the highest mobile users (Ons.gov.uk, 2018). 
5.3.2 Users’ Average Preferences and Their Variances 
In order to analyse the users’ preferences, the  responses were transformed into a value 
number from one (extremely concerned) to five (Not at all concerned). To visualise the 
results, heat maps were utilised in 2D to display users’ average preferences for all 407 
participants in a data matrix, as shown in Figure 5.1. Red cells indicate a higher level of 
concern, while green cells indicate a lower level of concern. The empty cells indicate the 
absence of data for a particular data type. For example, according to prior studies, fitness 
apps sent motion activity information (steps, calories burned and sleep duration) out of 
the smartphone, whilst others app categories do not. Likewise, health information was 
shared only by the health categories. 
The three use cases with the highest levels of concern were game category, which shared 
multimedia and contact data (multimedia: μ = 1.51, contact: μ = 1.67); SN which shared 
multimedia, contact and phone information (multimedia: μ = 1.73, contact: μ = 1.86), and 
the third highest level of concern was the shopping category, which shared multimedia 
(multimedia: μ = 1.88). This indicates that multimedia information presented the highest 






Figure 5.1: Average User Preferences 
Participants are generally less concerned when an app category shares personal 
information related to the app’s core functionality.  For example, the fitness category that 
shares motion data which represents a core functionality for this category (μ =3.73) and 
navigation which shares location (exact location μ =3.03; approximate location μ =3.19).  
Regarding the exact location, participants are less concerned when app health, shopping 
and navigation categories share personal information related to the exact location (μ =3). 
Whilst, participants are highly concerned about sharing exact location with the game and 
social media category μ =2. When the exact location result compares with the multimedia 
in the social media category, which is the lowest level of concern, the conclusion that 
there is no statistically significant difference between them. 
In term of category, participants are highly concerned about sharing their information 
with the game category μ =2. On the contrary, participants feel more comfortable sharing 
their information with the health category μ =3.14. This result suggests that participants 
are unconcerned when a trusted app such as the NHS shares their information. For the 
remaining categories, the participants expressed different levels of concern.  
The overall insight into participants’ average preferences shows a good starting point to 
understand the current users’ privacy preferences. However, the outcomes of the average 




preferences, yet according to the literature review, users’ privacy preferences are diverse. 
Therefore, a serious move towards finding the variances in user preferences in each 
category in each app was necessary, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
The darker shades of red in Figure 5.2 indicate lower variance among users’ concern 
ratings for different categories. The variance outcome shows that users’ preferences are 
definitely diverse. In general, variances are larger than 0.8 (of a rating in a [1 to 5] scale) 
in all cases and lower than three. Even though Figure 5.2 shows participants were 
somewhat unconcerned about their information being shared by the health category, the 
variance outcome implies that participants’ preferences for the health category are in fact 
different, and represent the highest variance among the participants. 
The multimedia information in-game category appears the highest diversity among the 
participants. Whilst, the approximate and exact location for the navigation category also 
show the highest diversity among the participants. The outcomes of these results show 
that multimedia information presented the highest level of concern for the most 
participants, whether in the game, SN or shopping category.  
By looking at categories, the game category shows the lowest diversity among the 
participants. Moreover, the highest levels of concern were game category. This indicates 
that multimedia information presented the highest level of concern for the participants 
across different categories and most participants in the game category were conservative. 
This variance indicates that users’ privacy-related information could not adequately be 
captured by a one-size-fits-all default approach. Therefore, it is important to move toward 






Figure 5.2 Variances in User Preferences 
5.3.3 Privacy Profiling 
This section aims to find out how to cluster the entire user population into a number of 
subgroups in order to cater to different user preferences and expectations related to 
privacy information initially, user profiling could be utilised to cluster users into a smaller 
number of privacy profiles.  
Due to the dataset size is small, this research follows these processes: 
 Performing simple machine learning algorithms. 
 As a general rule associated with machine learning, the simpler the model, the better it 
learns from small datasets. Therefore, when it comes to small datasets, models require 
low complexity to avoid overfitting the data. For this reason, low-complexity machine 
learning such as hierarchical clustering, k-means and SVM would be utilised in this thesis 
as they are more likely to work well with smaller datasets (Lin et al, 2014a; Akman et al, 
2019).  
 Statistical testing methods, visual exploration, and the precision of predicting users’ 
preferences have been used to validate the clusters. 




Unsupervised machine learning was performed to obtain valuable insights from the data 
by seeing what groups the data points fall into. Before clustering the entire user population 
into a number of subgroups, the users’ preferences were encoded into a vector. After these 
pre-processing steps, a matrix of 46 columns which represent self-reported concern 
ratings of different data types, and 407 rows, were obtained, where each row of the matrix 
represents a participant. This step yielded a total number of 407 unique participants with 
18,722 responses. Each entry on the matrix was a value between one and five.  
Two algorithms were utilised to cluster users’ preferences into subgroups: k-means and 
hierarchical cluster. As discussed in Chapter Four, determining the optimal number of 
clusters in a data set is a fundamental issue in K-means clustering. Therefore, different 
approaches for estimating the optimal number of clusters have been proposed:  
 Statistical testing methods  
 Visual exploration  
 The precision of predicting users’ preferences 
Gap statistics were performed to determine the optimal number of clusters. The gap 
statistic compares the total within intra cluster variation for different values of k.  The 
optimum number of clusters is the smallest value of k. It is clear from Table 5.4 that the 
smallest sum of errors is the fourth cluster. 
No. of Clusters (K) Sum of Errors 
1      0.0131  
2      0.0102  
3      0.0096  
4       0.0095  
5      0.0105  
6      0.0103  
7      0.0098  




Visualisation of each profile would also make it easier to interpret the cluster. Hence, it 
helps to determine the optimal number of clusters. To demonstrate the meaning of each 
cluster, the centroid of each cluster was computed by averaging the feature vectors of 
instances within the cluster.  
Figure 5.3 shows that when the users’ preferences were divided into more than four 
clusters, it will be more difficult to interpret each cluster.  For example, when there are 
six clusters, cluster 2, 3 and 4 are similar (close) to each other. The centroid for cluster 2, 
3 and 4 are 2.3, 2.63 and 2.71.  In addition, both cluster 5 and 6 are almost close to each 
other, which represents unconcerned users. When there are seven clusters, the centroid 
for 2, 3, and 4 are also similar to each other. However, as the number of clusters increases, 
the similarity between the clusters gradually increases too. Therefore, when the number 
of clusters is four, it is easy to interpret and meaningful. Lin et al. (2014) also found four 
clusters useful, but they used hierarchical clustering with Canberra distance. They named 
each cluster based on their characteristics: conservatives, unconcerned, fence-sitters, and 
advanced users.  
 
Figure 5.3: Average of Each Cluster 
Multi classifications were performed to determine the optimal number of clusters. The 




when the classifier has a high prediction of determining each user with their cluster and 
has high accuracy, this indicates that the number of clusters is good to utilise. Table 5.5 
shows that both the number of cluster three and four have high accuracy (0.84 and 0.82) 
and high prediction. On the contrary, when the number of clusters is more than four, the 
correct prediction will decrease. 
No. of 
Clusters (K) 
Accuracy Lowest Prediction Cluster 
3 0.84 Cluster 2=77.8% 
4 0.82 Cluster 3=70% 
5 0.80 Cluster 1= 68% 
6 0.75 Cluster 6=40% 
Table 5.5: The Accuracy of Predicting Users’ Preferences 
Different methods were used to determine the optimal number of clusters in a data set. 
These methods include precision of predicting users’ preferences, the interpretability and 
understandability, and the gap statistic method. The results from the three methods show 
that four clusters is the optimal number of clusters. Despite three clusters showing the 
highest accuracy, four clusters has the smallest sum of errors and it is easy to interpret 
and more meaningful. Moreover, it is similar to the number of clusters that were found 
by Lin et al. (2014) in their study.  
Looking more deeply into the size of participant groups all four clusters, cluster 2 
represents the largest participant groups (33 %) compared to the others. In order to 
understand the characteristics of each cluster, the average of each app category and data 
type was computed for each cluster.  Cluster 3 represents the most conservative group 
because this group were extremely concerned about most of the data. Furthermore, the 
average of the cluster 3 is (μ= 1.7) which indicates this group felt uncomfortable with 
mobile apps that want to share their information. In terms of people who are comfortable 
with disclosing their data, cluster 4 has the largest area, covered in the green colour 




slightly concerned or not concerned.  Moreover, the average of the cluster 4 is (μ= 3.8) 
and represents the lowest participant groups (14 %). 
However, due to difficulties predicting the number of clusters in the k-means method and 
hierarchical clustering, it is easier to decide on the number of clusters by looking at the 
dendrogram, and so hierarchical clustering was performed in this research. Moreover, 
hierarchical clustering is much more informative and more interpretable than other 
methods such as k-means. 
Agglomerative hierarchical clustering has different methods for measuring the 
dissimilarity between sets of observations, such as average, single, complete, and ward. 
Therefore, it is important to determine the best method which can be used to measure the 
distance between pairs of observations. However, R code provides a function to attain the 
agglomerative coefficient, and it measures the amount of clustering structure found 
(values closer to 1 suggest a strong clustering structure). Table 5.6 shows the 
agglomerative coefficient for different methods. Ward’s method is the strongest 
clustering structure out of the four methods assessed, as shown in Table 5.6. 
Average Single Complete Ward 
0.7676869 0.5390081 0.8725427 0.9710358 
Table 5.6: The Agglomerative Coefficient for Different Dissimilarity Methods 
After performing Ward’s method, a dendrogram was used to represent the hierarchy of 
clusters. Figure 5.4 illustrates the resulting dendrogram produced by the above-mentioned 
clustering configurations, where different colours indicate the ten clusters when k=10. 
The dendrogram for the hierarchical method indicates that the number of clusters is more 





Figure 5.4: The Resulting Dendrogram Produced by Hierarchical Clustering 
However, to simplify each cluster analysis and make it easy to extract the output of data 
analyses, the result was visualised on a scatter plot, as shown in Figure 5.5. Cluster 5 is 
the largest cluster compared to others, while cluster 10 is the smallest. Furthermore, 
looking at the distances between the clusters, it shows that cluster 4 is far from cluster 8. 
These outcomes trigger many questions regarding the reasons that make these clusters 
different from each other. Therefore, more analysis is required in order to understand the 





Figure 5.5: Visualisation the Clusters Result in a Scatter Plot 
In order to understand the characteristics of each cluster, the average of each app category 
and data type was computed for each cluster, as shown in Table 5.7. Red cells indicate a 
higher level of concern, while green cells indicate a lower level of concern. Cluster 5 
represents the most conservative group because this group were extremely concerned 
about most of the data. Furthermore, Table 5.8 shows that the average of cluster 5 is (μ= 
1.4) which indicates this group felt uncomfortable with mobile apps that want to share 
their information, even if it is a trusted app such as NHS which shares their information. 
Looking more deeply into the size of participant groups, cluster 5 represents the largest 
participant groups compared to the others. By looking into the demographic 
characteristics, the largest numbers of postgraduate participants fall into cluster 5, which 
in turn could suggest why cluster 5 is the most conservative group. This poses another 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Game 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 
Health 2 4 2 4 2 2 4 5 4 4 
Fitness 3 3 2 4 2 2 4 4 2 4 
SN 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 4 2 4 
Shopping 4 3 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 3 
Productivity 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 5 2 3 
Lifestyle 3 2 3 2 1 2 3 4 2 4 
Navigation 3 3 2 3 1 3 3 5 2 3 
Approximate Location 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 4 
Exact Location 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 4 2 4 
Identity 3 4 2 3 2 2 4 4 3 4 
Contact 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 
Multimedia 3 1 2 3 1 2 2 4 1 2 
Phone 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 4 2 3 
Calendar 4 4 2 3 2 3 4 5 3 5 
Table 5.7: Average of Each App Category and Data in Each Cluster 
Clusters 3, 9, and 6 represent participants who are moderately concerned about sharing 
privacy-related information with the apps. When the centroid of each cluster was 
computed by averaging the feature vectors of instances within the cluster, clusters 3, 9, 
and 6 indicate moderately concerned at μ=2.07, μ=2.13 and μ=2.33 respectively, as 
shown in Table 5.8. Nevertheless, despite the centroid of clusters 3, 9, and 6 being quite 
similar, the participants have different levels of concern regarding the app category and 
data type. For instance, cluster 9 is extremely concerned about the game category, whilst 
cluster 3 and 6 are not. This observation raises an essential question regarding the variance 
between quite similar clusters because the significant variance similar cluster could 
possibly help to identify each profile. When each cluster in Table 5.7 was analysed, the 
outcome revealed that each cluster has a unique profile, even though there are some 





Average of each 
cluster 
Cluster 5 1.4 
Cluster 3 2.07 
Cluster 9 2.13 
Cluster 6 2.33 
Cluster 2  2.73 
Cluster 4 2.87 
Cluster 1 2.93 
Cluster 7 3.07 
Cluster10 3.47 
Cluster8 4.2 
Table 5.8: Cluster Ranking With the Average 
In terms of people who are comfortable with disclosing their data, cluster 8 has the largest 
area, covered in the green colour (indicate unconcerned). In general, participants who 
share this privacy profile are between slightly concerned or not concerned. On the 
contrary, the game category shows most concerned for cluster 8 and 10, which implies 
that groups are not unconcerned regarding all information. However, these groups (cluster 
8 and 10) represent 10% of all the participants, which indicates the unconcerned groups 
are a small number of participants compared to the other groups who are most concerned. 
A closer analysis suggests a possible interpretation that it might be the age groups of 
participants that plays a role in the falling into these groups because 63% of participants 
are age between 18 and 34 in cluster 8. 
In terms of the social psychology of privacy, an interesting finding from the analysis is 
that the preferences of the conservative group were the largest group, whilst Westin found 
that small numbers of users would fall at both extremes of the spectrum (i.e. privacy 
fundamentalist, and unconcerned) (Kumaraguru and Cranor, 2005). A possible 
interpretation might be that nearly half of the participants have a postgraduate degree in 
the whole dataset, as discussed in the demographic section, which may play a role in the 




Overall, the result of analysing of the ten clusters has revealed a significant variance 
between each cluster, which in turn could possibly help to predict many of the users’ 
preferences. Otherwise, users have to manually configure, which could significantly 
increase the burden on, and frustration of, the users. 
In terms of privacy knowledge, the results show that almost half of the participants were 
intermediate. Whilst 20% of them were a novice and 31% were advanced users, as shown 
in Figure 5.6. Regarding the question about understanding privacy settings for the apps, 
26% of participants rated themselves as extremely knowledgeable. The vast majority of 
them were advanced users.  
 
Figure 5.6: The Percentage of Novice, Intermediate and Advance 
On the other hand, 71% of participants who chose “Not knowledgeable at all” were novice 
users, as shown in Figure 5.7. In addition, there was a positive correlation between the 
levels of knowledge about the privacy of apps and understanding the privacy settings of 
the apps (r =0.525, p < 0.000), which means when the level of knowledge increases, the 
understanding of the privacy settings increases as well. Regarding the second question 
related to understanding the permission of apps, there was a positive correlation (r =0.524, 





Figure 5.7: Answers Distribution between Novice, Intermediate and Advance to the 
Question (Understanding Privacy Settings) 
Additionally, the following questions that are related to understanding privacy policy and 
privacy permissions yielded statistically significant correlations, as shown in Table 5.9. 
The results of these questions draw attention to the fact that the users are different in term 
of level of knowledge and how to manage privacy settings. This, in turn, emphasises the 
need to classify users. Accordingly, novice users need more assistance to understand 
privacy settings and how to control these settings. 
Factor 
Correlation 




Understanding permissions 0.524 0.001 Strong 
Understanding privacy settings 0.525 0.001 Strong 
Understanding privacy policy 0.478 0.001 Moderate 
Table 5.9: The Correlation between Understanding the Privacy of Apps and the Three 
Categories 
Further investigation looking at whether users’ demographic information, including age, 
gender, and education level, were conducted to check for any correlation with the three 
categories (novice, intermediate and advance) in order to assign users to one of these 
categories. In regard to gender, the results indicate significant differences between males 




A Spearman‘s test reveals no significant correlation between knowledge and age (r=0.96, 
p=0.53). A similar test on the education level of all groups of participants was also 
performed. The results show that the effect of education level is a significant correlation 
(r=0.98, p=.04). Although there is a statistically significant correlation between education 
level and knowledge, this correlation is weak according to Cohen's (1992) guidelines, as 
discussed in the methodology chapter. Table 5.10 shows the correlation between 
demographic information and the three categories (novice, intermediate and advanced) 
and the strength of the relationship. 
Factor Correlation 
coefficient ( r ) 
P-value Strength of the 
relationship 
Gender -0.98 0.04 Weak 
Age 0.96 0.53 No correlation  
Education level 0.98  0.04 Weak 
Table 5.10: The Correlation between Demographic Information and the Level of Knowledge 
Regarding providing user multi-level privacy controls (No access, Low access, and Full 
Access), 87% of participants strongly agree or somewhat agree to have this feature. The 
results indicate the need to provide users with more fine-grained privacy controls on 
mobile platforms. Furthermore, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
knowledge and display for multi-level privacy controls. When the level of knowledge 
increases, the need to display multi-level privacy controls increases as well (R=-0.115, 
p=0.021).  
5.3.4 Possible Ways to Assign Privacy Profiles 
This section examines how to predict many of a user’s mobile app privacy preferences, 
which could significantly reduce user burden with minimum questions. Accordingly, 
different techniques were utilised to assign users to the privacy profiles that most closely 




examined to look at whether users’ demographic characteristics, including questions 
related to gender, age, education and level of knowledge, are sufficient to determine 
which privacy profile a user should be assigned.  
The results of the demographic information shown in Table 5.11 indicate that apps should 
not directly use gender, age, education or level of knowledge to assign users to privacy 
profiles that closely capture their preferences, because each demographic information 
attribute is distributed between each cluster, and there are no significant differences in 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age 18-24 9% 6% 6% 18% 9% 3% 12% 18% 18% 3% 
24-34 10% 12% 8% 13% 16% 8% 6% 6% 13% 7% 
35-44 12% 9% 13% 9% 23% 6% 5% 6% 17% 1% 
44+ 2% 0% 27% 7% 29% 12% 5% 2% 12% 2% 
Education Less bachelor 13% 9% 11% 20% 13% 7% 7% 7% 7% 9% 
Bachelor  9% 8% 9% 15% 15% 7% 6% 9% 15% 6% 
Postgraduate  9% 9% 14% 7% 23% 8% 6% 5% 17% 1% 
Knowledge Novice 13% 10% 8% 10% 20% 6% 7% 12% 10% 4% 
Intermediate 9% 10% 16% 13% 14% 8% 5% 6% 17% 4% 
Advance 10% 6% 8% 10% 26% 8% 7% 6% 15% 5% 
Gender Male 11% 7% 13% 14% 20% 6% 6% 5% 13% 4% 
Female 7% 13% 8% 5% 18% 10% 7% 11% 18% 3% 
Table 5.11: Distribution of Demographic in each User Group 
Even when the combination of demographic information has computed the distributions 
between clusters, there are no significant differences as well. Therefore, another 
technique was performed to predict the users’ mobile app privacy preferences.  
The machine learning approach was applied in order to predict the users’ mobile app 
privacy preferences. R program supports different machine algorithms, such as Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), Random Forest (RF) and K-Nearest Neighbors (kNN). Before 
using the classifier, it was important to determine which questions are the most important 




used to minimise the 46 questions and help the models perform better and more 
efficiently, as shown in Figure 5.8.  
 
Figure 5.8: Feature Selection Methods 
 Machine learning assigns a weight to general questions about privacy-related 
information. Hence, it should be easy to minimise the number of questions, which 
in turn could actually help reduce user burden. Table 5.12 shows the features 
ranked according to the ranking algorithm with their weight.   
N Category Weight 
1 Exact Location 0.12 
2 Health  0.10 
3 Multimedia  0.10 
4 Contact 0.10 
5 Approximate Location 0.09 
6 Shopping  0.08 
7 Identity 0.08 
8 Productivity  0.07 
9 Fitness 0.07 
10 Lifestyle 0.06 
11 Navigation 0.05 
12 Social media 0.04 
13 Game 0.03 
Table 5.12: The 13 Most Important Questions 
Ten fold cross-validations were performed to estimate accuracy. This divides the data into 
10 groups, train in nine and test in one, and is released for all combinations of train-test 
splits. The process was repeated three times for each algorithm with different splits of the 
data into 10 groups, in an effort to attain a more accurate estimate to predict the users’ 
mobile app privacy preferences. SVM machine-learning algorithm was evaluated in order 
to select an appropriate number of questions to ask the user.  
Set of all questions 








In order to study the effect of change from the number of questions on the accuracy, the 
accuracy of the SVM algorithm was evaluated based on several question sets (13 to 1 
question respectively). Figure 5.9 shows that from 13 to 5 questions had accuracy equal 
or greater than 80%. Whilst the result between 4 to1 questions shows a low precision 
(<=70%) which indicates indicate a large number of False Positives. Despite 91% being 
the highest accuracy with 13 questions, 13 questions could increase the user’s burden. 
Therefore, looking at a lower number of questions, the SVM classifiers show the five 
questions would be a reasonable result, which could be used in the initial interface to 
assign the user to the profile. This result reflects the exploration of trade-offs between 
accuracy and the number of questions; in other words, trade-offs between accuracy and 
user burden. The result also decreased by 90% (46 to 5 questions) of the user’s effort. 
 
Figure 5.9: The Results of Accuracy from SVM Algorithm 
To compare the outcomes of SVM model with other algorithms, three different machine-
learning algorithms were evaluated in order to determine the best algorithm for this 
problem. The following list shows these algorithms: 
 Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA). 
 Classification and Regression Trees (CART). 




Figure 5.10 indicates that the CART algorithm shows the lowest accuracy compared to 
other algorithms. Whilst, the SVM algorithm had the highest accuracy with different 
question sets.  These outcomes indicated that the SVM algorithm could be used in this 
model because it offers the highest accuracy with different question sets. This algorithm 
also has the advantage of being quite efficient computationally compare to other 
algorithms. 
 
Figure 5.10: The Results of Accuracy from Different Algorithms 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
The initial requirements were set out in this chapter according to prior studies in order to 
enhance privacy technology on mobile apps, which in turn would help users to increase 
their awareness of privacy issues, and help them to manage a large volume of data, taking 
into account the level of users’ knowledge. The survey was designed to include these 
initial requirements in order to explore whether these requirements would meet the 
current users’ privacy preferences and achieve their desires. The results of the survey 
have been derived from a range of participants with a variety of backgrounds in terms of 
gender, age, education, and level of knowledge, and these factors had some impact on the 




The survey findings reveal interesting results related to the prioritisation of information. 
The outcomes from this study indicate that is possible to divide the users into 10 unique 
subgroups that have similar preferences in terms of privacy-related information. This 
clearly represents a significant reduction in user burden while allowing users to better 
control information. Furthermore, the result of 10 clusters shows that is possible to 









Chapter Six   
Requirements Analysis for  





6. Requirements Analysis for Privacy usability   
6.1 Introduction 
It has been found from the analysis of the literature review in Chapter Three that there is 
an issue regarding how to design usable interfaces that maximise user satisfaction. 
Therefore, this chapter seeks to design usable initial interfaces based on HCI principles. 
The initial interfaces have been used to investigate end users’ perceptions and attitudes 
towards usability in order to develop usable and adaptive interfaces that maximise user 
satisfaction. This analysis and investigation is in the form of a survey, and the third section 
presents the methodology of the survey questions. The fourth section provides an insight 
into vision-related ways of how to improve the initial interface, which in turn could 
overcome the usability issues without compromising the users’ convenience.  
However, it is important to consider the interfaces that are presented to end-users due to 
users playing an essential role in controlling their personal information, which in turn will 
increase users’ awareness and help them to discriminate potentially harmful actions. 
Therefore, usability is arguably one of the essential requirements in the field of privacy 
today, which is described as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users 
to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction in a specified 
context of use” (ISO 9241, 1998).  
6.2 Usable Interface Design Literature 
 Numerous studies have been published in the usability literature that have focused on 
identifying usability problems and proposing guidelines and recommendations to address 
them  (Nielsen, 1994; Johnston, et al., 2003). Nielsen (1994) has developed the 10 most 
general principles for interaction design by comparing several published sets of usability 




that these principles seem to be excellent for explaining the usability problems previously 
found. The 10 general principles are presented in Table 6.1. 
Criteria of HCI Description 
1. Visibility of system status  The system should always keep users informed about what is going 
on through appropriate feedback within reasonable time.  
2. Match between system 
and the real world 
The system should speak the users’ language with words, phrases 
and concepts familiar to the user, rather than system-oriented terms. 
Moreover, it should follow real-world conventions, making 
information appear in a natural and logical order. 
3. User control and freedom  Users often choose system functions by mistake and will need a 
clearly marked "emergency exit" to leave the unwanted state without 
having to go through an extended dialogue. Support undo and redo 
functions.  
4. Consistency and standards  Users should not have to wonder whether different words, situations, 
or actions mean the same thing. It should follow platform 
conventions.  
5. Error prevention  
 
Even better than good error messages is a careful design which 
prevents a problem from occurring in the first place. The system 
should either eliminate error-prone conditions or check for them and 
present users with a confirmation option before they commit to the 
action.  
6. Recognition rather than 
recall  
Minimize the user’s memory load by making objects, actions, and 
options visible. The user should not have to remember information 
from one part of the dialogue to another. Instructions for use of the 
system should be visible or easily retrievable whenever appropriate.  
 
7. Flexibility and efficiency 
of use  
Accelerators — unseen by the novice user — may often speed up the 
interaction for the expert user such that the system can cater to both 
inexperienced and experienced users. It allows users to tailor 
frequent actions.  
8. Aesthetic and minimalist 
design  
Dialogues should not contain information, which is irrelevant or 
rarely needed. Every extra unit of information in a dialogue competes 
with the relevant units of information and diminishes their relative 
visibility.  
9. Help users recognize, 
diagnose, and recover 
from errors  
Error messages should be expressed in plain language (no codes), 
precisely indicate the problem, and constructively suggest a solution.  
10. Help and documentation  Even though it is better if the system can be used without 
documentation, it may be necessary to provide help and 
documentation. Any such information should be easy to search, 
focused on the user’s task, such as a list of concrete steps to be carried 
out, and not be too large.  
Source: (Nielsen, 1994) 
Table 6.1: Nielsen 10 Usability Heuristics 
Plaisant and Shneiderman (2005) have proposed eight usability guidelines, based on the 




Plaisant and Shneiderman’s Eight Golden Rules of interface design are the most widely 
used set of usability. Looking at the similarities and differences between Nielsen’s rules 
and Plaisant and Shneiderman’s rules, it is found that five of the presented rules are the 
same for both sets of principles:  
 Flexibility and efficiency of use 
 Consistency and standards 
 Visibility of system  status 
 Error prevention and/or recovery 
 Memory load reduction  
However, Nielsen focuses more on help, aesthetic and minimalist design, whilst Plaisant 
and Shneiderman provide users with more control to meet the user’s desire and make 
them the initiators of actions rather than the responders. However, the limitation of both 
these studies is that they are general usability guidelines and the researchers have not 
considered the security impact or created a balance between security and usability. 
In term of security, Johnston et. al.  (2003) introduced a new term in the usable security 
field called HCI-S. The term is defined as “the part of a user interface which is responsible 
for establishing the common ground between a user and the security features of a system. 
HCI-S is human-computer interaction applied in the area of computer security.” Johnston 
et. al.  (2003) developed a set of six HCI guidelines in order to form a balance between 
security and usability, as shown in Table 6.2 
However, the HCI-S concept introduced by Johnston et. al.  (2003) did not address how 
to enhance users’ security awareness, in particular, privacy, yet enhancing users’ privacy 





Criteria of HCI Description 
1. Convey features  
 
The interface needs to convey the available security 
features to the user. 
2. Visibility of system 
status 
It is important for the user to be able to observe the 
security status of the internal operations.  
3. Learnability  
 
The interface needs to be as non-threatening and easy to 
learn as possible.  
4. Aesthetic and minimalist 
design  
 
Only relevant security information should be displayed.  
5. Errors  It is important for the error message to be detailed and to 
state, if necessary, where to obtain help.  
6. Satisfaction  
 
Does the interface aid the user in having a satisfactory 
experience with a system?  
Source: Johnston et al. (2003) 
Table 6.2: HCI-S Criteria 
Ibrahim et al. (2010) also developed a set of HCI-S guidelines based on a literature review 
in order to enhance security tool interfaces. These guidelines focus on how to provide 
users with a usable alert to help them to make informed decisions and give a timely 
response with a consistent presentation of information. The guidelines are listed below: 
 Interface Design Matches User’s Mental Model: The interfaces should be 
designed according to user’s thinking to match the user’s mental model. 
 Aesthetic and Minimalist Design: The interfaces should only show the important 
and relevant information. 
 Visibility of the Alert Detector Name: It is useful to display the security tool name 
when the alert appears. 
 Establish Standard Colours to Attract Users’ Attention: It would be useful to 
design attractive colours to draw the user’s attention and help them to interpret 




 Use Icons as Visual Indicators: It is important to utilise the icons and pictures 
during the design to make the interfaces easily interpretable and understood by 
the user. 
 Explicit Words to Classify the Security Risk Level: The level of the risk should 
be displayed clearly in the system 
 Consistent Meaningful Vocabulary: The sentences on the interfaces should be 
look consistent and function in a similar way. 
 Consistent Controls and Placement: The controls should appear in an appropriate 
location in the interface in order to be found by users easily. 
 Learnability and Flexibility: The security alert should provide users with more 
flexibility and enhance the user’s ability to learn the required security basics. 
 Take Advantage of Previous Security Decision: Displaying information about the 
triggered alert and simple statistics, which summarises this information, would be 
useful for the user to make an informed decision. 
 Online Security Policy Configuration : The designers should develop default 
settings for the security policy. 
 Confirm / Recover the Impact of User Decision: The security tool should give 
users the opportunity to recover the error and modify the response. 
 Awareness of System Status all the Time: It would be useful to provide users with 
a simple report regarding the state of the system. 
 Help Provision and Remote Technical Support: The user should be able to obtain 
more help with extra information at the time of the alert with an appropriate 
response. 
 Offer Responses that Match User Expectation: The security tool should meet 




 Trust and Satisfaction : The security tool should be easy to understand and prevent 
performance failure to increase users’ acceptance and satisfaction. 
Additionally, several researchers (Whitten and Tygar, 1999; Yee, 2002; Zhou, Blustein 
and Zincir-Heywood, 2004), have proposed a set of design guidelines that consider 
security. These studies aim to address the security features of the GUI in order to design 
a more user-friendly interface that is easier to understand. These guidelines could be 
utilised in this research to overcome the usability issues and improve the interface. For 
instance, Whitten and Tygar (1999) focus on the issue of novice and non-technical users 
who have little initial understanding of security. They emphasise that security interfaces 
may confuse novice users due to a lack of consistency in their design and not clarifying 
the message, thus hindering rather than helping users. Therefore, they suggest that to 
make the interface usable, the designer needs to consider the novice user during the 
design. This draws attention to one of the research requirements, which is about adapting 
the interface to the user’s knowledge, which in turn should be considered during the 
design of the interface. 
To enhance privacy technology in the user interfaces, LaTouche (2013) proposed eight 
guidelines which focus on user interfaces for Web-based privacy-enhancing technologies 
in order to help designers to address the lack of user control features. The guidelines are 
listed as follows: 
 Visibility of user-controlled e-privacy features. 
 Conformance of privacy policy statements and user preferences. 
 Navigation and graphical design. 
 User control and freedom over personal data.  
 Help users recognize and track the use of personal information. 




 Allow easy monitoring and notification of accesses to personal data. 
 Help and feedback. 
However, the design would be more difficult when it comes to mobile interfaces and their 
apps due to the screen size and resolution restricting mobile phones in displaying content. 
Moreover, the usability guidelines for mobile interfaces are limited, which creates more 
challenges during the design of the proposed system. To overcome this limitation, 
Baharuddin et. al. (2013) proposed usability guidelines that could help researchers to 
design usable mobile applications, which include four dimensions: mobile user, mobile 
task, mobile technology and mobile environment. These factors would guide designers to 
decide which usability dimensions should be considered during the design. The user 
profile is an essential factor that helps to identify the characteristics of potential users and 
design the information required by them, which in turn determines which information is 
more suitable to be presented for users.  
6.3 Initial Interfaces 
As seen in Chapter Three, most of the solutions introduced to protect the users’ privacy 
focus on technical issues, whilst only a few studies have focused on the usability 
perspective. Usability problems in these systems can lead to privacy vulnerabilities 
because users may miss an attack altogether or misdiagnose it. Moreover, when interfaces 
are presented with too little or misleading information, or are too cumbersome, or 
overwhelm the users with too much information, then security could be failing.  
To overcome the usability limitations in the prior studies, this research seeks to design 
the initial system according to HCI principles. However, privacy notification is one of the 
primary requirement of privacy and data protection in order to educate and enhance the 




Therefore, notification interfaces have been designed which include a clear indication of 
the current privacy status and warnings for events of interest or concern. Informing the 
user about what is going on through appropriate feedback is suggested by Nielsen (1994) 
and Johnston, et al., (2003) which has guided the visibility of system status. 
The first consideration for the notification design is the type of information being 
communicated (Kim, 2015). In general, the notification contains contextual information 
related to on-going data transfers such as location or contact. The second consideration is 
how to design user interfaces for the notification. One of the options would be to show a 
small icon in the device’s status bar, similar to those used by Android to indicate GPS 
usage, as shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: The Small Icon in the Status Bar 
The problem with this method is it may easily go unnoticed (Wagner et al., 2016). 
Therefore, Wagner et al. (2016) suggest a small notification and a large pop-up window. 
Therefore, these two types of notification have been presented to the participants in order 
to investigate their expectations and preferences. 
Another important aspect is the integration of user controls and consent into notifications 
to make them actionable (Schaub, Balebako and Cranor, 2017). Agarwal and Hall (2012) 
proposed two options - “Protect” or “Allow” - on the notification in order to control the 
data which can be utilised.  
Accordingly, Figure 6.2 was designed in order inform the user about on-going privacy 
risks and provides the user with mitigation options to minimise the risk incurred. It can 




information. It is also important to avoid the use of technical terms  in the notification 
which can confuse the user attempting to understand the notification. This is particularly 
useful for novice users to understand what a privacy notification means (Nurse et al., 
2011). 
 
Figure 6.2: Short Interface Notification 
A large pop-up window is another option to inform the user about on-going privacy risks, 
as shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
Figure 6.3: Full Interface Notification 
As previously mentioned, it is important to provide the user with mitigation options to 




shown in Figure 6.4, which shows how the protection settings look for the proposed 
system. The interface will be displayed when the user clicks the protect button from the 
notification interface. To support different multi-level privacy controls for users in the 
proposed system, Figure 6.4 shows three levels: full access, low access and no access.    
 
Figure 6.4: Three Levels Privacy Protections Settings 
Moreover, Sheikh et al. (2008), Christin et al. (2011), and Kim et al. (2017) suggested 
more than three levels of privacy control in order to achieve more flexible privacy 
controls. Accordingly, another interface has been designed with four levels for the 





Figure 6.5: Four Levels Privacy Protections Settings 
In general, the criteria of several researchers (Chiasson et al. (2006), Chiasson et al. 
(2007), Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) Johnston et al. (2003), Nielsen (2005) Whitten and 
Tygar (1999) and Yee (2002)) has guided the interfaces design and how it should match 
users’ mental model. Mental models are connected to the way that users look at the world 
around them based on belief, not facts, and simulating these models into the system. For 
instance, when users see a bin on the desktop, they expect it to be for delete files. 
Therefore, this design seeks to match the user’s mental model because mental models 
play a significant role in HCI and interaction design. Paul et al. (2012) proposed the C4PS 
privacy interface which utilises a colour coding scheme for making privacy settings more 
usable. Moreover, Muñoz-Arteaga et al. (2008) utilised the colours of traffic lights to 
determine security level. For instance, the system displays a traffic light image with the 
green colour to indicate the system is protected.  Hence, a traffic-light pattern approach 
has been adopted for designing the privacy protection setting interfaces to make privacy 
protections more usable and assist the user to understand the function of these options 
quickly.    
To design different options for the protection levels interfaces, a review of the design and 
API documentation of Android and iOS was conducted, and it was found that there is 




well from the real world to touchscreens. The mobile operating system provides two types 
of sliders: continuous slider and a discrete slider.  The discrete slider allows users to make 
slider adjustments until meeting their preference, as shown in Figure 6.6.  
 
Figure 6.6: Four Levels of Privacy Protections Settings Sliders 
The protection settings interface contains a risk impact interface in order to help the 
novice user to make an informed decision about protecting his or her privacy.  Bal et al. 
(2015) proposed the Styx privacy tool, which displays the risk impact interface and seeks 
to enhance the comprehensibility of privacy risks while at the same time increasing trust 
and reducing concern. Johnston et al. (2003) and Nielsen (2005) emphasise providing 




interface has been designed, as shown in Figure 6.7. One of the essential criteria for 
Johnston et al. (2003) is learnability, which can be achieved by a risk impact interface. 
 
Figure 6.7: Graphic User Interface  
Katsabas et al (2005) found that novices will find it hard to comprehend the security 
threats if technical vocabulary and advanced terms are used profusely. Therefore, the use 
of technical terms in the risk impact interface was avoided because it could confuse the 
user attempting to understand the information.  
From a psychology perspective, it is possible to distinguish between two types of memory 
retrieval: recognition versus recall (Budiu, 2014). Therefore, Nielsen (2005) proposed 
one of the primary usability guidelines, which is recognition rather than recall. 
Recognition refers to the human ability to “recognise” information as being familiar, 
whereas recall indicates the retrieval of related details from memory (Budiu, 2014).  
Hence, visual icons have been used in the risk impact interface in order to attract users’ 
attention to make the content of the interface easily interpreted and understood and to 
promote recognition. 
However, some users may prefer the Text-based User Interface (TUI), and a Graphic User 
Interface (GUI) does not always mean ease of use. Chen and Zhang (2007) compared 




interface was better for advanced users than a GUI interface; although it is difficult to use 
the TUI interface for novice users. This indicates the importance of considering both 
interfaces, GUI and TUI, in the design and investigating the users’ preferences. 
Accordingly, a TUI risk impact interface has been designed, as shown in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8: Text-based interface 
Regarding the transparency requirement that was discussed in Chapter Five, historical 
view interfaces have been designed, as shown in Figure 6.9. Ibrahim et al. (2014) suggest 
taking advantage of previous security decisions because it will be useful for the users in 
the decision-making process and provide them with the opportunity to evaluate the effect 
of their decision. However, historical view interfaces utilised the colours of the traffic 
light to determine the protection level, similar to the colours on the protection level 
interface mentioned above. This design has led to achieving one of the important 






Figure 6.9: Historical View Interfaces with Colours 
Hall and Hanna (2004) highlight that black text on a white background was found to be 
more readable than other combinations of colours. Lynch (2008) also suggests a white 
background with black text for optimal contrast results. Deubel (2003) recommends other 
colours such as grey and pastels for backgrounds. In these studies, providing a sufficient 
contrast is an essential factor to improve readability and would make the interface easy 
to interpret for colour-blind users. Accordingly, another historical view interface was 
designed to consider another colour such as black text and white background, as shown 
in Figure 6.10, which could improve the readability. One of the advantages of this 
interface is that it uses a few colours because the fewer colours used in the design, the 





Figure 6.10: Historical View Interface White and Black Colours 
Accordingly, the initial interfaces were designed based on the following guidelines from 
different sources: 
 Interface design matches user’s mental model (Chiasson et al. (2006), Chiasson 
et al. (2007), Herzog and Shahmehri (2007) Johnston et al. (2003), Nielsen 
(2005),Whitten and Tygar (1999) and Yee (2002)). 
 Visibility of the System Status (Nielsen, 2005). 
 Recognition Rather than Recall guidelines (Nielsen, 2005). 
 Use Icons as Visual Indicators (Ibrahim et al. 2014). 
 Strive for consistency within (Plaisant and Shneiderman 2005). 
 Learnability (Johnston et al., 2003). 
 Take advantage of previous security decisions (Ibrahim et al., 2014). 




6.4 Survey Methodology 
To explore end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards the initial design, the survey was 
designed to include these interfaces. The survey includes four primary questions related 
to usability which were derived from the initial requirements and organised as follows: 
1. Notification interfaces questions 
Regarding the notification questions, two interfaces were displayed to the participants 
because the prior study suggested a small notification and a large pop-up window, as 
discussed in the section on initial interface design. This would help to investigate users’ 
expectations and preferences towards these two interfaces. Accordingly, this question has 
been presented to the participants:  
"Two interfaces will be displayed to you. The first interface is full-screen notification 
whilst the second interface is short screen notification. Please, read each statement 
carefully and rate each point based on the above interface" 
 The icons used in the notification. 
This question would help to find out how the icon on the notification interface can visually 
please users and enhance the aesthetic appeal of the design. 
 The understanding of the interface.  
Prior studies demonstrated that users struggle to understand privacy notification. 
Therefore, this question aims to measure how easy to understand the information provided 
in notification. 




Another important aspect is the integration of user controls and consents into notifications 
to make them actionable. The notification contains two options - “Protect” or “Allow” - 
in order to control the data. Accordingly, this question aims to assess how options - 
“Protect” or “Allow” - on the notification interfaces are easy to use. 
2. Help and support interfaces questions 
The survey also includes help and support interfaces in order to help the user to make an 
informed decision about protecting his or her privacy. The help and support interfaces 
questions aim to investigate users’ understanding of interfaces. Additionally, the 
participants were asked to choose between the Graphic User Interface (GUI) and Text-
based for the risk impact interface to find out to what extent participants prefer any 
interface. Moreover, the following scenario was presented to the participants: 
“From this interface, you can understand the risk impact when the app sends your 
personal information each time. For example, when the Facebook app wants to send your 
location each time, it could infer the location of your work, home, and school.” 
After presenting the scenario to the participants, the following statements have been 
shown to them: 
 The icons used in the risk impact interfaces. 
As demonstrated in the initial interfaces section, visual icons have been utilised in the risk 
impact interface in order to attract users’ attention to make the content of the interface 
easily interpreted and understood. To make sure this aim is achieved, therefore, this 
question was presented to the participants. 




The question aims to make sure the participants could easily to understand the risk impact. 
Hence, the responses for this question would help to make sure the interface convey the 
available privacy features to the user effectively. 
 The text font used in the risk impact interface. 
This question aims to identify any problems with the font in terms of readability and size.  
3. Privacy control interfaces questions. 
Two Privacy control interfaces have been included in the survey aim to explore how easy 
the interface to use and to understand. The interfaces were presented to the participants 
as animated pictures to help them to understand how to perform the tasks. Then, the 
following statements were presented to the participants: 
“From the interface, you can select a certain level of privacy to help you control your 
personal information easily. Please, read each statement carefully and rate each point 
based on the above interface”   
 The understanding of privacy control interfaces. 
The privacy control should be easy to understand in order to increase users’ acceptance 
and satisfaction. Therefore, this question would assess how easy it is to understand the 
information provided in these interfaces. 
 The icons used in the interface. 
The traffic-light icons have been utilised for designing the privacy protection setting 
interfaces to make privacy protections more usable and assist the user to understand the 




icons are designed. This question would help to find out how the icons can visually please 
users and enhance the aesthetic appeal of the design. 
    The ease of selecting a certain level of privacy. 
The questionnaire displays some interfaces such as privacy control interfaces and has an 
animated image to guide the user on how to use the interfaces. Therefore, after displaying 
the interfaces, the question was presented to participants concerning how easy the 
interfaces are to use. This question aimed to assess how efficient the interfaces make 
completing tasks. The user interface needs to be intuitive, which means even if the user 
has never used the interface before, they should be able to predict how it works and 
navigate it with ease. 
4. Historical view interfaces questions. 
The survey also includes historical view interfaces to investigate user' understanding 
regarding these interfaces and how well the colours are designed. As discussed in the 
section on initial interface design, prior studies suggested two types of interfaces 
historical colour interface and another historical view interface that consider another 
colour such as black text and white background. Therefore, the survey includes these two 
interfaces to investigate to what extent participants prefer any interface. Moreover, the 
interfaces included the following statement:  
“The interface presents data history to help you to know who has accessed data, when 
and at which degree of granularity. Please, read each statement carefully and rate each 
point based on the above interface.”  




Due to using colour on the history interfaces, therefore there were questions regarding 
colour. The right choice of colour will make it easier for users to immediately determine 
what they can do on each interface and will satisfy aesthetic needs and provide visual 
solutions. Ultimately, this question would help to create a clear and harmonious style that 
meets users’ needs. 
 The understanding of the history interface 
This question aims to measure how easy it is to understand the information provided 
in the interfaces. Moreover, this question would help to identify what aspect of the 
interfaces are difficult to understand, especially by novice users, which would help to 
improve the interface design in the context of how easy they are to understand.  
 The text font and size  
This question aims to identify any problems with the font in terms of readability and size. 
The right choice of text could measurably improve user productivity and increase user 
satisfaction. 
In general, these questions are aimed at helping to measure users’ satisfaction with the 
interfaces and to find out the possible weaknesses in these interfaces. Moreover, there is 
a comment field in order to receive useful feedback, which in turn would improve the 
design interfaces to meet users’ satisfaction. 
The next step is regarding the types of scale that can be suitably used in the survey. 
Nielsen (2012) describes usability as a quality attribute that assesses how easy user 
interfaces are to use.  Therefore, the rating scales used five points of the level of quality, 
which include poor, fair, good, very good and excellent, which in turn measure users’ 




Accordingly, the initial interfaces were designed based on HCI principles to overcome 
usability issues without compromising the users’ satisfaction. Therefore, the initial 
interfaces were included in the survey in order to explore the users’ thoughts regarding 
the design of those interfaces. Moreover, the current approach in the survey involved 
creating two types of interfaces for various notifications and screens in order to cater for 
the full range of users’ needs and expectations, which in turn provide participants with a 
level of flexibility by providing users with different options of the interface (Christin et 
al., 2012). This approach might be perceived as a sensible trade-off between the flexibility 
and to reduce participants burden to be less confusing to increase the response rate. 
6.5 Analysis of the Results 
This section aims to explore the users’ thoughts regarding the design and the functionality 
of the interfaces. 86% strongly agree or somewhat agree to have the ability to change 
privacy notification settings for different apps (μ= 1.5). Regarding the type of 
notifications, 56.3% of participants prefer full-screen notifications, whilst 43.7% of 
participants prefer the short screen. In terms of the icons that are used in the notification 
interfaces, 72% of participants stated that the icons are excellent or very good in the full-
screen notification, and an almost similar result of 70% was found for the short screen. 
The result of the notifications questions strongly indicates that equipping the solution 
with the push notification feature is effective for enhancing the user’s awareness, 
especially for users with little experience with mobile apps. In addition, notification 
preferences are diverse because some of the participants prefer full screen notifications, 
whilst others prefer the short screen.  
Another requirement to help the user to make an informed decision for protecting his or 




understood the risk impact from the interface by combining the scale from excellent to 
good. In the context of the novice participants, the vast majority of them (86.7%) 
indicated they understood the risk impact from the interface. When the participants were 
asked to choose between Graphic User Interface (GUI) and Text-based, 80% chose the 
GUI for the risk impact interface. The comparative study of user preferences with regards 
help and notification interfaces revealed differing results. While the vast majority of 
participants prefer one particular help interface called “GUI”, two notification interfaces 
appeared to be equally preferred by the participants. 
Specific questions were asked to investigate users’ usability perspectives regarding the 
history interface, and 81% of participants chose the interface that contains data history 
with colours to help the user to know who has accessed data, when and at which degree 
of granularity. 92% of participants stated that the interface is excellent or very good or 
good for understanding the history view. Regarding the colour of the interface, 86% of 
the participants indicated the colour is excellent or very good or good. 
In relation to participants’ attitudes towards icons and colours on all interfaces, as shown 
in Figure 6.11, the responses were above 85%, which represents good and over. 86% is 
the lowest percentage, which is about the history interface. This would indicate that the 
history interface requires further improvement in term of colour design. One of the 
advanced users stated in the comments that the red colour affected his understanding of 
the interface. ِMost of the comments regarding the history interface are about the red 
colour being too flashy and so it requires more improvement. In addition, there is a 




interface. When the level of knowledge increased, the understanding of the interface 
increased as well (R=-0.144, p=0.004).  
 
Figure 6.11: The Participants’ View on Icons and Colours 
As a result, it is difficult for novice users to understand the history interface when there 
is a large volume of data. Therefore, it is important to consider both expert and novice 
users when interfaces are being designed. For instance, one of the comments regarding 
history interface is: “users or moderators looking for simplicity when using 
applications”. 
In general, the results presented in Figure 6.12 indicate that over 90% of the participants 
stated that the interfaces are easy to understand. This is perhaps due to the icons and 
colours, which could make the interface simple and easy to understand with less technical 
terminology. When it comes to the text font used for the interfaces, 92% of the survey 
respondents rated it excellent or very good or good. This result shows that the font is good 






Figure 6.12: The Participants’ View on Understanding the Interfaces 
When examining the participants’ preferences according to their knowledge, and finding 
out the differences between novice, intermediate and advanced users in terms of which 
screen they prefer, the results indicate that there is no significant difference between 
novice, intermediate and advanced users. This result shows that there is no correlation 
between users’ preferences regarding the interfaces and knowledge factors.    
Advanced participants 
It is important to consider advanced participants’ opinions towards the attributes of the 
interfaces to investigate whether they have any ideas regarding the design, which in turn 
could help to improve the interfaces.  
Regarding how easy the interfaces are to understand, a few participants chose poorly for 
this attribute. However, for some interfaces such as the history interface, protection 
settings and full-screen notification, no expert participants chose the poor level to 
understand the interfaces. Rather, the vast majority of their choices are between excellent 





Figure 6.13: Experts’ Opinions about Understanding the Interfaces 
Similarly, regarding how easy the interface to use, the vast majority of expert participants 
chose excellent or good. However, the protection settings interface revealed the lowest 
percentage for those who chose excellent or good compared to the other interfaces, as 
shown in Figure 6.14. When looking at the differences between novice users and experts 
regarding how easy it is to use the protections settings, it is found there is no difference, 
as 74% of novice users stated they are are excellent or good, while 73% from the experts 
did so. The experts’ choices for the lowest level of the scale (poor or fair) were very little, 
which indicates that interfaces in general are easy to use. 
 




In general, the experts’ opinions were positive regarding each attribute of the interfaces, 
where the overall percentage is over 90% when combining between excellent or very 
good or good, as shown in Figure 6.15 . The most interesting point is that there is an 
agreement across most of the results for these attributes: easy to use, easy to understand, 
font and the quality of icons. It can be deduced from these outcomes that there are no 
remarkable differences between experts’ opinions and all participants’ opinions. This is 
perhaps due to considering the knowledge level during the design phase of these 
interfaces, which has been discussed in Chapter Five. 
  
Figure 6.15: Experts’ Opinions about All Interfaces 
6.6 Conclusion 
The initial interfaces were designed based on HCI principles to overcome usability issues. 
The initial interfaces were included in the survey in order to explore the users’ thoughts 
regarding the design and the functionality of those interfaces, which in turn could help to 
overcome the usability limitations without compromising the users’ convenience. In 
general, the majority of the participants’ perceptions and attitudes towards the initial 




which should maximise user satisfaction. Furthermore, the survey revealed an interesting 
result whereby users are different not only in the context of prioritisation of their 
information, as seen in Chapter Five, but also in the context of design, multilevel privacy 
controls, and level of knowledge. This, in turn, emphasises the need for a holistic tailored 
solution for users, considering all these dimensions. 
When it comes to comparing participants’ preferences between two interfaces, the vast 
majority of participants tend towards a single interface, except for the notification 
interface, where it appears to be equally preferred by the participants. This highlights the 
importance of considering which interfaces will be the default in the proposed system. 
However, some interfaces require some improvements regarding the colour, in particular, 
the history interface, because colours play a significant role in readability and user 
satisfaction. Moreover, the history interface requires further consideration of the 
knowledge of users during the design of that interface because the results have revealed 
that when the level of the user’s knowledge increases, the understanding of the interface 
increases as well. On the other hand, the evaluation of the interfaces shows that novice 
users prefer visual aids on the interface to understand the system, in particular, the risk 
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7. Design and Development of a Privacy-Enhancing 
Framework for Mobile Devices 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter Five revealed considerable results regarding how to prioritise privacy-related 
issues, which represents an essential role in building an initial user profile. Chapter six 
also shows significant outcomes regarding initial interfaces and how to improve them. 
Accordingly, this chapter builds upon the knowledge in Chapter Five and Six to develop 
a novel privacy framework that considers the current privacy preferences, followed by 
detailed architectural specifications designed in a modular and robust manner. The 
chapter continues to present the interfaces in order to practically prove that the concept 
of the proposed architecture would work in practice.  
Additionally, this chapter seeks to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach. Despite the users’ feedback and results, presented 
in Chapter Five and Six of this thesis, for preliminary system requirements and interfaces, 
there is a need for an additional qualitative evaluation involving the core stakeholders of 
the system and experts to investigate users’ acceptance and satisfaction in-depth, which 
is difficult to achieve through purely quantitative approaches. 
7.2 Essential Requirements 
Based on the analysis contained in the literature review (Chapter 3), the outcomes from 
the survey (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), and in order to offer an effective novel mobile 
privacy mechanism, the proposed system requirements have to be specified prior to the 





 Prioritisation of privacy-related information based on users’ privacy preferences 
As seen in the survey results, privacy preferences are diverse and cannot adequately be 
captured by one-size-fits-all default settings because the level of privacy required differs 
from user to user. Therefore, in order to cater to different user preferences and 
expectations, initially, the ten point privacy profiling that was generated in Chapter Five 
could be utilised to determine which of these profiles provides the best match for a given 
user. Each profile effectively represents a cluster of like-minded users and captures their 
privacy-related information preferences. According to the machine learning results, it is 
possible to match individual users with profiles by asking those users five questions. In 
turn, the ten profiles could help predict, with a high level of accuracy, many of the users’ 
privacy-related information preferences. 
 Personalised response system to inform and control the flow of privacy-related 
information 
The outcomes of the data collection strongly indicate that users desire to be notified about 
information being shared by apps. A push notification feature is effective for enhancing 
users’ awareness, especially for users with little experience. Therefore, a personalised 
response system to inform and control the flow of privacy-related information has been 
implemented. The notifications would be personalised according to the user’s 
prioritisation. For instance, some users are extremely concerned about their personal 
information on social media platforms, therefore, the notification that requires action 
from the user will display the information related to social media. 
 Historical auditing - to provide an overview of privacy-related information usage 
across apps and prior user decisions 
In order to meet the user’s requirements and their preferences, this system offers a 




reduce privacy concerns. The proposed system allows users to access the date of the data 
that was sent out of the mobile and which app has shared this data and at what degree of 
granularity. In order to help a novice user to understand the historical interface, they can 
view the history of data in a high-level format without going deeper into the details. This 
also allows an advanced user to know who has had access to which data, at which degree 
of granularity and when, without confusing the novice.  
 Multi-level privacy control – to provide users with a non-binary choice over 
privacy and thus more flexibility 
The result of the survey indicates current controls are arguably not sufficient to cater for 
the full range of users’ needs and expectations. Therefore, the proposed system provides 
users with multilevel privacy controls, which allow them to limit the disclosure of their 
private information on multiple levels, taking factors such as the level of user’s 
knowledge into account. The proposed approach suggests providing four-levels of 
control: full access, medium access, low access and no access. However, the full access 
and no access options are easy to apply because there are no modifications to the 
information but medium access or low access requires modification. Numerous studies 
have defined methods for modifying users’ private information with multiple 
granularities across various domains (Ajam et al., 2010; Hornyack et al., 2011). The 
specific information on how to apply, and what these modification methods are, on low 
and medium access settings can be determined based on the levels of access and the type 
of personal information. For example, the medium level for the calendar is to allow the 
app to access the year, month and day, while low level access is to just the year and month. 
Another example is that location information can also be classified into four options: full 
access, no access, medium access and low access: the system shares the city location in 
the low access level, while in the medium level, the system shares the approximate 




As users’ knowledge is different and not all users can correctly configure all settings, 
therefore the proposed system allows novice users to access a minimum set of features in 
order to protect their privacy. For example, when the app wants to send the user’s location 
out of the mobile, the system notifies the user and provides the user with two options: 
allow or protected.  
In contrast, the system provides intermediate and advanced users with more options to 
protect their privacy, and these options have different colours in order to assist the user 
to understand the function of these options and he or she can respond quickly.  
 Adaptable privacy-related guidance depending upon prior knowledge and 
experience 
The results of the survey draw attention to the fact that the users are different in term of 
level of knowledge. This, in turn, emphasises the need to divide the privacy options into 
different levels. The goal of this requirement is to make the system understandable and 
learnable for the novice user, while at the same time not hindering the advanced user from 
working productively. A novice is a user who is trying to complete the task in the system 
but has little or no experience of privacy systems in terms of how to manage and control 
a large volume of data. Therefore, they need additional help and support such as 
documentation and tutorial guides. A novice might also need a clearer description of the 
alert. As the user gains more knowledge about how to use the system, the level of 
knowledge changes, from novice to intermediate, or from intermediate to expert; 
consequently, the system provides the ability to automatically adapt the level of assistance 
and guidance provided.  
 Privacy impacts 
Another requirement to help the novice user to make an informed decision for protecting 




them understand potential impacts on their privacy. Prior studies, as discussed in Chapter 
Two and Chapter Three, have highlighted that users may have difficulties in 
understanding the risk signals. Therefore, the permission screens that have been provided 
by mobile operating systems are not effective privacy indicators. Additionally, the 
outcomes of the data collection indicate that a risk impact feature can help the novice user 
to understand potential impacts on their privacy.  
  Continuously monitor  
Due to users being assigned to the closest profile, as shown in Chapter Five, the 
application and data type in each profile needs to be monitored in order to notify the user 
about information being shared by apps. Therefore, the system should have the ability to 
monitor the privacy-related information flow between the device and applications in real-
time. The advantage of prioritising the user’s information is to make the monitor focus 
on the most important information for the user, which will reduce the overheads in the 
system, as the system, in this case, will not monitor every single piece of data. Moreover, 
the proposed system should continuously review the privacy settings on each app in order 
to be compared. 
 Usable interfaces 
 Users play an essential role in the proposed system in term of how to manage privacy 
settings; therefore, it important to design interfaces based on HCI and usability principles.  
The analysis of the users’ thought towards the interfaces has revealed that some users 
stated that some interfaces’ colour needs more improvement. Hence, interfaces should be 
clear, easy to use and easy to understand in order to meet the users’ requirements and 
satisfaction. Moreover, the interfaces should have a minimalist design in terms of the 
information displayed on the screen and system interactions. Irrelevant or rarely needed 




 A Flexible design 
The outcomes of the survey in Chapter Six showed an interesting result, as the users 
differed not only in the context of prioritisation of their information, as seen in Chapter 
Five, but also in the context of design. For instance, notification preferences are diverse 
because some of the participants prefer full-screen notifications whilst others prefer the 
short screen. Thus, the system should have a level of flexibility by providing users with 
different options to change interface themes, colours and size. These options could help 
different people, such as colourblind people and older people.  Moreover, the design of 
the interface does not rely on colour alone to convey a message because some people such 
as colourblind people might make it difficult to understand the history interfaces. 
Therefore, visual icons and colours have been used in the interface in order to make the 
content of the interface easily understood and to promote recognition. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the interfaces should contain a few colours because the fewer colours used in 
the interfaces, the fewer instances there will be for the confusion. Additionally, the 
proposed system used textures and colours to show contrast because it might be difficult 
for colour blind users to interpret contents and charts. 
 Use Icons as Visual Indicators 
As seen in the results of the survey, users are most often affected by the use of pictures 
and icons on the interfaces. In particular, when visual icons were used on the risk impact 
interface in order to attract users’ attention to make the contents of the interface easily 
interpreted and promote recognition. Therefore, it is very important to utilise this feature 
and ensure it can be easily interpreted and understood by the user.  
The aforementioned requirements can be fulfilled by utilising the enhanced privacy 




7.3 Enhancing Privacy Technology Architecture 
Stemming from the above-mentioned essential requirements, enhancing privacy 
technology architecture is proposed. A novel architecture for user privacy encompasses 
the core functionality to allow for the personalisation of privacy awareness and adaptive 
interfaces. Adaptive interfaces can assist in providing personalisation and supporting 
flexibility. Figure 7.1 illustrates an architectural enhancing privacy technology, beginning 
with an initial interface that displays a series of questions related to users’ information, 
aiming to assign users to the privacy profiles that most closely capture their privacy 
preferences. These questions were identified in chapter 5 where the SVM classifiers 
showed the highest accuracy of 80% with five questions, which could be used in the initial 
interface to assign the user to the profile. Then, the system will update the personal 
privacy preferences of the user based on their interactions. Updating personal privacy 
preferences would enable the system to create individual privacy profiles in order to adapt 
an individual’s specific preferences without overly burdening them. The system will use 
user's profile to monitor the privacy-related information flow between the device and 
applications in real-time. The outcomes of the survey also indicate that the users are 
different in term of level of knowledge. This, in turn, emphasises the need to divide the 
privacy options into different levels. Therefore, the system also provides a user-adaptive 
interface. In this case, the system could meet personal privacy preferences and personal 
visualisation. 
Accordingly, the framework has been designed based on different phases, which begin 
with initial requirements in chapter 5 and 6. Then the initial requirements were improved 
according to the outcomes of the survey, which demonstrated in section 7.2. Hence, the 
framework consists of a number of key components aimed at enhancing privacy 




User-related information: When the user logs on to the proposed system for the first 
time, five primary questions related to the user’s information would be displayed. These 
questions have been examined by the machine-learning algorithm in Chapter Five to 
determine the minimum questions related to users’ information. SVM classifiers showed 
the highest accuracy of 80% from five questions, but it is possible to achieve 91% with 
13 questions, as shown in discussed in Chapter Five. The 13 questions are listed below: 
 Exact Location  Productivity  
 Health   Fitness 
 Multimedia   Lifestyle 
 Contact  Navigation 
 Approximate Location  Social media 
 Shopping   Game 
 Identity  
 
Figure 7.1: Mobile Privacy Awareness framework 
When the user answers these questions, the Privacy Manager passes the information to 




knowledge level will be pass to an Adaptive Interface component in order to display the 
appropriate control level and interfaces. 
Adaptive Interface: The basic premise behind the Adaptive Interface is that users are 
different and therefore have different needs from the system in the context of adapting 
what information to present, how to present the information, and how to interact with this 
information. Due to users being different in term of their knowledge and skills, the 
Adaptive Interface will provide novice users with a simple interface in order to make the 
system understandable for them, whilst at the same time not hindering the advanced user 
from working productively. This simplicity also includes the adaptation of users to 
appropriate controls over their privacy-related information. Additionally, this component 
aims to notify the user about potential privacy risks based on that user’s preferences. In 
this case, the presenting of information and notifications will dynamically change when 
the system updates the user’s preferences. Hence, the Adaptive Interface is further broken 
down into three smaller components, as illustrated in Figure 7.2, which include how to 
present information, controls and responses. Ultimately, this is the user-facing component 





Figure 7.2: Adaptive Interface Components 
Control Level 
The proposed system provides users with multi-levels of control, as discussed in the 
requirements. The full access and no access options are easy to apply because there are 
no modifications of the information, but medium access or low access requires 
modification. Users can select a certain level from among the four levels. Table 7.1 shows 
different examples of the four levels. When a user desires to select a certain type of data 
unmodified to a mobile application, the user can select the full access. Otherwise, if the 
user does not want to provide any data, the user can select the no access level.  




City Block City 
Sheikh et al. (2008) 
Approximate 
Location 
Cell Tower or 
Wi-Fi 
City Block City 
Sheikh et al. (2008) 
Calendar 
Year, month, day, 
hour, minute 
Year, month, day,  Year, month Knijnenburg et al. 
(2013) 
Audio Original voice 
Modified 




Moncrieff et al. (2008) 
Image Original image Number of people Face blued Christin et al. (2011) 




For instance,  Robert wants to use Twitter, and this app wants to share location 
information. Robert desires to share his location information at medium level, rather than 
sharing his exact location with Twitter. In this case, the original location will be modified 
to the city block location. For instance, when GPS coordinates are 50.487 and 150.354, 
the original GPS coordinates will be then changed to be  50.490, 150.360. In this case, 
the medium access is approximately 539.87 meters away from the exact location, as 
shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3: Location Information Representation at Medium level 
Monitor: The primary goal of the monitoring component is to collect privacy-related 
information from a user such as location, contact, Email and multimedia. Given the range 
of monitoring modalities that can be captured by a device, and utilised by a user, their 
related agents are put into effect to capture their information characteristics 
simultaneously and transparently. However, some tools could be utilised to monitor data, 
such as PrivacyGuard and ReCon, as mentioned in Chapter Three. ReCon requires root 
permissions and knowledge about VPN technology, whilst PrivacyGuard does not require 




remote VPN server or any knowledge about VPN technology from its users. Therefore, 
PrivacyGuard could be utilised as the implementation of this component.  
All data that is collected would be stored in the storage which consists of (but is not 
limited to) the requested application name, types of data, date, time and category.  The 
architecture runs the data on the local device in order to increase the level of privacy and 
security. However, during the latter process, the data is used by the Privacy Manager to 
verify the user’s profile. 
User Privacy Profile: in order to assign the user to the privacy profile that most closely 
captures their privacy preferences, the initial interface will display a series of questions 
related to users’ information when the user logs on to the system for the first time. The 
questions have been examined by the machine learning algorithm in Chapter Five to 
determine the minimum questions needed to predict the user’s mobile app privacy 
preferences. These questions include questions about, Exact Location, Health, 
Multimedia, Contact, and Approximate Location. Based on the user’s answers, the User 
Privacy Profile will determine the closest privacy profile for the user from the profile 
storage. 
User Profile storage: this component stores the ten unique profiles that were derived 
from hierarchical clustering, as explained in Chapter Five. Ten unique privacy profiles 
provide a reasonable default prioritisation of information for an initial interface. Figure 
7.4 shows how each cluster prioritises the information according to the users’ privacy 
preferences for each profile. The red colour represents a higher level of concern, while 





Figure 7.4: Ten-Privacy Profiles 
The priority of notifications would be changed according to the user’s profile. For 
instance, when the user’s profile is Cluster 2, the user would be notified about multimedia 
because this category is the first priority for cluster 2, which is represented by the red 
colour; whilst, multimedia in Cluster 8 is not a high priority to them. Therefore, when the 
system assigns the user to the right profile, the Privacy Manager passes the user’s 
preferences to the Monitor in order to monitor this information, and passes this 
information to the Adaptive Interface component to notify the user about potential privacy 
risks based on the user’s Profile. 
Privacy Profile Refinement: the vital function of this component, which should receive 
more care, is to refine the user profiles that were derived from the system logs. It is 
responsible for updating personal privacy preferences for individual users based on users’ 
interactions that stored on the System Log. The Privacy Profile Refinement then takes the 
System Log as the input and tries to match the information related to the user with a 




System Log: the main task of System Log is to perform the collection of a wider dataset 
of all information which is related to capturing the interaction with the users’ personal 
information. 
Privacy Manager: this is the core component of the proposed system. The main function 
of privacy manager is to control the processing between these elements: User Privacy 
Profile, Adaptive Interface and Monitor. When the system chooses a privacy profile that 
is the closest to the user’s preferences from Profile storage, which includes the ten 
clusters, the Privacy Manager passes the user’s preferences to the Monitor in order to 
monitor this information.  
In order to update the personal privacy preferences for individual users, the Privacy 
Manager will keep passing the privacy preferences from the Privacy Profile Refinement, 
which were extracted from the System Log component, to the monitor. 
When the user selects the level of his or her knowledge from the first interface, the Privacy 
Manager will pass the level of the user’s knowledge to Adaptive Interface component in 
order to provide the user with appropriate information and settings. 
7.4 Privacy Enhancing Technologies Interfaces 
The privacy enhancing technologies interfaces have been designed to help in visualising 
and better understanding how the architecture would work in practice. The Moqups web 
app was utilised to design the mobile interfaces and provides a streamlined web app that 
helps to design, test and validate the system with quick wireframes and detailed mock-
ups. The advantage of the Moqups is also to prove the concept by showing interactive 
interfaces. Building the interfaces would help to show the end-user and the experts what 




The users’ interface is composed of five primary interfaces, which are historical view, 
dashboard, app privacy settings, response control and notifications. These interfaces were 
designed according to the users’ perceptions and suggestions from the questionnaire and 
based on HCI principles in order to develop usable and adaptive interfaces that maximise 
user satisfaction. The system also provides users with different features, such as historical 
auditing, to provide an overview of privacy-related information usage across apps and 
prior user decisions, multi-level privacy controls, consequences of the disclosure of 
sensitive information and personalised responses. The information from the registration 
interface will help to prioritise the user’s information. This prioritisation will play an 
essential role in many interfaces, such as the order of apps in the app setting interfaces, 
history interface and notification. 
Regarding the user’s knowledge, novice, intermediate and advanced users have some 
different interfaces in the context of interface complexity, app privacy controls and 
historical view. Table 7.2 demonstrates the characteristics of each interface for different 
users.  
Characteristics 
Type of user 
Novice Intermediate Advanced 
Privacy Controls Two levels Three levels Full control 
Interface complexity Simple 
Medium level 
descriptions 
More details and 
information 
Historical view 
Visual aids on the 
interface 
(Word and icons cloud) 
Statistical charts Statistical charts 




Therefore, the main challenge is how to design a system that can accommodate novice, 
intermediate and advance users. In order to overcome the usability issues without 
compromising the users’ convenience, some guidelines have been utilised to design the 
interfaces. When a user installs the proposed system for the first time, the registration 
screen displays six questions related to the user’s information, as shown in Figure 7.5. 
The first five questions centre on how concerned users are about their privacy-related 
information being shared by categories of apps. These questions will assign users to the 
privacy profiles that most closely capture their privacy preferences; whilst the last 
question will determine the level of user’s knowledge.  The system will allow users to 
change their level of knowledge from novice to intermediate or advanced if they desire 
from the settings of the system, which in turn gives the system more flexibility and helps 
users to change their preferences regarding their level of knowledge. Additionally, users 
can change their preferences related to the priority of information. Hence, the system will 
update the personal privacy preferences of the user based on their interactions. The 
advantage of updating personal privacy preferences is that it would enable the system to 





Figure 7.5: User Registration Interface 
When the user selects novice user, the system will display a novice dashboard which is 
simple and easy to understand, as stated in the characteristics of novice user interfaces. 
Figure 7.6 shows the dashboard for the novice user, which consists of two sections: active 
controls section and word cloud. The first section allows the novice user to select from 
two options - allow or deny - to share the information with apps. Each data type of 
information is represented by icons to help the novice user to scan the page more easily.   
The second section in the novice dashboard displays the amount of user data that is shared 
by the apps in the word clouds technique. The word clouds are a visualisation technique 




cloud, the more user data shared by the app. Gruen et al. (2007) and Bateman et al.  (2008) 
found that font size is the most effective aesthetic to convey information when they 
investigated various measures of impression-forming. It is clear from Figure 7.6 that 
Facebook is the app that uses the most user’s data. However, when the novice user clicks 
the Facebook app in the word cloud section, the system will display another interface, 
which includes more details about the user’s data on Facebook. In this case, the interface 
does not overwhelm the users with too much details information. 
Figure 7.6 also displays the menu in the bottom bar. Icons are used on the menu elements 
to make navigation simple and easy-to-use. Each icon in the bottom bar guides the user 
directly to a specific destination in order to minimise the number of clicks.  
 
Figure 7.6: Novice Dashboard 
When it comes to the intermediate and advanced user, the dashboard would present more 




regulate access to privacy-related information. This allows them to limit the disclosure of 
their private information on multiple levels taking factors around the level of the user’s 
knowledge into account, as stated in the requirements.  
Figure 7.7 shows the advanced user interface, which displays three sections. The first 
section represents the alert that is required to interact by the user. The interface does not 
only display the alert to the user, but it is also associated with multiple active controls to 
reduce the amount of user effort to accomplish a task and achieve the system’s efficiency. 
The second section, which is about a recent activity to allow the user to change the recent 
setting controls in case he changes his mind about the settings. This is because Chapter 
Three highlights that users may change their privacy preferences from time to time. This 
could help reduce the user burden and the frustration of the user.  
Charts are an important feature for the user to visualise a useful summary of the data and 
enable users to advance their understanding. Therefore, advanced and intermediate users 
can see some charts on the dashboard, as seen in Figure 7.7. A few charts will be presented 
here to reduce the number of contents in order to not overburden the user with too much 
data. Users can click on any chart to go beyond simple charts to express more advanced 






Figure 7.7: Advanced Dashboard 
According to the outcomes of the survey, users desire to be notified at the moment data 
is being sent. Therefore, the dashboard displays notification icons in the menu bar. The 
notification icon badge shows the number of unread alerts and it is omnipresent on the 
app icon.  It is a simple way of informing the user, at a glance, if they have an unread 
notification. 
Regarding the responses feature, which represents one of the essential requirements, the 
system provides three levels of responses based on the user’s priority related to privacy 
information, as shown in Figure 7.8.  As a result, all data does not require action to be 
taken by the user, so they do not feel overwhelmed by the warning messages. However, 
the high-priority notification is a foreground notification and offers two options - to deny 




of data to them. The system also displays an alert for the second priority categories for 
the user; whilst the third priority would also be displayed on the system. To elaborate 
more about how the system distinguishes between the three levels, Figure 7.8 shows one 
example from Cluster 9. From multimedia to the health category, it represents the first 
level or the highest importance for users in Cluster 9, whilst fitness and productivity 
represent the second level. Accordingly, the system prioritises these responses according 
to the user’s profile, which would reduce overwhelming the user with superfluous 
warnings and achieve a connection between the user’s profile and the notifications. 
 
Figure 7.8: Sending Notification According to the Importance of Data in Cluster 9 
Due to the survey findings revealing that participants strongly desire to have the ability 
to change privacy notification settings for different apps, the user can change the response 
settings in the proposed system. When the user clicks the notification icon on the 
dashboard, the system displays the alert settings interface. When the user clicks on the 
setting icons for the calendar in the Facebook app, he would be provided with more 






Figure 7.9: Control the Priority of the Alert 
One of the requirements to help users to make an informed decision for protecting their 
privacy is the risk impact. Therefore, when the app is going to share the data, the system 
displays the notification screen to deny or protect the user’s information. As seen in the 
results of the survey, users are most often affected by the use of pictures and icons on the 
risk impact interface. Therefore, it is very important to utilise this feature and ensure it 
can be easily interpreted and understood by the user. When the user clicks on the protect 
button, they will be able to select the level of protection. The vast majority of participants 
prefer the colours of the traffic light on protections settings in the initial interface to 
determine the protection level. Therefore, this interface was utilised in the final design. 
To help the user to make an informed decision and to learn about the actual privacy risks, 
the system provides a risk impact button. Figure 7.10 shows the risk impact of the location 




educate users about the importance of protecting their privacy and about the risks of 
disclosing their information. Hence, they could make an informed decision about 
controlling their data. 
  
Figure 7.10: Risk Impact Interface 
The dashboard contains app icons to change the order of importance of the data in each 
app. When the user clicks on the icon, the app settings would be displayed, as shown in 
Figure 7.11. The order of each app on the app settings interface is based on the cluster 
profile order. For instance, Figure 7.11 shows the game apps as the first category, whilst 
social media is the second category, because this interface displays the profile for Cluster 
5.  However, each user has their own privacy preferences. Therefore, the system learns 
the user preferences based on his or her past click history data and personalises based on 
the user’s preferences. Hence, the order of each app on the app settings interface would 




concentrate on the important apps for them, in contrast to current mobile privacy where 
the apps do not organise according to the users’ preferences. 
 
Figure 7.11: App Settings Interface 
When the novice user clicks on any app, the privacy settings are displayed for this app. 
For instance, when the novice user clicks on the Facebook app, he is enabled to control 
the privacy settings for the Facebook app in binary form, as seen in Figure 7.12. Whilst 
the system allows advanced users to manage their privacy controls by selectively 





    
 
Figure 7.12: Novice and Advance App Settings 
In order to meet the user’s requirements and their preferences, this system offers a 
historical auditing feature, which aims to show the user how his or her personal 
information is being used, thus enhancing user awareness even further. Moreover, it 
would increase trust in the system and reduce privacy concerns. The outcomes of the 
survey in Chapter 6 also indicate that the history interface requires further improvement 
in term of colour design. Therefore, the chart for the privacy-related information usage 
was utilised on the history interface instead of flashy colour that confused participants in 
the initial interfaces.  
The system allows users to access the date of the data that was sent out of the mobile and 
which app shared this data and at which degree of granularity. The dashboard displays a 
historical icon which users can use to acquire statistics about the accessed data for each 
app. However, the system also distinguishes between novice and advanced users in terms 
of presenting more information related to the level of access. Figure 7.13 shows the 




The size of the icon indicates the usage of each data type to make the interface easy to 
understand; whilst the advanced and intermediate users can see a chart for the privacy-
related information usage, as shown in Figure 7.14. 
 Figure 7.13: Historical Interface for 
Novice User 
 
Figure 7.14: Historical Interface for 
Advanced User  
7.5 Evaluation of the Proposed Approach  
As discussed in the literature review that numerous studies evaluated their systems in 
term of a technical issue for capturing and monitoring the data. Therefore, the main goal 
of this section is to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of the 
proposed approach regarding ease of use, comprehension, user satisfaction and enhance 
their awareness about privacy on mobile apps. Hence, this study focuses more specifically 
on the end-user interaction with at the interface level.  Despite the user feedback results 
obtained in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, there is a need for additional qualitative 




acceptance and satisfaction in-depth, which is difficult to achieve through purely 
quantitative approaches.  
Two separate stakeholders (end users - experts) were involved in the focus group. The 
investigative questions for the end-users were about their perceptions and acceptance of 
the proposed system. When it comes to the experts, the questions were more advanced 
and were about the feasibility, achievability, and practicality of the system. 
Five experts were invited to the focus group at The Thirteenth International Symposium 
on Human Aspects of Information Security & Assurance (HAISA 2019), July 2019, in 
Nicosia to evaluate the proposed system and whether it could meet users’ privacy 
preferences and enhance privacy technology. When the experts accepted to participate in 
the focus group, each was asked to sign a consent form. A summary of how the system 
works, including screenshots of the interfaces and a question list, was presented to the 
experts. The session was recorded after gaining the permission of the focus groups 
interviewees, and was transcribed afterwards. The focus groups lasted approximately an 





A1 Researcher in user security and privacy 
A2 Researcher in Cyber-Social Engineering 
A3 Researcher in Information Security and Risk Management  
A4 Researcher in Information Security Policy  
A5 Researcher in IT  
Table 7.3: Expert Participants’ Background 
As has previously been identified (in Chapter 4), end-users are the main stakeholders of 
the system, therefore, their opinions on the system are essential. Moreover, experts have 
been involved in order to provide a more accurate scientific judgment of the proposed 




questions were drafted and reviewed in terms of being understandable and objective in 
order to achieve the aims of the focus group method. The purpose of the evaluation 
questions can be summarised as follows: 
 To evaluate the identified research problem. 
 To evaluate the feasibility, achievability, and practicality of the method. 
 To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the developed system. 
 To identify the key barriers moving forward. 
 The attractiveness of the format and layout of the system interfaces. 
 To evaluate the three-level approach, which includes novice, intermediate and 
advanced. 
 To evaluate the main dashboard. 
 To assess users’ satisfaction with colour. 
 To evaluate the utilisation of the following functions in the proposed approach 
and if it could enhance the user’s awareness about privacy-related information?   
o Historical privacy 
o Controlling privacy 
o Notification 
 To obtain suggestions in order to integrate anything that might have been missed 
from the system. 
 To gain the experts’ and end users’ opinions about the system and whether it is 
easy to use. 
 To evaluate the utilisation of the prioritisation privacy-related information based 
on users’ privacy preferences. 
 To obtain the users’ feelings about understanding the components and the features 






The interviews with the experts revealed valuable outcomes regarding the open-ended 
questions.  The following number of themes or key points are identified to gain useful 
insight from the participants' perceptions and experiences concerning the proposed 
solution in this research. 
A. The importance of the identified research problem 
Regarding the first question, which is about the relevance of the research problem 
identified, they indicated that it is considered a vital issue in terms of how to manage a 
large volume of data, designing for usable privacy, and transparency, therefore the 
solution should be valuable.  
A3 states: “This research addressed a vital issue related to privacy and it is a 
comprehensive solution which addressed different dimensions: usability, transparency 
and prioritisation. However, the prioritisation looks important question because if I have 
a hundred apps it is hard to control a large volume of apps”. This, in turn, emphasises 
the importance of data ranking for the user, especially with the growth of apps, which 
makes it difficult for the user to control the huge amount of information. 
A1 states: "The research problem is so important because the proposed solution considers 
that privacy preferences are diverse and cannot adequately be captured by one-size-fits-
all default settings". This feedback highlighted that it is unrealistic to assume 
homogeneous privacy requirements across the whole population as most prior studies 
proposed. Most of the prior studies assume the homogeneity of privacy preferences across 
users, yet users’ privacy preferences differ from one user to another in the context of how 
to control and manage their data, prioritisation of information, personalised notifications, 




A4 states," The research problem enhances user awareness and user empowerment which 
aims to inform users about the privacy consequences of the disclosure of sensitive 
information". This underlines the important role for risk impact feature, which could help 
the user to make an informed decision about protecting his or her privacy where the 
protection settings interface contains a risk impact interface. A1 and A5 also believed that 
notification feature is effective for enhancing users’ awareness; especially the solution 
does not overwhelm the users with too much notification. This emphasised the feature of 
a personalised response system to inform and control the flow of privacy-related 
information according to the user’s prioritisation. 
In general, most of the expert opinions regarding evaluating the identified research 
problem were positive and they believed that the prioritisation of privacy-related 
information based on users’ privacy preferences would be useful especially with the 
growth of apps, which makes it difficult for the user to control the huge amount of 
information. They also indicated that users need this solution because it would make 
privacy management significantly easier to perform and enhance the user’s awareness. 
B. The feasibility of the proposed design at the operational level  
Regarding the feasibility, achievability, or practicality of the method: It is quite feasible, 
as long as the monitoring tool required detecting the privacy-related information is 
available.  A1 and A4  have a concern about this approach could requires root permissions 
for the mobile device. Regarding this issue, the ReCon requires root permissions and 
knowledge about VPN technology, whilst PrivacyGuard does not require root 
permissions and runs in its entirety on the local device. Therefore, PrivacyGuard could 




In the context of the performance overheads of the system runtime, A3 and A2 indicate 
that it is possible to monitor sensitive information for users in real-time but they have a 
concern regarding the performance when the system handles a large volume of data. 
A3 explained: “The performance of the system should be considered for analysing very 
large and real-time data available from data repositories, social media, sensor networks 
and the Web”. A2 also stated, “Technically, it is possible to implement it”. These 
comments reveal a positive impression concerning the possibility of its application in a 
real environment, taking into account the speed of system performance. Therefore, to be 
practical, the performance overheads of the system runtime must be minimal due to the 
system being comprehensive and handling a large volume of data. However, when 
looking at the proposed solution, it shows that prioritising the user’s information make 
the monitor focus on the most important information for the user, which will reduce the 
overheads in the system, as the system, in this case, will not monitor every single piece 
of data. 
C. The convenience and usability of the proposed design 
To investigate expert perceptions towards usability in terms of the colour, the layout, ease 
of use, and being easy to understand, they indicated these factors are convenient and 
usable to increase the user’s awareness. When it comes to the format and layout, A2 
states, "The format and the layout of the interfaces are well designed and the notification 
was easy to understand”. A3 also stated "The format and layout of the setting controls 
interface is considered as easy to use, and can help the user to recognise the level of 
privacy easily”. This, in turn, emphasised the importance of utilised the colours of the 




Experts’ participants also indicate that when the historical interface contains icons to 
represent the usage of each data type, it makes the interface easy to understand for the 
novice user. This feedback highlighted that important to consider the level of knowledge 
during the interface design where the proposed solution considers the adaptive interface 
requirement. The goal of this requirement is to make the system understandable and 
learnable for the novice user, while at the same time not hindering the advanced user from 
working productively. 
The reason for these positive results is due to the initial interfaces were designed based 
on HCI principles to overcome usability issues. Moreover, the initial interfaces were 
included in the survey in order to explore the users’ thoughts regarding the design and the 
functionality of those interfaces, which in turn could help to overcome the usability 
limitations without compromising the users’ convenience. However, some of them 
suggested changing the colour of the word clouds for the novice user interface to match 
with the app colour. For instance, the Facebook app uses a blue colour for the Facebook 
icon, therefore the word cloud should use the blue colour; hence the user can quickly scan 
the interface.  
D. Evaluation of the three-level approach, which includes novice, intermediate and 
advanced. 
Concerning experts’ opinions on the three-level approach that is provided by the system, 
which includes novice, intermediate and advanced, they claimed that the approach made 
the system flexible and accommodating to novice and advanced users. Although novice 
users may need more assistance and systematic guidance to understand the indications of 
some symbols that are used to represent the information and how to use the settings of 
the system. A3 explained, “In terms of usability, novice user needs more guidance and 




to provide some assistance to understand the nature of privacy work and help in decision-
making, there seems to be a need to include more support for novice users, as the experts 
suggested. 
E. The key barriers in the proposed system  
When it comes to identifying the key barriers moving forward, they indicated that the 
motivation aspect is one of the key challenges to using the system.  Therefore, they stated 
that information privacy concerns have an essential impact on enhancing users’ privacy 
awareness. Increasing users’ concerns regarding the importance of privacy could 
significantly motivate users to preserve their privacy and enhance their awareness. They 
suggested increasing the risk impact features that are provided by the system to justifiably 
heighten their concerns and hence increase the use of the system. 
Regarding utilising the historical view, and controlling the information and notifications 
in the proposed system, they believe using these features would provide users with 
effective transparency into the system and reduce privacy concerns. However, while the 
prioritisation of the categories of apps in the historical interface and app settings is a great 
idea to implement, it would require more description to explain to the user how the system 
uses prioritisation for the apps on these interfaces. In general, prioritisation of information 
would significantly reduce the burden while allowing users to better control information.  
F. The convenience of the main dashboard 
To ensure that the main dashboard of the developed system allows the user to quickly 
control and track the use of information or not, generally, most experts agree that the main 





G. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the developed system. 
Moving forward to exploring the experts’ opinions about the system’s strengths and 
weaknesses, two lists have been driven by their opinions:  
Strengths: 
 The system utilises many efficient methods for enhancing users’ awareness about 
privacy-related information on mobile apps, which includes the historical view, 
prioritisation of user’s information, multi-level privacy controls and considering 
the user’s knowledge.  
 The historical view increases the transparency of the sharing process.  
 The risk impact interface helps users to understand the privacy risks and motivates 
users to respond.  
 The system gathers different functions regarding privacy together in one place, 
which reduces the user’s burden and frustration.  
 It is very useful to use the system because it allows users to know who has 
accessed their data, when and at what degree of granularity.  
However, the experts identified some weaknesses or concerns, some of which have 
already been implemented or taken into account, and others that can be considered in 
future work: 
 Another method for presenting the information is to display the apps that most 
commonly share a user’s information. 
 In term of usability, the novice user needs more guidance and a tutorial to 
understand the system quickly. 
 It is better to show whether the user’s information is related to the app’s 




 The multi-level of privacy controls requires more description to help the user to 
understand each level of each data. 
Finally, despite some experts stating some concerns and weaknesses, in general, the 
majority of the experts’ opinions on the system are positive. 
7.5.2 End-Users  
The aim of the focus group was to evaluate the system regarding ease of use, 
comprehension and user satisfaction. In order to make the questions understandable for 
the end-users, advanced questions were avoided and the questions simplified for them. 
Accordingly, a number of open-ended questions were asked in such a way to trigger 
discussion among the participants, which in turn revealed some interesting results.  
All the participants agreed that they really need this system to enhance their awareness 
about privacy on mobile apps. It has educated them about how the different apps collect 
and share their information without their knowledge because the current privacy settings 
on mobile operating systems such as Android do not help users to know the frequency 
and destination of data being shared by apps. Therefore, they stated explicitly that they 
would be more aware of what information apps collect about them when they used this 
system. One of the participants said, “The system would help them to check the usage of 
data in particular when my child uses his mobile because children are more exposed and 
vulnerable than adults.” However, another participant stated regarding the usage of data 
“A very important idea, it is designed very well, but it needs to explain how to use the 
word cloud for novice users”.  This, in turn, emphasises the point raised by the experts 
that novice users may need more support regarding understanding the system.  
A number of participants indicated their desire to have multi-level privacy controls. One 




to limit the disclosure of their private information. Another participant liked the privacy 
controls on the dashboard because he struggled to find how to control his permissions 
from the current privacy settings on his mobile. However, these features need more 
description to explain the meaning of multi-level settings and how to use them.  One of 
the participant said, “It is a good project because this system supports his rights to control 
his personal information as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (or GDPR) 
stated.” 
Regarding the notifications, they like to be notified when an app wants to share their 
information based on their preferences. Despite the system allowing the user to know the 
implications of sharing their data, they need more features like this to enhance their 
awareness, and they suggested this to be through notifications, as the experts suggested.  
In terms of adaptable privacy depending upon the prior knowledge feature, the 
participants indicated the need for this feature to make the system flexible and 
accommodating for novice and advanced users. One of the participants stated, "It is a 
flexible system that provides different options for a different type of users". Despite end-
users wanting this feature in the system, they suggested including some steps and 
guidelines to help users to understand the differences between novices, intermediate and 
advanced users.   
Some questions were asked to investigate users’ usability perspectives regarding the ease 
of using some functions, and the colour and ease of understanding.  They stated that the 
layout of the interfaces is simple and easy to use and navigate through, which is one of 
the advantages of this system. They do not see any difficulties in using the system by a 
simple user. However, one of the comments was, “I enjoyed the good interfaces of the 
system. I suggest enhancing the colours”. Despite changing the colour of the initial 




different users regarding the colours, which means more difficulty during the design. 
Another participant highlighted that the interfaces are well designed but he added one 
point regarding the description of the icons. He said, "The system has been designed 
professionally but needs to add some descriptions for some icons". 
7.6 Conclusion 
The requirements for the design and development of a privacy-enhancing technology 
framework for mobile devices have been established, followed by detailed architectural 
specifications designed in a modular and robust manner that would support such a system 
in practice, considering a personalised response; prioritisation of privacy-related 
information; multilevel privacy controls; usability, and the level of knowledge.  
The architecture offers a mobile privacy awareness mechanism to enhance users’ 
awareness and meet their needs to protect their privacy. The architecture also provides 
prioritisation of privacy-related information, based on an individual user basis to reduce 
user burden and the frustration of the user.  
A comprehensive description of the system architecture, and its components and 
functionalities, has been provided. The architecture has the potential to meet the 
requirements of offering a holistic framework for increasing users’ privacy awareness 
across the different mobile operating systems. Moreover, the mock-up interfaces have 
been designed, developed and presented in order to practically prove that the concept of 
the proposed architecture would work in practice. 
This chapter has also presented a focus group evaluation by two separate groups: experts 
and end-users. The evaluation outcomes provide support for the view that the system has 
large potential to be implemented to help users to enhance their awareness and meet their 




therefore, the solution should be valuable.  With the rapid growth in mobile devices, the 
key barriers have become far less than a few years ago, and as such, this privacy system 
is able to monitor and detect privacy related information and could be applied across 
different operating systems on mobile apps. In general, the majority of the feedback from 
respondents was positive about the system. The outcomes confirm that the system 
provides more transparency and more control than current provision, to limit the 
disclosure of users’ private information, and in turn, the system is capable not just of 
detecting but also protecting the user’s privacy. Designing a good user interface,  efficient 
management and the attractiveness of the system interfaces are the significant 
achievements of the system, which have been supported by the evaluation results. This 
system should gain a higher level of acceptability from the end-user and hence increase 







Chapter Eight  






8. Conclusions and Future Work  
This chapter presents and concludes the main achievements of this research. It begins 
with outlining the key contributions and achievements, and then proceeds to discuss the 
limitations of the research and identifies future research directions.  
8.1 Achievements of the Research 
Overall, the thesis has accomplished all the objectives and aims initially identified in 
Chapter One, with quantitative studies undertaken to meet users’ requirements and needs 
in order to develop a mobile privacy awareness system and enhance privacy technology.  
The key achievements of this research are: 
 Reviewing the current privacy techniques across a range of platforms and 
applications in order to understand current state-of-the-art of privacy methods, 
including both the problems and available solutions. 
 Developing a novel approach to manage and prioritise privacy-related information 
and assign users to the privacy profiles that most closely capture their privacy 
preferences by using machine learning. 
 One of the significant achievements of the system is designing a usable user 
interface according to the user’s perceptions and based on HCI principles to 
overcome the usability issues without compromising the user’s convenience.  
 To design and develop a framework for enhancing privacy technology on mobile 
devices to meet users’ privacy preferences considering all these dimensions: 
multilevel privacy controls, personalisation responses, prioritisation privacy-
related information and adaptable privacy-related guidance depending upon prior 




 Evaluation of the proposed approach has also been accomplished to ensure that 
the objectives are met and they are as effective as they can be. The evaluation 
results of the experts and end-users can be considered as positive, constructive 
and valuable.  
8.2 Limitations of the Research Project  
Despite the concrete contributions and the achievements of the research having been 
accomplished, there are some limitations that have been identified, which are:  
 Although the effectiveness of the privacy enhancing technology approach has 
been assessed by different groups - experts and end-users - through mock-up 
interfaces and the results were positive and valuable, it should be noted that the 
system was not a full implementation and captures real data in order to provide 
feedback and recommendations based on actual data.  Fully operational software 
would be very useful to evaluate this approach in a real environment, and would 
have provided a better insight into the effectiveness of it.  
 The data that is used to cluster users into different profiles is limited to two 
dimensions - app categories and data type – although it would be useful to add 
another dimension about the purpose of the app to share this information. This is 
required to analyse the static code and look up the third-party libraries to 
understand the purpose or functionality associated with each piece of data. 
 The system categorises users into three types: novice, intermediate and advance 
according to the user’s self-report in the initial interfaces. However, it would also 
be helpful to capture the user’s level by monitoring the user’s behaviour over time. 
 This study has shown that is possible, theoretically, to predict the user’s mobile 




this approach has neither been operationalised nor evaluated with actual users 
before. 
8.3 Suggestions and Scope for Future Work 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, this research has enhanced the privacy 
technology for mobiles in general, as illustrated by the experts and end-users’ evaluation 
feedback. In addition, as with any research, this research offers many other opportunities 
that need further research and improvement. These suggestions are highlighted below: 
 The system needs full implementation based on the proposed model in a real 
environment and monitoring real data. This is required to develop a technology to 
capture and measure privacy-related information across different mobile 
operating systems and different mobile resources, which might be difficult due to 
their operating system features and some technical aspects.  
 Developing an interactive profile assignment that utilises permission settings on 
a user’s mobile to elicit the user’s privacy preferences would allow the system to 
generate a number of tailored questions about their privacy preferences in order 
to assign the user to the privacy profile that best aligns with their preferences. 
 In addition, this research can also be further developed as a crowdsourcing system 
to provide each user with personalised recommendations when the user wants to 
make a decision to protect his data. The ten unique profiles could be utilised to 
generate recommended data settings for users in each cluster. It would help users 
to make informed decisions, in particular, the novice user, and reduce their degree 
of exposure. 
 Further research could investigate the reasons behind the user’s preference to 
grant certain information to a given app for a particular purpose 




8.4 The future of mobile phone privacy 
The total number of mobile apps continues to increase and these apps can access and 
share storing financial, medical and business information that is considered is sensitive 
and valuable. Therefore, the enormous amount of private and personal information that 
is stored on the mobile phone has increased. Moreover, new technology allows mobile 
phones to connect to many smart devices at home and could control these devices from 
their mobile phones, e.g TVs, smart appliances, thermostats and smartwatch.  Therefore, 
it would be difficult for the average user to assert control over such large amounts of data 
and it is undesirable to present a user with large privacy information or a large number of 
requests. The future of privacy protection on the mobile phone will have to consider 
seamless adaptation to include the evolution of wearables (e.g. smart glasses and watches) 
Internet of Things technologies in general. Therefore, it would be useful to prioritise 
user's privacy-related information according to user's preferences. This, in turn, would 
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Appendix A – Ethical Approval (User Survey) 
 
PLYMOUTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND  ENGINEERING 
 
Research Ethics Committee 
 








This is a WORD document.  Please complete in WORD and extend space where 
necessary.  Clearly name any supporting documents and reference in the application.  
 
Postgraduate and Staff must submit a signed copy to 
SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
Undergraduate students should contact their School Representative of the Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics Committee or dissertation advisor prior to completing this 
form to confirm the process within their School. 
 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics undergraduate students – 
please submit to SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk with your project supervisor 




1. TYPE OF PROJECT 
 
1.1   What is the type of project? 
 
Applicant Type Put X in 1 only 
STAFF Specific project  





Practical / Laboratory Class  
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS Taught Masters Project  
M.Phil / PhD by research X 
UNDERGRADUATE 
STUDENTS 
Student research project  
Practical / Laboratory class where 





2.1  TITLE of Research project 
A Holistic Framework for Enhancing Privacy Awareness 
 
 
2.2  Name, telephone number, e-mail address and position of applicant for this project 
(plus full details of Project Supervisor for postgraduate and undergraduate students)  
1- Aziz Alshehri (Research student)             aziz.alshehri@plymouth.ac.uk,      
+447453267227 
2- Prof Nathan Clarke (Director of Studies)    n.clarke@plymouth.ac.uk,           
+441752586226 
3- Fudong Li (Supervisor)                               fudong.li@port.ac.uk 
 
2.3  General summary of the proposed research for which ethical clearance is sought, 
briefly outlining the aims and objectives (no more than 200 words) 
The purpose of this research is to develop novel approaches in order to help inform and 
manage privacy preference. The survey will look to identify what the current privacy 
preferences are, and how would like to manage privacy preferences. This will require 
conducting an online survey in order to collect data which includes the Demographic 
information, Privacy Concerns and Privacy Management. In addition, different initial 




2.4  Physical site(s) where research will be carried out 
N/A – to be conducted online. 
 
2.5  Does your research involve external institutions (e.g. other university, hospital, 
prison etc. see guidelines) 
No          







2.5b  If yes, you must provide  letter(s) from institutional heads permitting you to carry 
out research on their clients, and where applicable, on their sites(s).  Are they 
included? 
     
If not, why not? 
 
2.6  Start and end date for research for which ethical clearance is sought (NB 
maximum period is 3 years) 
 
Start date: From date of ethical approval    End date: 
February 2019 
 
2.7 Has this same project received ethical approval from another Ethics Committee?  
No  
2.7a  If yes, do you want Chair’s action? 
 





3.1  Describe (a) the procedures that participants will engage in, and (b) the methods 
used for data collection and recording 
The survey will be created on an online survey tool (Qualtrics.com). The survey will be 
provided in two languages: English and Arabic. The participant will be asked to answer 
different questions online including demographic information, Privacy Concerns and Privacy 
Management and skills and interface evaluation. 
 
 
3.1a If surveying or interviewing, you must include your questionnaire(s) and interview 
schedule(s). 
Are these attached:                          
  Yes 
  
3.2 How long will the procedures take? Give details 






3.3  Does your research involve deception? 
 
No         
                                                    
                                                   
Please explain why the following conditions apply to your research: 
3.3a   Deception is completely unavoidable if the purpose of the research is to be met 
 
 
3.3b   The research objective has strong scientific merit 
 
 
3.3c   Any potential harm arising from the proposed deception can be effectively 
neutralised or reversed by the proposed debriefing procedures  
 
 




 4.  BREAKDOWN OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
 4.1 Summary of participants 
 





Approximately 400  
 























4.2  How were the sample sizes determined? 
Based upon prior studies of this nature and in order to get a statistically significant sample for 
analysis. 
 
4.3  How will subjects be recruited? 
The participants will be recruited via e-mail and social network websites. 
 
4.4  Will subjects be financially rewarded?  If yes, please give details. 
No 
 
5. NON-VULNERABLE ADULTS 
 
5.1  Are some or all of the participants non-vulnerable adults? 
 
 Yes      
5.2  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
Participants who are 18 years old and above will be invited to answer the survey.  
 
5.3  How will participants give informed consent? 
Participants will be asked in the first page of the survey whether they agree to participate in the survey 
and give permission for their answers to be used in this study or not 
5.4  Consent form(s) attached 
 
Yes      






5.5  Information sheet(s) attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No     
If no, why not? 
Relevant details are explained in the first page of the survey  
 
5.6  How will participants be made aware of their right to withdraw at any time? 
 
It will be stated in the first page along with the consent form that participants have the right to 
withdraw at any stage up to the completion of the survey. 
5.7  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 
data where appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
Participants will be informed that their data will be anonymous, securely stored and only used 
for the purpose stated in the briefing 
 
 
6. VULNERABLE PARTICIPANTS (Minors <18 years, and Vulnerable Adults) 
 
6.1  Are some or all of the participants: 
                                                     (Delete as applicable) 
Under the age of 16?    No          
 
Between the ages of 16 and 18?   No          
 
Vulnerable adults?  (See guidelines)  No          
If no to all, please proceed to section 7. 
If yes, please continue and consult guidelines for working with minors and/or 
vulnerable groups. 
 
6.2  Describe the vulnerability (for minors give age ranges) 
 
 
6.3  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
 
 





Please delete as applicable and explain below (See guidelines) 
For minors < 16 only:    Opt-in    Opt-out     
If opt-out, why? 
 
 
6.5a  Consent form(s) for minor/vulnerable adult attached 
 
Delete as applicable:              No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.5b Information sheet(s) for minor/vulnerable adult attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6a  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6b  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.7  How will parent/legal guardians, minors and/or vulnerable adults be made aware of 
their right to withdraw at any time? 
 
 
6.8  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 







Investigators working with children and vulnerable adults legally require 
clearance from the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 
6.9  Do ALL experimenters in contact with children and vulnerable adults have current 
DBS clearance?  Please include photocopies. 
 
Delete as applicable:                No                         Yes       
    




 7. PHYSICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
7.1  Will participants be at risk of physical harm (e.g. from electrodes, other 
equipment)?  (See guidelines) 
 
Delete as applicable:     No (Go to Q8)      Yes      
7.1a  If yes, please describe 
 
 
7.1b  What measures have been taken to minimise risk?  
 
 




8. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
8.1  Will participants be at risk of psychological harm (e.g. viewing explicit or 
emotionally sensitive material, being stressed, recounting traumatic events)?  (See 
guidelines) 
 





8.1a  If yes, please describe 
 
 
8.1b  What measures have been taken to minimise risk? 
 
 




 9.  RESEARCH OVER THE INTERNET 
 
9.1  Will research be carried out over the internet? 
 
Delete as applicable: Yes      
9.1a  If yes, please explain protocol in detail, including how informed consent will be 
obtained, procedures concerning the right to withdraw and how confidentiality will be 
maintained.  Give details of how you will guard against abuse by participants or others 
(see guidelines) 
Qualtrics.com will be used as online survey tool to distribute the survey. The user will 
be asked to read a consent form on the first page and agree to begin the survey. The 
user has the right to withdraw at any time by closing the page. No personal 
information will be collected at any stage and the response will be stored 
anonymously. All of the results will be used only for this research.  
 
 
9.1b Have you included the online version of questionnaire and information/consent 
form? This should be as close to the format which will be viewed on line as possible.  
 
Yes      
 
 
10. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & THIRD PARTY INTERESTS 
 
10.1  Do any of the experimenters have a conflict of interest?  (See guidelines) 
 





If yes, please describe 
 
 
10.1a  Are there any third parties involved?   (See guidelines) 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If yes, please describe 
 
 
10.1b  Do any of the third parties have a conflict of interest?   
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      




11. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 









12. ETHICAL PROTOCOL & DECLARATION 
 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, this research conforms to the ethical principles laid down 
by the University of Plymouth and by any professional body specified in section 10 above. 
 
This research conforms to the University’s Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human 
Participants with regard to openness and honesty, protection from harm, right to withdraw, 






Sign below where appropriate: 
 
STAFF / RESEARCH POSTGRADUATES 
 
     Print Name  Signature   Date 
 
Principal Investigator:  Aziz Alshehri                                 
20/07/2018 
 
Other researchers:  Prof Nathan Clarke______________________
 _____________ 
 
     Dr Fudong Li ______________________
 _____________ 
      
      
 
Staff and Research Postgraduates should email the completed and signed copy of this 




     Print Name   Signature  
 Date 
 
Student:      ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Supervisor / Advisor:     ______________________
 _____________ 
 
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 







Undergraduate students should pass on the completed and signed copy of this form to 
their School Representative of the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee. 
 
        Signature   Date 
 
School Representative on Science and 
Engineering Faculty Research Ethics Committee                ______________________
 _____________ 
Faculty of Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee List of School 
Representatives 
 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Dr Sanzidur Rahman 
     Dr Kim Ward 
 
School of Biological and Marine Sciences  Dr Gillian Glegg (Chair)
   
     Dr Victor Kuri  
 
School of Biomedical and Healthcare Sciences   Dr David J Price  
 
School of Engineering   Dr Liz Hodgkinson  
     
School of Computing, Electronics & Mathematics   Dr Mark Dixon 
     Dr Yinghui Wei  
 
External Representative   Prof Linda La Velle 
        
  
Lay Member   Rev. David Evans 
 
Committee Secretary:  Mrs Paula Simson   
Email: paula.simson@plymouth.ac.uk 

































































































































Appendix D – Consent Form for the System Evaluation 
 
UNIVERSITY OF PLYMOUTH  
 
FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING  
 
Human Ethics Committee Sample Consent Form 
 
CONSENT TO PARICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT / PRACTICAL STUDY 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Name of Principal Investigator 
Aziz Alshehri 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Title of Research  
 
A Holistic Framework for Enhancing Privacy Awareness 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Brief statement of purpose of work 
You are invited to participate in focus group discussion conducted by Aziz Alshehri as 
part of his project concerning the enhance privacy awareness in the mobile and how to 
manage privacy app in the mobile. The main purpose of the research is to design a 
system that considers users’ preferences and needs.   





The objectives of this research have been explained to me.   
 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any stage, and ask for my 
data to be destroyed if I wish.  
 






I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as far 
as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have been  
separately assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSHH regulations) 
  
Under these circumstances, I agree to participate in the research. 
 

















PLYMOUTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND  ENGINEERING 
 
Research Ethics & Integrity Committee 
 








This is a WORD document.  Please complete in WORD and extend space where 
necessary.  Clearly name any supporting documents and reference in the application.  
 
Postgraduate and Staff must submit a signed copy to 
SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
Undergraduate students should contact their School Representative of the Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics & Integrity Committee or dissertation advisor prior to 
completing this form to confirm the process within their School. 
 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics undergraduate students – 
please submit to SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk with your project supervisor 




4. TYPE OF PROJECT 
 
1.1   What is the type of project? 
 





STAFF Specific project  
Thematic programme of research  
Practical / Laboratory Class  
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS Taught Masters Project  
M.Phil / PhD by research X 
UNDERGRADUATE 
STUDENTS 
Student research project  
Practical / Laboratory class where 





2.1  TITLE of Research project 
 
A Holistic Framework for Enhancing Privacy Awareness 
2.2  Name, telephone number, e-mail address and position of applicant for this project 
(plus full details of Project Supervisor for postgraduate and undergraduate students)  
1- Aziz Alshehri (Research student)             aziz.alshehri@plymouth.ac.uk,      
+447453267227 
2- Prof Nathan Clarke (Director of Studies)    n.clarke@plymouth.ac.uk,           
+441752586226 
3- Fudong Li (Supervisor)                               fudong.li@port.ac.uk 
 
2.3  General summary of the proposed research for which ethical clearance is sought, 
briefly outlining the aims and objectives (no more than 200 words) 
The purpose of this research is to develop a novel approach to inform and manage privacy 
preferences in mobile applications.  This study aims to present the approach to end user for 




2.4  Physical site(s) where research will be carried out 
The University of Plymouth 
2.5  Does your research involve external institutions (e.g. other university, hospital, 
prison etc. see guidelines) 
Delete as applicable:   No             
2.5a  If yes, please give details: 
 
 
2.5b  If yes, you must provide  letter(s) from institutional heads permitting you to carry 







Delete as applicable:   No                   
If not, why not? 
 
2.6  Start and end date for research for which ethical clearance is sought (NB 
maximum period is 3 years) 
 
Start date: From date of ethical approval   End date: 1th September 
2019 
2.7 Has this same project received ethical approval from another Ethics Committee?  
Delete as applicable:  Yes             
2.7a  If yes, do you want Chair’s action? 
 
Delete as applicable:  No           





3.1  Describe (a) the procedures that participants will engage in, and (b) the methods 
used for data collection and recording 
- At least 5 end users will be invited in order to participate in a focus group session 
- The participants will be formally invited either in person or via e-mail. Once a 
participant initially accepted the invitation, the consent form will be signed by the 
participant. 
-  A summary of how the system works including a demo of the system will be 
presented to the participants in order to provide them with a better insight about how 
it works in the beginning of the focus group session. 
-  The discussion session will be promoted by asking a series of open-ended questions 
regarding the system and the designs in order to encourage the participants to enrich 
the discussion. 
-  The session will be recorded after having a permission of the participants, and 
transcribed afterward 
3.1a If surveying or interviewing, you must include your questionnaire(s) and interview 
schedule(s). 
Are these attached:                        
Delete as applicable:                                                             Yes 
  
3.2 How long will the procedures take? Give details 
One 1 hour approximately 





Delete as applicable:  No             
                                                   If no go to section 4                       
                                                   
Please explain why the following conditions apply to your research: 
3.3a   Deception is completely unavoidable if the purpose of the research is to be met 
 
3.3b   The research objective has strong scientific merit 
 
 
3.3c   Any potential harm arising from the proposed deception can be effectively 
neutralised or reversed by the proposed debriefing procedures  
 
 




 4.  BREAKDOWN OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
 4.1 Summary of participants 
 




























4.2  How were the sample sizes determined? 
Based upon prior studies of this nature. 
 
4.3  How will subjects be recruited? 
The participants will be recruited via e-mail or face-to-face invitation 
 




5. NON-VULNERABLE ADULTS 
 
5.1  Are some or all of the participants non-vulnerable adults? 
Delete as applicable:           Yes      
5.2  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
Participants who are 18 years old and above will be invited to participate in the focus group 
session. 
5.3  How will participants give informed consent? 
It will be stated in the briefing along with the consent form that participants have the right to 
withdraw at any stage up to the completion of the session. Should any participant wish to 
withdraw from the session, their discussion will be securely removed from the records and 
completely destroyed. 
5.4  Consent form(s) attached 
Delete as applicable:        Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
5.5  Information sheet(s) attached 
Delete as applicable:         Yes      







5.6  How will participants be made aware of their right to withdraw at any time? 
It will be stated in the briefing along with the consent form that participants have the right to 
withdraw at any stage up to the completion of the session. Should any participant to withdraw 
from the session, their discussion will be securely removed from the records and completely 
destroyed. 
5.7  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 
data where appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
No names will be used in the written report. Interviewees’ information will be kept confidential 
and be used by the researcher only. 
 
6. VULNERABLE PARTICIPANTS (Minors <18 years, and Vulnerable Adults) 
 
6.1  Are some or all of the participants: 
                                                     (Delete as applicable) 
Under the age of 16?    No          
 
Between the ages of 16 and 18?   No        
 
Vulnerable adults?  (See guidelines)  No          
If no to all, please proceed to section 7. 
If yes, please continue and consult guidelines for working with minors and/or 
vulnerable groups. 
 
6.2  Describe the vulnerability (for minors give age ranges) 
 
 
6.3  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
 
 
6.4  How will minors and vulnerable adults give informed consent? 
Please delete as applicable and explain below (See guidelines) 
For minors < 16 only:    Opt-in    Opt-out     
If opt-out, why? 
 
 






Delete as applicable:              No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.5b Information sheet(s) for minor/vulnerable adult attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6a  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6b  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.7  How will parent/legal guardians, minors and/or vulnerable adults be made aware of 
their right to withdraw at any time? 
 
 
6.8  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 
data where appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
Participants will be informed that they will be anonymous and the session will be recorded, 
securely stored within the Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research 
(CSCAN). They will also be only used for the purpose stated in the briefing. 
 
Investigators working with children and vulnerable adults legally require 





6.9  Do ALL experimenters in contact with children and vulnerable adults have current 
DBS clearance?  Please include photocopies. 
 
Delete as applicable:                No                                
   




 7. PHYSICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
7.1  Will participants be at risk of physical harm (e.g. from electrodes, other 
equipment)?  (See guidelines) 
Delete as applicable:     No (Go to Q8)          
7.1a  If yes, please describe 
 
 
7.1b  What measures have been taken to minimise risk?  
 
 




8. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
8.1  Will participants be at risk of psychological harm (e.g. viewing explicit or 
emotionally sensitive material, being stressed, recounting traumatic events)?  (See 
guidelines) 
Delete as applicable:  No    (Go to Q9)           
8.1a  If yes, please describe 
 
 











 9.  RESEARCH OVER THE INTERNET 
 
9.1  Will research be carried out over the internet? 
Delete as applicable:  No   (Go to Q10)            
9.1a  If yes, please explain protocol in detail, including how informed consent will be 
obtained, procedures concerning the right to withdraw and how confidentiality will be 





9.1b Have you included the online version of questionnaire and information/consent 
form? This should be as close to the format which will be viewed on line as possible.  
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
 
 
10. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & THIRD PARTY INTERESTS 
 
10.1  Do any of the experimenters have a conflict of interest?  (See guidelines) 
No 
Delete as applicable:  No           
If yes, please describe 
 
 
10.1a  Are there any third parties involved?   (See guidelines) 
 
Delete as applicable:  No     (Go to Q11)       







10.1b  Do any of the third parties have a conflict of interest?   
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      




11. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 









12. ETHICAL PROTOCOL & DECLARATION 
 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, this research conforms to the ethical principles laid down 
by the University of Plymouth and by any professional body specified in section 10 above. 
 
This research conforms to the University’s Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human 
Participants with regard to openness and honesty, protection from harm, right to withdraw, 
debriefing, confidentiality, and informed consent. 
 
Sign below where appropriate: 
 
STAFF / RESEARCH POSTGRADUATES 
 
     Print Name  Signature   Date 
 






Other researchers:  Prof Nathan Clark ______________________
 _____________ 
 
     Dr Fudong Li ______________________
 _____________ 
      
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Staff and Research Postgraduates should email the completed and signed copy of this 




     Print Name   Signature  
 Date 
 
Student:      ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Supervisor / Advisor:     ______________________
 _____________ 
 
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Undergraduate students should pass on the completed and signed copy of this form to 
their School Representative of the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee. 
 
        Signature   Date 
 
School Representative on Science and 
Engineering Faculty Research Ethics & Integrity  
Committee                     ______________________
 _____________ 





Faculty of Science and Engineering Research Ethics & Integrity Committee List 
of School Representatives 
 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Dr Sanzidur Rahman 
 
School of Biological and Marine Sciences  Dr Gillian Glegg (Chair)
   
     Dr Victor Kuri  
 
School of Biomedical Sciences                                             Dr David J Price  
 
School of Engineering   Dr Asiya Khan   
     Mr Chris Pollard  
     
School of Computing, Electronics & Mathematics   Dr Mark Dixon 
     Dr Yinghui Wei  
 
Doctoral College, Deputy Director   Prof Steven Furnell  
 
External Representative   Dr Satish B K  
        
  
Lay Member   Rev. David V. Evans 
Committee Secretary:  Mr Steven Neal   
Email: steven.neal@plymouth.ac.uk 






Appendix F – End Users Questions for the System Evaluation 
1. To what extent do you think the proposed system enhances your awareness 
about privacy-related information? 
2. To what extent do you feel the main dashboard allow you to quickly control 
and track the privacy-related information? 
3. To what extent do you think that the structure of the proposed design is 
convenient and usable? 
4. To what extent do you feel the layout and the format are convenient and 
usable? 
5. To what extent are you satisfied with the used colours? 
6. To what extent do you think the proposed system are easy to use? 
7. To what extent do you feel that it is easy to understand components and 
features of each interface of the system? 
8. What do you feel are the particular strengths & weaknesses of the 
developed system? 
9. Would you like to suggest anything you feel is missing from the system? 










1. What are your thoughts of the identified research problem? 
2. To what extent do you think the proposed system is feasible 
/achievable /practical? 
3. What do you think about the three-level approach? That is; novice, 
intermediate and advanced? More/less levels? 
4. What do you feel are the key barriers or issues in using this approach? 
5. To what extent do think the utilisation of the following functions in the 
proposed approach could enhance the user’s awareness about 
privacy-related information?   
a. Historical privacy 
b. Controling privacy 
c. Notification 
6. What do you think about monitoring users privacy-related 
information? 
7. The privacy-related information is prioritised based on users privacy 
preferences. To what extent do you think this prioritisation could 
make the system more flexible and usable? 
8. To what extent do you feel the main dashboard allow you to quickly 
control and track the use of privacy-related information? 
9. To what extent do you think that the structure of the proposed design, 
the layout and the format are convenient and usable? 
10. To what extent are you satisfied with the used colours? 
11. To what extent do you think the proposed system is easy to use? 
12. To what extent do you feel that it is easy to understand components 
and features of each interface of the system? 
13. What do you feel are the particular strengths & weaknesses of the 
developed system? 
14. Would you like to suggest anything you feel is missing from the 
system? 






Appendix H –Ethical Approval for the System Evaluation 
(Experts) 
 
PLYMOUTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SCIENCE AND  ENGINEERING 
 
Research Ethics & Integrity Committee 
 








This is a WORD document.  Please complete in WORD and extend space where 
necessary.  Clearly name any supporting documents and reference in the application.  
 
Postgraduate and Staff must submit a signed copy to 
SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
Undergraduate students should contact their School Representative of the Science and 
Engineering Research Ethics & Integrity Committee or dissertation advisor prior to 
completing this form to confirm the process within their School. 
 
School of Computing, Electronics and Mathematics undergraduate students – 
please submit to SciEngHumanEthics@plymouth.ac.uk with your project supervisor 




7. TYPE OF PROJECT 
 
1.1   What is the type of project? 
 
Applicant Type Put X in 1 only 





Thematic programme of research  
Practical / Laboratory Class  
POSTGRADUATE STUDENTS Taught Masters Project  
M.Phil / PhD by research X 
UNDERGRADUATE 
STUDENTS 
Student research project  
Practical / Laboratory class where 





2.1  TITLE of Research project 
 
A Holistic Framework for Enhancing Privacy Awareness 
2.2  Name, telephone number, e-mail address and position of applicant for this project 
(plus full details of Project Supervisor for postgraduate and undergraduate students)  
4- Aziz Alshehri (Research student)             aziz.alshehri@plymouth.ac.uk,      
+447453267227 
5- Prof Nathan Clarke (Director of Studies)    n.clarke@plymouth.ac.uk,           
+441752586226 
6- Fudong Li (Supervisor)                               fudong.li@port.ac.uk 
 
2.3  General summary of the proposed research for which ethical clearance is sought, 
briefly outlining the aims and objectives (no more than 200 words) 
The purpose of this research is to develop a novel approach to inform and manage privacy 
preferences in mobile applications.  This study aims to present the approach to experts in the 
field for evaluation. This would be achieved through a focus-group based activity lasting for 
an hour approximately. 
2.4  Physical site(s) where research will be carried out 
The student is attending and presenting a paper at HAISA 2019 
 conference and will use the opportunity to host a focus-group whilst present (with the 
assistance of the supervision team in making appropriate contact with delegates). 
 
2.5  Does your research involve external institutions (e.g. other university, hospital, 
prison etc. see guidelines) 
Delete as applicable:   No             
2.5a  If yes, please give details: 
 
 
2.5b  If yes, you must provide  letter(s) from institutional heads permitting you to carry 







Delete as applicable:   No                   
If not, why not? 
 
2.6  Start and end date for research for which ethical clearance is sought (NB 
maximum period is 3 years) 
 
Start date: From date of ethical approval   End date: 1th September 
2019 
2.7 Has this same project received ethical approval from another Ethics Committee?  
Delete as applicable:  Yes      
2.7a  If yes, do you want Chair’s action? 
 
Delete as applicable:  No           





3.1  Describe (a) the procedures that participants will engage in, and (b) the methods 
used for data collection and recording 
 
 At least 5 experts that have experience and qualification related to the research 
project will be invited in order to participate in a focus group session 
 The experts will be formally invited either in person or via e-mail. 
 Once an expert initially accepted the invitation, the consent form will be signed by the 
participant. 
 A summary of how the system works including a demo of the system will be 
presented to the participants in order to provide them with a better insight about how 
it works in the beginning of the focus group session. 
 The discussion session would be promoted by asking a series of open-ended 
questions regarding the system and the designs in order to encourage the 
participants to enrich the discussion. 
 The session will be recorded after having a permission of the participants, and 
transcribed afterwards 
 
3.1a If surveying or interviewing, you must include your questionnaire(s) and interview 
schedule(s). 
Are these attached:                        






3.2 How long will the procedures take? Give details 
One 1 hour approximately 
3.3  Does your research involve deception? 
Delete as applicable:  No             
                                                   If no go to section 4                       
                                                   
Please explain why the following conditions apply to your research: 
3.3a   Deception is completely unavoidable if the purpose of the research is to be met 
 
3.3b   The research objective has strong scientific merit 
 
 
3.3c   Any potential harm arising from the proposed deception can be effectively 
neutralised or reversed by the proposed debriefing procedures  
 
 




 4.  BREAKDOWN OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
 4.1 Summary of participants 
 




























4.2  How were the sample sizes determined? 
Based upon prior studies of this nature. 
 
4.3  How will subjects be recruited? 
The participants will be recruited via e-mail or face-to-face invitation 
 




5. NON-VULNERABLE ADULTS 
 
5.1  Are some or all of the participants non-vulnerable adults? 
Delete as applicable: Yes      
5.2  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
The participants will be recruited via e-mail and face-to-face invitation. 
5.3  How will participants give informed consent? 
The participants will be given the consent to sign at the beginning of the session, should they 
wish to carry out the study. It will be also ensured that they understand their right to withdraw 
from the session at any time up until the end of their participation. 
  
5.4  Consent form(s) attached 
Delete as applicable:        Yes      







5.5  Information sheet(s) attached 
Delete as applicable:         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
5.6  How will participants be made aware of their right to withdraw at any time? 
It will be stated in the briefing along with the consent form that participants have the right to 
withdraw at any stage up to the completion of the session. Should any participant wish to 
withdraw from the session, their discussion will be securely removed from the records and 
completely destroyed. 
5.7  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 
data where appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
No names will be used in the written report. Interviewees’ information will be kept confidential 
and be used by the researcher only.  
 
6. VULNERABLE PARTICIPANTS (Minors <18 years, and Vulnerable Adults) 
 
6.1  Are some or all of the participants: 
                                                     (Delete as applicable) 
Under the age of 16?    No          
 
Between the ages of 16 and 18?   No        
 
Vulnerable adults?  (See guidelines)  No          
If no to all, please proceed to section 7. 
If yes, please continue and consult guidelines for working with minors and/or 
vulnerable groups. 
 
6.2  Describe the vulnerability (for minors give age ranges) 
 
 
6.3  Inclusion / exclusion criteria 
 
 
6.4  How will minors and vulnerable adults give informed consent? 
Please delete as applicable and explain below (See guidelines) 
For minors < 16 only:    Opt-in    Opt-out     







6.5a  Consent form(s) for minor/vulnerable adult attached 
 
Delete as applicable:              No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.5b Information sheet(s) for minor/vulnerable adult attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6a  Consent form(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.6b  Information sheet(s) for parent / legal guardian attached 
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
If no, why not? 
 
 
6.7  How will parent/legal guardians, minors and/or vulnerable adults be made aware of 
their right to withdraw at any time? 
 
 
6.8  How will confidentiality be maintained, including archiving / destruction of primary 
data where appropriate, and how will the security of the data be maintained? 
Experts will be informed that they will be anonymous and the session will be recorded, 
securely stored within the Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research 






Investigators working with children and vulnerable adults legally require 
clearance from the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) 
6.9  Do ALL experimenters in contact with children and vulnerable adults have current 
DBS clearance?  Please include photocopies. 
 
Delete as applicable:                No                                
   




 7. PHYSICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
7.1  Will participants be at risk of physical harm (e.g. from electrodes, other 
equipment)?  (See guidelines) 
No 
Delete as applicable:     No (Go to Q8)          
7.1a  If yes, please describe 
 
 
7.1b  What measures have been taken to minimise risk?  
 
 




8. PSYCHOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
8.1  Will participants be at risk of psychological harm (e.g. viewing explicit or 
emotionally sensitive material, being stressed, recounting traumatic events)?  (See 
guidelines) 
No 
Delete as applicable:  No    (Go to Q9)           







8.1b  What measures have been taken to minimise risk? 
 
 




 9.  RESEARCH OVER THE INTERNET 
 
9.1  Will research be carried out over the internet? 
No 
Delete as applicable:  No   (Go to Q10)            
9.1a  If yes, please explain protocol in detail, including how informed consent will be 
obtained, procedures concerning the right to withdraw and how confidentiality will be 





9.1b Have you included the online version of questionnaire and information/consent 
form? This should be as close to the format which will be viewed on line as possible.  
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      
 
 
10. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & THIRD PARTY INTERESTS 
 
10.1  Do any of the experimenters have a conflict of interest?  (See guidelines) 
No 
Delete as applicable:  No           
If yes, please describe 
 
 






Delete as applicable:  No     (Go to Q11)       
If yes, please describe 
 
 
10.1b  Do any of the third parties have a conflict of interest?   
 
Delete as applicable:  No         Yes      




11. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
 









12. ETHICAL PROTOCOL & DECLARATION 
 
To the best of our knowledge and belief, this research conforms to the ethical principles laid down 
by the University of Plymouth and by any professional body specified in section 10 above. 
 
This research conforms to the University’s Ethical Principles for Research Involving Human 
Participants with regard to openness and honesty, protection from harm, right to withdraw, 
debriefing, confidentiality, and informed consent. 
 
Sign below where appropriate: 
 






     Print Name  Signature   Date 
 
Principal Investigator:  Aziz Alshehri ___ ________ _____________ 
 
Other researchers:  Prof Nathan Clark ______________________
 _____________ 
 
     Dr Fudong Li ______________________
 _____________ 
      
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Staff and Research Postgraduates should email the completed and signed copy of this 




     Print Name   Signature  
 Date 
 
Student:      ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Supervisor / Advisor:     ______________________
 _____________ 
 
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
        ______________________
 _____________ 
 
Undergraduate students should pass on the completed and signed copy of this form to 
their School Representative of the Science and Engineering Research Ethics Committee. 
 






School Representative on Science and 
Engineering Faculty Research Ethics & Integrity  
Committee                     ______________________
 _____________ 
   
Faculty of Science and Engineering Research Ethics & Integrity Committee List 
of School Representatives 
 
School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences Dr Sanzidur Rahman 
 
School of Biological and Marine Sciences  Dr Gillian Glegg (Chair)
   
     Dr Victor Kuri  
 
School of Biomedical Sciences                                             Dr David J Price  
 
School of Engineering   Dr Asiya Khan   
     Mr Chris Pollard  
     
School of Computing, Electronics & Mathematics   Dr Mark Dixon 
     Dr Yinghui Wei  
 
Doctoral College, Deputy Director   Prof Steven Furnell  
 
External Representative   Dr Satish B K  
        
  
Lay Member   Rev. David V. Evans 
 
Committee Secretary:  Mr Steven Neal   
Email: steven.neal@plymouth.ac.uk 
Tel: 01752 584877 
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